The History of Anatolia and of the Hittite Empire: An Overview

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ANATOLIA IS A LAND of strong contrasts. It is geographically diverse; the high semiarid central plateau is bordered on the north and south by mountain ranges beyond which lie isolated and narrow coastal plains, often difficult of access through the mountains. Toward the west, wide river valleys leading to the Aegean coast give a more gentle climate and a richer agricultural yield. To the east, the land rises and becomes much more rugged, with long, hard winters and much less potential for human exploitation. Almost everywhere the nature of the terrain makes travel difficult, and settlements have always been concentrated in those often limited areas where there is a dependable water supply.

This geographical diversity is inevitably reflected in the political patterns of Anatolia. The natural political unit of the area, dictated by the terrain, is the small, independent, self-sufficient state, and if a state did at any time cherish expansionist and imperialistic ambitions, the physical difficulties involved in conquering and retaining control of distant and diverse territories were enormous. Thus, although from time to time, as we shall see, attempts at large-scale control were made, long-term success was not achieved without constant effort, and even the strongest and most stable states eventually broke down under the strain. For this reason, it is impossible to provide an overview of Anatolian history in the second and first millennia BCE that takes the form of a continuous narrative of the fortunes of a single power. Rather, this review must largely be a kaleidoscope of ever-changing political patterns, with different states emerging into greater prominence at different times as various internal and external factors play their part in determining the history of the area. Only the geographical factors remain constant.

ANATOLIA, CIRCA 2000–1750 BCE

Archaeological evidence does indeed suggest that Anatolia at the end of the third millennium was divided, as it had been since the early settlements of the Neolithic period approximately three thousand years before, into a large number of small political units, each centered on a castle-like fortified settlement a few acres in extent, and in all probability controlling only a very limited amount of territory surrounding that settlement. But there are signs that by 2000 BCE a different, more "urban" type of settlement, with residential areas and public buildings, was beginning to make its appearance on the plateau.



Fig. 1. Plan of Khattusha at its zenith in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries as the capital of the Hittite Empire. The plan reveals excavations up to 1992. ADAPTED FROM PETER NEVE, "DIE AUSGRABUNGEN IN BOĞAZKÖY-HATTUŠA 1992," *ARCHÄGLOGISCHER ANZEIGER* 4 (1993)

Shortly after 2000, many of these settlements developed rapidly into what can only be described as "cities," the truly urban centers of what are in political terms independent city-states. Sites such as Kültepe (ancient Kanesh), Boğazköy (ancient Khattusha), Alişar (pronounced Alishar), Acemhüyük (pronounced Ajemhuyuk), Karahüyük-Konya in central Anatolia, and Beycesultan (pronounced Beyjesultan) toward the southwest average some fifty to seventy acres (twenty to thirty hectares) in extent by this period. (Contemporary Troy, in the northwest, which maintained the older castle-form, covers three or four acres at most.) Signs are plentiful of urban layout and large public or administrative buildings. By this point, the reasons for such growth, with its accompanying increase in prosperity, are becoming clearer. They are to be found in the increasing demand for the natural resources of the Anatolian region and in the increasing ability of local rulers to exploit these resources to their advantage.

Metals and Metal Trade

The third millennium, in archaeological terms, is the Early Bronze Age. Although Anatolian metal ores had been used as far back as about 7000, it was only in the Early Bronze Age that there was a marked increase in their exploitation and an increased mastery of more complicated metallurgical processes. Thus, there emerged an increasing demand for metal ores and metal products, not only in Anatolia itself but also in areas, particularly to the southeast in Syria and Mesopotamia, where urban societies were already well developed but local sources of metals were lacking. Even in the late fourth millennium there is ample evidence for south Mesopotamian trading interest reaching as far to the northeast as the Turkish section of the Euphrates Valley, and there is reason to believe that by the second half of the third millennium southern Mesopotamian merchants were operating as far from home as central Anatolia. It may well be that the concept of the city-state reached the area together with the arrival of such merchant communities and that the wealth created by the trade provided the means to put the idea into practice—hence the rise of city-states, their prosperity based on trade and industry, and their citizens increasingly drawn into larger urban settlements.

By the Middle Bronze Age (roughly the early second millennium), many such sizable and prosperous urban communities had emerged. It is our good fortune that some of them (especially Kültepe, but to a lesser extent Boğazköy and Alişar) have yielded written evidence that enables us to see in greater detail what was going on and how the system worked. Clearly, the great stimulus to the central Anatolian economy was provided by the presence of merchants from distant Asshur (modern Qalat Sharqat) in northern Mesopotamia. The activities of these Assyrian merchants need not be described in detail here; at this point, it is sufficient to say that the movement of metals had an important part to play in the system, with tin being imported into Anatolia and silver and gold being exported to Asshur. It is important to stress the two-way nature of this movement. The Anatolians certainly had control of commodities that were essential to the outside world; but there were other commodities, such as tin for bronze making, that were equally essential to their own well-being and were available to them only through contact with areas outside their boundaries. Investigations have established the presence of tin ores closer to home in the Taurus Mountains. Thus, we have to assume either that the local ores were, for geological or political reasons, not available to the central Anatolian states or that the imported tin, which was cassiterite rather than stannite, was preferable to the local ores because it enabled bronze workers to adjust the proportion of tin in their alloys more accurately. But whatever the reason for this neglect of local tin may have been, it is clear that the connection with Syria, and through Syria with Mesopotamia, was vital to the continuing prosperity of the central Anatolian states. As a result these states were inexorably drawn into the complicated web of international near eastern politics. The history of Anatolia in the second millennium cannot, therefore, be treated in isolation. The area was by then an essential part of an international system, and for much of that period it had a vital role to play within that system. (See also "Kanesh: An Assyrian Colony in Anatolia" earlier in this volume and "Mining and Metalwork in Ancient Western Asia" in Part 7, Vol. III.)

Western Anatolia

In western Anatolia the picture is less clear. There are no signs of Assyrian mercantile penetration farther west than the Konya Plain, but the rich urban site of Beycesultan in the upper Maeander (modern Menderes) Valley suggests that in this area, too, local people were enjoying the fruits of economic well-being. We may guess that Beycesultan formed part of a west Anatolian trading network, perhaps with Aegean connections, dealing possibly in agricultural produce and other commodities that are difficult to recognize in the archaeological record.

The End of the Merchant Colonies

The pattern of life then that emerges for Anatolia in the earlier part of the second millennium is one based on independent urban communities and peaceful interstate and international trade. Despite the apparent advantages of a system of independent units and cooperative trade relations, by about 1750 the whole system had collapsed. The reasons are by no means clear. It

may have been caused, at least in part, by local interstate rivalry. We know, for instance, that shortly after 1800, Pitkhana, the ruler of a state called Kusshar somewhere on the central plateau, extended his influence to Kanesh (the site now known as Kültepe) and that his son and successor, Anitta, later made Kanesh his capital. A continuing policy of aggression resulted in the destruction of Khattush (later Khattusha) and a seesaw series of campaigns against Zalpa, a state on the Black Sea coast near modern Bafra. At the end of these efforts, Anitta felt able to claim the title "Great King." Unfortunately, the documentary evidence fails us at this point, and we do not know what happened to this expansionist monarch. A spearhead with the inscription "palace of Anitta the king" has been found in a large burned building at Kanesh, and it may therefore be that this building was Anitta's palace and that its owner perished in its destruction. If that is the case, the burning may well have been the work of a rival state, very possibly the constant enemy Zalpa. This debilitating period of internal Anatolian rivalry unfortunately coincided with the increased pressure on the trade routes and on Asshur itself exerted by Hurrians to the north and Amorites to the west and south. As a result, the essential trading contacts were lost, and with this loss, the communities that had depended on them went into rapid decline. In fact, very few of the dominant Anatolian states of the earlier part of the second millennium retained any importance in the later years of that millennium. At some indeed, such as Acemhüyük and Karahüyük-Konya, there is little or no sign that they were even occupied in the later period. Clearly, the way of life that had led to their growth had radically changed.

THE HITTITE OLD KINGDOM

Following the decline of the mid-eighteenth century, a new pattern emerged that had at its center Khattusha, which had played a part, though a comparatively minor one, in the network of trading states of the earlier period. As we have seen, however, it was destroyed by Anitta, who even laid a curse on the site to ensure that it would never be occupied again. A hundred years after Anitta's sack of the city, the resettlement of the site was to mark the rise of a power that would have a central part to play in the near eastern political world for almost five hundred years.

Khattusha is situated on the north-central part of the plateau, where a convenient rocky outcrop offers an excellent site for a ruler's citadel, with reasonably level ground for lesser citizens below (see figs. 1 and 2). Yet, apart from the defensible nature of the citadel, it offers few natural advantages. It controls no valuable local products, nor does it lie particularly close to important natural routes. But one vital thing its new rulers apparently did have—their ability to learn from the years of strife and turbulence that had preceded their arrival. Peaceful coexistence, the key to the prosperity of the previous period, was no longer possible. In this new climate, too many people were fighting for too few natural resources, and the way to success and prosperity required dominating one's neighbors rather than cooperating with them. Aggressive imperialism, one could say, was about to rear its ugly head in central Anatolia.

International Imperialism

Outside Anatolia things were changing in the same way. In Mesopotamia, for instance, even in the second half of the third millennium, rulers like Sargon and Naram-Sin of Akkad had built short-lived "empires" that extended over what is now Iraq and Syria, with some attempts to enlarge them even beyond those borders. And although, as we have seen, the merchants of Asshur in the early second millennium succeeded in following a policy of cooperation, the later years of the trading system brought interstate rivalry to Mesopotamia as well, which resulted finally in the emergence of rulers with strong imperialistic ambitions. Indeed, the rise of truly international trading networks fueled the flames of imperialism. Dominance, whether by military or by political means, had to be extended until it ensured the supply of those products that made imperialistic control possible. Thus, the desire for dominance could not be contained within the natural boundaries of Anatolia or Mesopotamia. As the situation developed, even Egypt, a power that previously had little to do with such northerly areas, began increasingly to enter the murky waters of international politics. The stage was set for a power struggle on what was for the combatants a worldwide scale.

Khattushili I: The Founding of the Hittite Kingdom

The choice of Khattusha on the northern part of the plateau as the center of a new state might at first seem rather surprising. Indeed, it may have been dictated more by local considerations, particularly the presence of hostile peoples immediately to the north, than by any vision of future near eastern greatness. It may well have been this local danger that about 1650 prompted an ambitious local ruler, possibly a minor member of the old royal family of Kusshar, to decide that strategic considerations were of greater importance than the curse of Anitta and to build a new fortress on the long-deserted but naturally defensible site. To celebrate the occasion, he adopted the throne name Khattushili or "man of Khattusha," and thus he emerged into history as the founder of what we now call the Hittite Old Kingdom. There is in the Hittite tradition an earlier monarch known as Labarna, who adopted Khattushili as his son. But little or nothing is known of him; he probably did not rule from Khattusha, and indeed, some scholars doubt his very existence. It is Khattushili who must be regarded as the first true Hittite monarch.

Early Hittite Expansion

Once his northern base was secured, Khattushili set about the implementation of his wider policy by the conquest of those cities which lay between his capital and the route to the southeast through the Cilician Gates. When this was achieved, he could reach the Mediterranean Sea and advance toward northern Syria, the focal point of the majority of near eastern trade routes. In this area, the most important power at the time was Halab (Aleppo), then the capital of Yamkhad, and all the Hittite monarch's efforts were concentrated on weakening this state, particularly by the capture of Alalakh (modern Tell Atchana), Halab's outlet to the sea. But before he could complete the job, his attention was diverted toward a completely different area.

His concentration on the southeast had meant that not enough attention was being paid to possible danger from other directions, and it was in fact toward western Anatolia that he was now forced to turn. Here the enemy was the state of Arzawa, a country of which little is known, except from Hittite sources; indeed, its very location is still a matter of dispute, with some scholars placing it in the southwest in what was later Lycia and Pamphylia, while others set it on the central part of the west coast, stretching inland to include what in a later period was Lydia. But wherever its location, it is clear that Arzawa was an important power, on at least an equal footing with the emergent Hittite state. Its control of large portions of western Anatolia was a constant block to any Hittite ambitions for expansion in that direction and for possible contact with the rich markets of the Aegean world and even the Balkans. On this occasion, Khattushili's campaign seems to have been successful, and soon he was able to turn eastward again to deal with an attack that had almost succeeded in capturing Khattusha itself. Within a few years he had reached the Euphrates again. But still he failed to defeat Halab. He may, in fact, have received a mortal wound in the attempt to do so.

Murshili I: The Capture of Babylon

Khattushili's death left the realization of Hittite plans to his grandson and successor, Murshili, whose success was both speedy and spectacular. Not only did Halab fall to Hittite arms, but Murshili was persuaded to advance even farther into enemy territory. Far down the Euphrates lay Babylon, a city that almost two hundred years earlier had established its position as the leading power of southern Mesopotamia under its great king Hammurabi. Although under his successors its power and influence had greatly decreased, Babylon was still a name with which to contend in the near eastern world. Spurred on by his raid against Halab, Murshili advanced downriver, and in 1595, Babylon collapsed before the Hittite assault. There was no doubt that a new international power had arrived on the scene, the Hurrians. (See also "The Kingdom of Mitanni in Second-Millenium Upper Mesopotamia" later in this volume.)

Collapse of Hittite Power

Soon it became clear that the Hittites had overreached themselves. Conquest on this scale would have required a level of administrative structure that was still largely lacking in Khattusha. The absence of the king also gave other

members of the royal family the opportunity to plot against him. When he abandoned Babylon and returned homeward to try to deal with these domestic problems, he was assassinated by his brother-in-law Khantili. The result was a disaster for Hittite fortunes. Under Khantili and his successors Zidanta, Ammuna, and Khuzziya, there was a succession of dynastic coups, the Syrian conquests were lost, Arzawa in the west broke away and regained its independence, and to the north the Kashka people—tribal groups living in the Pontus Mountains and along the Black Sea coast—were able to advance to within a few miles of Khattusha. Hittite dominance in the Near East, it seemed, had been very short-lived indeed.

Telipinu: Partial Revival

The accession of Telipinu, just before 1500, marks a partial revival of Hittite fortunes. Although he made no attempt to expand beyond the confines of the Anatolian Plateau, he did achieve a number of victories in the Anti-Taurus region. He also concluded a diplomatic alliance with the ruler of Kizzuwatna (in the area later called Cilicia), a power on the southeastern edge of the plateau whose cooperation was vital if any future attempt to attack northern Syria were to be made. More important than that, he made strenuous efforts to regularize the system of royal succession and thus eliminate the problems that had beset the dynasty since the murder of Murshili.

As it turned out, Telipinu's efforts were largely in vain, for he died without sons and his reign was followed by about fifty further years of weakness and dynastic strife. The kingship, it seems, passed in rapid succession to Takhurwaili, Alluwamna, Khantili II, Zidanta II, Khuzziya II, and Muwattalli I, none of whom achieved anything of note. In fact, the period is so obscure that their order—and, in some cases, even their existence—is very much open to question. Some scholars, for instance, see Takhurwaili as a rebel who seized the throne for a time during the reign of Telipinu. Some view Zidanta, Khuzziya, and Muwattalli as regional rulers under a slightly later monarch. The whole of this period is still unclear and open to varying interpretations.

Khattusha: A Symbol of Achievement

Such problems must not, however, be allowed to obscure what the more successful monarchs of the Hittite Old Kingdom achieved. This can perhaps best be seen if we consider again the question of settlement size. The cities of the period of the Assyrian merchants, at sixty or seventy acres (twenty-four to twenty-eight hectares), were, as we have seen, large by previous standards. But for a power with international aspirations, something larger and grander was to be desired. So we can see that shortly after the conquest of Babylon, Khattusha had grown to cover an area of more than a hundred acres (forty hectares), and was enclosed by a city wall nearly twenty feet (six meters) high and twenty-three feet (seven meters) thick. There is nothing to suggest that in the less successful times that followed was there any great reduction in its size. Despite internal setbacks, the city remained a symbol of power and political ambitions; it lacked only a monarch who could translate these ambitions into action. (See also "Resurrecting the Hittites" in Part 11, Vol. IV.)

THE HITTITE EMPIRE

Tudkhaliya I: Revival of Hittite Power

The accession of Tudkhaliya I (about 1450) seemed likely to provide a strong and determined monarch. The beginning of his reign was nonetheless inauspicious; Kizzuwatna, which under his predecessors had been bound by treaty to the Hittites, was seized by the rival power of Mitanni in northern Syria. It remained for some years under Mitannian control. Tudkhaliya was, however, able to quell a Mitannian-inspired rebellion in Ishuwa, a border area situated within the great bend of the Euphrates, and thus he kept the Mitannian threat in check. He was also able to turn his attention to the west, where he defeated Arzawa, which had been outside the Hittite orbit since the time of Khattushili I, as well as an otherwise unattested area known as the land of Asshuwa.

Even in the west, however, all was not entirely well, for there was an annoying incident in which Madduwatta, a local ruler who favored

the Hittite cause, was driven from his country by someone called Attarshiya, described as "a man of Akkhiya." To the north, too, there were problems, and the Kashka peoples toward the Black Sea coast had to be driven back from the Hittite heartland. Finally, Kizzuwatna was defeated and relinked by treaty to the Hittite realm; a treaty of friendship was in all probability arranged with Egypt; and Tudkhaliya was able to mount a campaign against northern Syria, which showed such strength that Halab was persuaded to accept Hittite sovereignty. Not long afterward, however, as Mitanni and Egypt drew closer together in the face of the Hittite menace, Halab turned back to Mitanni. Tudkhaliya was quick to react, and soon both Halab and Mitanni were defeated. It must have seemed that the Hittites were once again a power of international status.

Renewed Weakness

Despite the success of Tudkhaliya, Arnuwanda I (circa 1420–1400), who had for some years been coregent with his elderly father, encountered renewed problems with the Kashka people. At their hands, many important cult centers were plundered. To the west, too, there was trouble; Madduwatta and Attarshiya had now joined forces and were able to take over the whole of Arzawa. At home Arnuwanda confronted a murderous power struggle. And in the southeast, even a dispatch of officials and troops to impose severe penalties for sedition was insufficient to stop Kizzuwatna's transferring its allegiance once more to Mitanni.

The appointment soon after of Arnuwanda's son, Tudkhaliya II, to the coregency was followed by a victory over Mitanni, but when Tudkhaliya succeeded to the full kingship (circa 1400) the decline gathered pace. Throughout the lands under Hittite control, there were rebellions, backed by the hostile kingdoms that bordered those lands. Armies from the Kashka lands in the north, Azzi in the northeast, Ishuwa to the east, Armatana to the southeast, Arzawa to the west, and Arawanna to the northwest all closed in on Khattusha. In the end, the city was captured and burned to the ground. This at least was how a later generation remembered the period, although excavation at the site has revealed no sign of destruction at the appropriate level.

But whether or not Khattusha was put to the torch, it is abundantly clear that its neighbors and rivals considered its power to be at an end. The king of Arzawa, for instance, now felt free to ignore any Hittite pretensions and to stake his own claim as an international power. Thus, he entered into correspondence with Amenhotep (Amenophis) III of Egypt regarding a marriage alliance between his family and that of the pharaoh. Unfortunately for him, his scribes could not cope with Akkadian, the international language of the time, and he was forced to write—and ask for a reply—in Hittite. This cannot have impressed the Egyptian ruler, and there is no evidence that any marriage ever took place. But news of the Hittite collapse had certainly reached Egypt, as Amenhotep made clear in his reply to the Arzawan king's request. "I have heard," he wrote, "that everything is finished, and that the Land of Khatti has perished." Arzawa was in the end unable to profit from the situation, but there are abundant signs that the collapse did indeed seem to be final.

Shuppiluliuma I: Founder of the Empire

In spite of these defeats early in the fourteenth century, before the death of Tudkhaliya II (about 1380), the Hittite army was able to mount a new campaign against Mitanni. A prominent part was played by Shuppiluliuma, one of the king's sons, in this effort. The result was disastrous for the Hittites, however, and Tushratta, the Mitannian king, was able to forward a sample of Hittite booty to his friend the pharaoh of Egypt. Nevertheless, this campaign and other more successful ones to the north and east of Khattusha must have played a part in establishing the reputation of the young general. Indeed, when his father died soon after and was succeeded by another son, Tudkhaliya III, a coup was staged by a group of senior officers who murdered the new king and elevated Shuppiluliuma in his place. Unethical though the move may have been, it proved to be a vital one in the reestablishment of Hittite power.

Conquest of Northern Syria

Shuppiluliuma's first priority after his accession (circa 1380) was to consolidate his Anatolian

The Predecessors of Shuppiluliuma I

The number, order, and dating of the predecessors of Shuppiluliuma I, as in the case of Telipinu's successors, are matters that have long raised many problems and produced many different solutions. An example of these differences can be seen in the charts published by O. R. Gurney in *The Hittites* (1990), p. 181, and R. L. Gorny in *Biblical Archaeologist* 52, nos. 2–3 (June–September 1989), p. 64. Difficulties are raised by the Hittite sources (or lack of them); furthermore, much depends on datable links with Egypt, where many dates were considerably lowered in the 1970s and 1980s.

Gurney		Gorny	
• Tahurwailis(?)		• Tahurwaili(?)	
• Alluwamnas		• Alluwamna	
• Hantilis II		• Hantili II	
• Zidantas II	1500–1420	• Zidanta II	1500–1450
• Huzziyas II		• Huzziya II	
• Muwatallis I(?)		• Muwattalli	
• Tudhaliyas I(?)	1420–1400	• Tudhaliya II	1450–1420
• Hattusilis II(?)	1400–1390	• Arnuwanda I	1420–1400
• Tudhaliyas II	1390–1370	• Tudhaliya III	1400–1380
• Arnuwandas I	1370–1355	• Tudhaliya (the younger)	1380?
• Tudhaliyas III	1355–1344	• Hattusili II(?)	
• Suppiluliumas I	1344–1322	• Suppiluliuma I	1380–1340

The term "Middle Kingdom" has been applied by some to the period between the reigns of Telipinu and Shuppiluliuma I and limited by others to the years between the accession of Tudkhaliya I (II) and that of Shuppiluliuma I. Still others see little point in giving the period, however defined, a separate name, and that is the policy followed in this chapter.

realms. This undertaking occupied the first twenty years of his reign and included campaigns against Azzi, the Kashka lands, and Arzawa. Toward the end of that period, he felt sufficiently secure to enter the international field once more. Taking advantage of the fact that Egypt was now ruled by the "heretic" pharaoh Akhenaten (Amenhotep IV), who systematically neglected his Syrian allies and vassals, Shuppiluliuma angered Tushratta by making an agreement with a rival claimant to the Mitannian throne and then by mounting an expedition that took him as far south as the Lebanon Mountains. Tushratta counterattacked, but was driven back, east of the Euphrates. The following year, Shuppiluliuma in a rapid campaign bypassed Tushratta's defenses in Syria by crossing the Euphrates farther to the north, recapturing Ishuwa, and descending on Wasshukkani, the Mitannian capital. Taken by surprise, Tushratta withdrew and left the way open for Shuppiluliuma to turn westward, recross the Euphrates, and once more advance as far south as the Lebanon Mountains.

Many of the important Syrian states—Halab, Alalakh, Qadesh, Nukhasshe, and Amurru—were brought firmly within the Hittite sphere of influence. Shuppiluliuma could now confidently confront both Mitanni to the east and Egypt to the south.

Some of the Syrian states, however, most notably Carchemish, which controlled a vital Euphrates crossing, still maintained their independence and their allegiance to Mitanni. Thus, they remained a potential source of danger to Hittite control. After his victories in the south, Shuppiluliuma was for some years occupied with problems nearer home, but about 1353 he was able to dispatch an army to Syria under the command of his son Telipinu. All the land around Carchemish fell to the Hittite force, but the city itself held out, and Mitannian troops were able to make a partially successful counterattack. Farther south there was an Egyptian attack on Qadesh. These events forced Shuppiluliuma to mount a stronger expedition. He himself took command of the army that moved against

Carchemish, while a second force continued southward to relieve Qadesh and drive back the Egyptians.

An Appeal from Egypt

Fortune was on the Hittite king's side, for Mitanni was at the time weakened by dynastic strife, which ended in the assassination of Tushratta. Egypt, too, had its domestic problems, since the young pharaoh Tutankhamun had just died without heir. So Carchemish, without Mitannian aid, fell within eight days. Indeed, Shuppiluliuma, encamped before the city, was astounded to be the recipient not of an Egyptian attack but rather of a letter from Tutankhamun's widow pleading with him to send one of his sons to marry her and be ruler of Egypt. The situation is vividly described by Murshili II, Shuppiluliuma's son and second successor:

> When my father was down in the country of Carchemish, he sent Lupakki and Tarkhunt-zalma (Hittite generals) into the country of Amka (between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges). . . . And when the people of Egypt heard about the attack on Amka, they were frightened. And since, besides, their lord Nibkhururiya (i.e., probably Tutankhamun) had died, the queen of Egypt . . . sent a messenger to my father with this message: "My husband has died. I have no sons. They say that you have many sons. If you were to give me one of your sons, he would become my husband. I will never take a servant of mine and make him my husband. . . . I am afraid."

Here indeed was an opportunity to take over his principal rival and become without doubt the leading power of the near eastern world. But Shuppiluliuma hesitated: "When my father heard this, he called the Great Ones into council and said, 'Nothing like this has ever happened to me before!'"

He simply could not believe what he was reading, so he dispatched an emissary to Egypt to check the facts. In return, he received a highly indignant message from the Egyptian queen:

> Why do you say, "They are playing tricks on me" like that? If I had a son, would I have written to a foreign land about my own and my country's humiliation? You did not believe me, and have actually spoken like that to me! . . . I have not written to any other country; I have written only to you! . . . Give me one of your sons! He will be my husband, and in Egypt he will be king!

So at last the news was confirmed, and Shuppiluliuma duly sent off one of his sons to be pharaoh. But the son died under mysterious circumstances, murdered probably by Egyptians opposed to the elevation of a foreigner. The opportunity was lost. (See also "Akhetaten: A Portrait in Art of an Ancient Egyptian Capital" earlier in this volume.)

Mitanni, however, could still be dealt with. Shuppiluliuma's first step was to confirm his grip on northern Syria by appointing two of his sons to be kings of Halab and Carchemish. Thus strengthened west of the Euphrates, he was in a position to take advantage of the fact that the son of the murdered Tushratta had taken refuge with him. Consequently, he sent an army across the river with the object of placing the young man as a vassal on the Mitannian throne. When this was successfully accomplished, the Mitannian threat had ceased to exist. So confident was the Hittite king about his position that despite minor uprisings in both Syria and Anatolia, he could still afford to send an expedition against Egyptian forces to the south. The result was a Hittite victory, and many prisoners were taken. But in the end the campaign proved to be a disaster, for the prisoners brought back a plague with them into Hittite territory, which was soon to carry off both the king (circa 1340) and his son and successor Arnuwanda II (circa 1339).

Murshili II: Imperial Consolidation

Shuppiluliuma's younger son, Murshili II, who thus unexpectedly inherited the kingship, proved to be an effective successor to his father. Fortunately for him, his brother, the king of Carchemish, was able to maintain Hittite authority in Syria, so Murshili could concentrate on the problems of the Anatolian homeland. First he had to curb the unruly Kashka peoples of the northern hills. When this was at least temporarily accomplished, he could turn to the main object of the earlier part of his reign, the conquest of Arzawa and its allies in western Anatolia. A two-year campaign was sufficient to accomplish his goal, after which the territory of Arzawa was divided among the other defeated states, and

treaties were drawn up that bound these states firmly to the land of Khatti.

Then Murshili turned again to the northern and northeastern frontiers, with further campaigns against the Kashka and Azzi. In the meantime Egyptian-inspired rebellions broke out in Syria, and the king of Carchemish, who could have been expected to deal with them, fell ill and died. This event encouraged a new enemy to enter the field. One result of the disappearance of an independent Mitanni had been the freeing of Assyria to the east from Mitannian control. Now Assyrian forces, eager to extend their power to the west, advanced through Hittite-controlled Mitanni and attacked Carchemish. Murshili, however, was soon able to quell the rebellions and restore Carchemish to the Hittite line by installing its former king's son as its new ruler. Syria was once more safely in Hittite hands, and the final defeat of Azzi meant that Murshili was in control of territory from the Euphrates and the Lebanon range to the Pontus Mountains and the Aegean Sea.

The final years of Murshili's reign were spent in organizing and consolidating his control over the territories that he had won. The rulers of the vassal states were kept under firm supervision, and only minor military action was necessary to deal with the troublesome Kashka people. Beyond his frontiers to the east and south neither Assyria nor Egypt had the strength to disrupt his dominance. In the west, too, there is little to indicate any great threat. Thus, Murshili was able to achieve what many of his predecessors had failed to do—a combination of military power and domestic stability that made the Hittite state clearly the dominant political unit of the near eastern world.

Muwattalli II: The Egyptian Threat Renewed

Such a position inevitably caused a great deal of jealousy abroad, and it only required the accession of an ambitious ruler in Egypt to renew the possibility of conflict. There was indeed a foretaste of this problem toward the end of Murshili's reign when Sety (Sethos) I advanced through Palestine and temporarily gained possession of Qadesh and at least part of Amurru. A much more dangerous situation, however, arose soon after the death of Murshili and the accession of his son, Muwattalli (Muwatallis) II (circa 1306–1282). Sety had in the meantime been succeeded by Ramesses II, who soon made it clear that he was determined to reassert Egyptian power in the Levant. Before the attack came, Muwattalli was able to mount a quick campaign to the west, which ensured the continued loyalty of his potentially rebellious vassals, while the appointment of his brother Khattushili to the governorship of the northern borderlands ensured that on the whole that region was kept secure. Only once did the Kashka people succeed in breaking through the line and reaching as far as the capital; and this attack must have been a factor in persuading Muwattalli to move south to a new capital, Tarkhuntassha, close to the Taurus Mountains, where he would also be nearer the future scene of action.

Conflict began in Ramesses's fifth year, when the pharaoh advanced to the Hittite border near Qadesh. The battle that followed is fully described in the article on Ramesses II in this volume. The result can fairly be described as a draw, but that was good enough to secure the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces and the confirmation of Syria as a Hittite sphere of influence. The political structure created by Murshili and maintained by Muwattalli had been secure enough to withstand the Egyptian onslaught. (See also "Hittite Military Organization" earlier in this volume.)

Assyrian Revival

Although the outcome of the war had been a successful one for the Hittites, it had very serious long-term consequences. Their concentration on the Egyptian menace had meant that little or no attention could be given to their vassal ruler in Mitanni. As a result, the Assyrians invaded Mitanni, defeated its pro-Hittite king, and advanced their frontier to the Hittite border along the Euphrates.

Khattushili III: Internal and External Problems

On the death of Muwattalli, the old bugbear dynastic rivalry once again reared its head. The legitimate heir was the dead king's son Urkhi-Teshub, who duly ascended the throne as Murshili III. But in the background his uncle Khattushili, who had for many years been in charge of the northern frontier, grew increasingly resentful as the new king tried to curtail his very considerable powers. Finally, after seven years, he could stand it no longer, and so deposed and exiled his nephew. His assumption of the kingship as Khattushili III, although it must have had support in Khattusha, caused considerable disruption in some of the borderlands under Hittite control. In the west, for instance, the king of Mira was a strong supporter of Urkhi-Teshub; he even went so far as to correspond with the king of Egypt on the subject. By contrast, the ruler of another vassal state, the Land of the Shekha River, favored Khattushili. But even his support was merely temporary, for soon afterward there was trouble in that area, too, when the local king relied—unsuccessfully it seems—on the help of Akkhiyawa. (See also "Khattushili III, King of the Hittites" later in this volume.)

Akkhiyawa

This country (earlier known as Akkhiya) was now playing a more prominent role in the affairs of western Anatolia, and it was happy to give its support to miscreants operating in Hittite territory whenever the opportunity occurred. The increasing status of Akkhiyawa can be seen in the fact that Khattushili, in requesting the extradition of one such miscreant, addressed its ruler as a great king, his brother and equal, and was careful to use the most conciliatory of diplomatic language. The security and stability built up over several generations were not, he must have felt, to be risked over the misbehavior of one local troublemaker.

The identification of Akkhiyawa is a long-standing problem in Hittite studies. The evidence has been sifted over and over again, with no certain conclusion emerging. The balance of probability does, however, at present seem to favor the equation with Mycenaean Greece, and Hittite contacts with Akkhiyawa can, with a fair degree of plausibility, be fitted into the known history of the Mycenaean world. (See also "Troy: Legend and Reality" later in this volume and "Island Cultures: Crete, Thera, Cyprus, Rhodes, and Sardinia" in Part 6, Vol. III.)

International Diplomacy

The situation in the west then was containable. To the north, the Kashka people were, as in previous reigns, an almost annual menace. Constant campaigns were necessary throughout Khattushili's reign to keep them out of Hittite territory. But, despite their attacks, King Khattushili felt strong enough to bring the capital back to Khattusha, leaving Kurunta, a son of Muwattalli, as king of Tarkhuntassha. From his palace in the restored citadel, he directed his attention toward the international situation in the southeast.

Here a delicate touch was required to play off Assyria and Egypt against each other and, by achieving a balance of power, to maintain Hittite control. In the early years of Khattushili's reign, there were still problems with Egypt, the nature of which is unknown, and so a conciliatory tone had to be maintained in his correspondence with Assyria. The situation became precarious, however, when the king of Mitanni, an Assyrian vassal, rebelled and Assyria responded by annexing the area and making it a province. Faced by a double danger—Egypt and Assyria—Khattushili hastened to conclude a treaty of friendship with the distant king of Babylonia, who promised military assistance in the event of war. Within a few years, however, the situation changed again when a new young Babylonian monarch, heavily influenced by his chief minister, withdrew from the treaty obligations. The Assyrian king, increasingly confident in his diplomatic position and military strength, had in the meantime communicated with Khattushili, claiming equal status as a "Great King," talking of "brotherhood," and proposing a summit meeting in the Amanus (Nur Mountains) region. The suggestion was furiously rejected by the Hittite king. But the danger from Assyria was now manifest, and this made it expedient to compose the quarrel with Egypt. So sixteen years after Qadesh, the rival powers signed a treaty of mutual friendship, and with their agreement, international peace seemed assured. Thirteen years later, the friendship was further cemented by the marriage of Khattushili's daughter to the Egyptian king.

Tudkhaliya IV: The Beginning of the End

Tudkhaliya IV (circa 1254–1220), Khattushili's son and successor, tried with an increasing lack of success to follow his father's foreign policy. His early correspondence with Assyria was



Fig. 2. Plan of Büyükkale, the citadel of Khattusha at Boğazköy. ADAPTED FROM *ANCIENT PEOPLES AND PLACES*, VOL. 83, EDITED BY GLYN DANIEL (1975)

again very conciliatory in tone, although it contained veiled threats of retaliation if an Assyrian army entered Hittite territory. In addition, he resorted to economic sanctions, inserting in a treaty with his vassal, the king of Amurru, a clause forbidding any commercial relations between Amurru and Assyria. His commercial embargo was presumably aimed at weakening Assyria by cutting off its access to supplies of Levantine and Mediterranean goods. When this strategy too failed, Tudkhaliya was at last forced to take military action. But an attempt to outflank Assyria by an attack via the upper Tigris Valley ended in disaster. This defeat caused considerable strain in the Syrian vassal states. But even closer to home, it seems likely that his cousin

Kurunta, who had been appointed by Khattushili to the vassal kingship of Tarkhuntassha, rose in rebellion, captured and burned Khattusha, and for a time was able to occupy the imperial throne. Although Tudkhaliya managed to regain the kingship, the event must have considerably weakened his position.

In the west, too, the problems continued to mount, and every effort was made to solve them by diplomatic means. But the evidence suggests that Tudkhaliya was having to allow ever greater freedom of action to his western vassals, and by the end of his reign, much of the area may well have been completely lost. In the background to this situation lurked Akkhiyawa, which could now be regarded—although it seems temporarily—as a great power. Faced as he was by Assyria to the east and Akkhiyawa to the west, Tudkhaliya could only attempt to keep them apart by including in his trade embargo a clause forbidding the entry of Akkhiyawan ships to the ports of Amurru. With continuing trouble from the Kashka people in the north, he could see the danger of total encirclement by hostile forces.

One way to break the ring he did find. Sea communication between the Aegean world and the Levant was heavily dependent on the island of Cyprus, and this consideration, together with the copper resources of the island, made its capture an obvious move. The fact that the Hittite expedition was successful shows that despite its many problems the Hittite state was still in a comparatively strong position. This can also be seen in the vast amount of construction undertaken by Tudkhaliya in Khattusha itself.

Shuppiluliuma II: The End Grows Nearer

Tudkhaliya was succeeded by his son Arnuwanda III, who soon died and was in turn succeeded by another son, Shuppiluliuma II. Under him, the situation rapidly deteriorated. Neither in the east nor in the west is there any indication of Hittite ability to mount offensive campaigns. At home problems of security were becoming increasingly prominent, for the king could rely less and less on the loyalty of his subordinates and palace intrigue was rife. It has been suggested that a gradual climatic change was also taking place, with rising temperatures and decreasing rainfall leading to failure of harvests and the necessity of importing grain from Canaan and Egypt. It was perhaps to protect grain cargoes passing through the still-loyal Ugarit (modern Ras Shamra) to the port of Ura in Cilicia that Shuppiluliuma II fought a successful naval battle off Cyprus. This is, however, the only sign that the Hittites were still capable of offensive action. Texts dealing with the construction of religious establishments, in particular a mortuary shrine in memory of the king's father that is probably to be identified with the smaller rock chamber at Yazılıkaya near Khattusha, may well be a sign that Shuppiluliuma, unable to maintain his position by human means, was increasingly seeking divine assistance.

The Fall of the Hittite Empire

Even the gods eventually failed. The end, when it came, was not as might have been expected the result of Assyrian aggression, for Assyria by now had its own internal problems and was totally unable to benefit from Hittite weakness. The catalyst that released all of the pent-up pressures was rather a great movement of peoples from the west and north, driven perhaps from their homes by the same famine conditions that were troubling the Hittite lands. The migration of this group, often collectively called "Sea Peoples," advanced inexorably by land and sea from the Aegean toward the borders of Egypt. In times of greater strength, the Hittites might well have been able to deal with such a movement. As it was, there was a rapid and total collapse. Taking advantage of the situation, hostile forces, most probably the Kashka people, the old enemies in the north, moved in on Khattusha and put it to the torch. Hittite power was at an end, and soon its very existence had been forgotten. (See also "The 'Sea Peoples' and the Philistines of Ancient Palestine" later in this volume.)

Khattusha: A Legacy of Achievement

Even today we have one very clear reminder of how great Hittite power had been—the site of Khattusha itself, with its impressive remains of citadel, temples, gateways, and defensive walls. But the most remarkable impression is that of sheer size. By the Old Kingdom period the city, as was said earlier, was already large by previous standards, with an area of about 100

Timeline of Anatolian and Hittite History

Date (BCE)	*Rulers (Selected)*	*Principal Events*
2000		
1950		
1900		Period of independent city-states
		Assyrian trading colonies centered on Kanesh (modern Kültepe)
1850		
1800		
	Pitkhana of Kusshar	Rise of Kusshar
1750	Anitta of Kusshar	Transfer of the capital to Kanesh; destruction of Khattush (modern Boğazköy)
1700		
1650	Khattushili I	Reoccupation of Khattush, now Khattusha; expansion of Hittite Old Kingdom
1595	Murshili I	Syrian conquests; capture of Babylon
1550		
1500	Telipinu	Period of Hittite weakness; rise of Mitanni
		Partial Hittite revival
1450	Tudkhaliya I	Further Hittite weakness
		Temporary Hittite success; beginning of Empire period
1400		
	Shuppiluliuma I	Conquest of Mitanni; appeal from Tutankhamun's widow
1350		
	Murshili II	Strengthening of Hittite control over Anatolia and north Syria
1300		
	Muwattalli II	Egyptian bid for north Syria; Battle of Qadesh (Kadesh)
	Khattushili III	Expansion of Assyria; Hittite alliance with Egypt
1250	Tudkhaliya IV	Increasing pressures on the Hittite Empire
1200	Shuppiluliuma II	The "Sea Peoples"; the destruction of the Hittite Empire
1150		"Dark Age"; movements of people and the emergence of new political units: "Neo-Hittite" states in central and southeast Anatolia and northern Syria, Phrygians and Lydians in central and western Anatolia, Greek settlements on Aegean coast
1100		
1050		
1000		
950		
900		
850		Renewed expansion by Assyria; attacks on Neo-Hittite states
800		
750		Rise of Urartu; defeat by Assyria
	Mita of Mushki	
700	(Midas of Phrygia)	Expansion of Phrygia; final Assyrian conquest of Neo-Hittite states; Cimmerian invasion

(Continued on the next page)

Timeline of Anatolian and Hittite History *(continued)*

Date (BCE)	*Rulers (Selected)*	*Principal Events*
		Cimmerian destruction of Gordion (Gordium)
	Gyges of Lydia	Rise of Lydia; Lydian alliance with Assyria
650		Cimmerian advance on Sardis (Sardes); death of Gyges
		Cimmerians driven from Anatolia
	Alyattes of Lydia	Destruction of Assyria
600		Advance of Medes to Halys River (modern Kızıl Irmak)
		Medes succeeded by Persians
	Croesus of Lydia	
550		
	Cyrus of Persia	Fall of Sardis; Lydia absorbed into Persian Empire
500		Anatolia under Persian rule
450		
400		
350		
	Alexander the Great	Macedonian conquest of Anatolia

acres (40 hectares). But during the imperial period it was expanded by massive building operations over very difficult terrain to a size of well over 400 acres (160 hectares). There is nothing else like it in Anatolia. It was, and remains, a physical embodiment of Hittite greatness.

THE "DARK AGE"

It was not only the Hittite kingdom that fell as a result of the turmoil caused by the wave of advancing peoples. "No country could stand before their arms," we are told by an Egyptian text describing their advance. "Khatti, Kizzuwatna, Carchemish, Arzawa, and Cyprus were crushed." The result in Anatolia was complete political disintegration.

The years between circa 1180 and 900 are obscure; this was a period of unsettled conditions and migrations. Our lack of sources makes it difficult to see any details at all. During the eleventh century, the Kashka people followed up their presumed success in destroying Khattusha by moving steadily southeastward and installing themselves in the Anti-Taurus region north of Malatya (ancient Melid, Melitene) accompanied by the Mushki, a people who may well have come from the same northern regions.

The Rise of the Neo-Hittite States

The result of this pressure, and doubtless other forces of which we know nothing—was that many of the inhabitants of the central and southern plateau were squeezed toward the southeastern corner of that region and through the mountains into northern Syria. In these areas, they were eventually able to regroup around the old trade routes and river crossings, and they recovered sufficiently to set up small independent states that to some extent preserved the Hittite name and traditions. In Syria, the principal Neo-Hittite state that emerged was Carchemish. Several other petty kingdoms were short-lived and soon succumbed to pressure from intrusive Aramaic-speaking nomads. Farther north, where Aramaic pressure was less intense, kingdoms such as Gurgum (Marash), Kummukh (Samsat), and Melid (Malatya) were more successful. In-

deed, about 1100 an Assyrian monarch claimed to have exacted tribute from both Carchemish and Melid, but by 1000 or even before, both of these communities had become sufficiently stable and prosperous to erect large sculptural monuments in a style derived from the Hittite imperial period, sometimes accompanied by inscriptions in the hieroglyphic script and Luwian language (closely related to the "Hittite" language of the state archives), which also had already been in use during the imperial period. (See also "Karkamish and Karatepe: Neo-Hittite City-States in North Syria" later in this volume.)

Central and Western Anatolia

The situation in central Anatolia is almost totally obscure. For the western area, we have only Greek tradition, almost entirely unsupported by archaeological evidence, to suggest a movement about 1200 across the straits from southeastern Europe that brought the Phrygians onto the western plateau, where eventually they established a kingdom centered on Gordion. Another tradition preserved in Greece was that of the founding at about the same time of a dynasty in Lydia, with its capital at Sardis. Better documented and ultimately of much greater importance was the colonization from about 1000 onward of much of the Aegean coast by settlers from Greece, who seem to have found the area sparsely populated and lacking in political organization. A little to the east, peoples such as the Mysians and Carians may have been moving in or already established in their own communities. It can thus be seen that after the Hittite experiment in power politics, Anatolia had resumed its more "natural" state of large numbers of small and disconnected political units—and in some areas none at all.

The Iron Age

The darkness that covers this period must not be allowed to obscure an important change that was taking place not only in Anatolia but throughout the eastern Mediterranean region. The fall of the Hittite Empire marked the end of the Bronze Age in a very literal sense. The collapse of political units brought with it the disruption of the international trade routes along which copper and tin had traveled to make a bronze age possible. The loss of these vital materials of the Bronze Age forced communities to turn to iron, a more readily available resource, which had in fact been known and to some extent exploited for more than a thousand years. Because of a lack of technical knowledge, iron had until then been a less effective material than bronze and had therefore been worked only in small quantities and regarded as a precious metal.

The necessity of finding a replacement for bronze, however, led to great improvements in technology, so that in the centuries following 1200 better-quality iron began to replace bronze as the principal material for tools and weapons. This development seems on present evidence to have started in the Levant and Cyprus, but it was during the "dark age" that it began to spread to and through Anatolia. This more widespread use of iron was to produce radical changes in warfare and, more important, in many aspects of everyday life.

RENEWAL OF ASSYRIAN PRESSURE

Soon after 900 the darkness caused by our lack of written sources begins to clear a little, at least in the southeast. This is largely a result of Assyria, which had by then recovered from its long period of weakness, and documentary evidence becomes available once more. The first sign of aggression came circa 876 when the Assyrian king, Assurnasirpal II, entered the territory of Carchemish and received tribute from its king. A few years later, he was also able to exact tribute from Kummukh. Assyrian expansion toward Anatolia had begun again. About 858 his successor, Shalmaneser III, defeated Carchemish, Unqi, and other states, including Que (Kue; the Cilician Plain) and Khilakku; he received tribute from them and also from Gurgum and Kummukh. Circa 839 he returned to the area and plundered Que, following this with a campaign through Melid onto the plateau itself. There he defeated twenty kings of Tabal, which now emerged as the general name for the area between the Taurus Mountains and the river Halys (modern Kızıl Irmak). Other campaigns followed between circa 836 and 831, but they seem to have had no long-lasting effect. Certainly, just before 800, Gurgum, Unqi, Que, and Melid were again

in a state of rebellion, and thereafter for about fifty years Assyrian attention was directed elsewhere. A new enemy had appeared in the easternmost part of Anatolia.

Urartu

The area centered around Lake Van was one with which the Hittites seem to have made no contact, and indeed the archaeological evidence suggests that in the second millennium it was sparsely occupied. But at the beginning of the first millennium, Aramaean and then Assyrian pressure seems to have forced a number of hill peoples on the north and northeastern flanks of Assyria farther back into the higher mountains, where by 850 they had organized themselves into a kingdom known as Urartu. In the period following 800, taking advantage of temporary Assyrian weakness, Urartu expanded westward to defeat and receive as vassals Melid, Unqi, Gurgum, Kummukh, and perhaps even Tabal, thus winning control of much of the vital area of northern Syria and the Taurus passes. Such activities could not be allowed by the Assyrians, and shortly after his accession about 745, the Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III met and bloodily defeated Urartu and its Anatolian dependents. Urartian support thus proved to be both ephemeral and ineffective. (See also "The Kingdom of Urartu in Eastern Anatolia" later in this volume.)

The End of the Neo-Hittite States

From then on, the fate of the Neo-Hittite states lay in Assyrian hands, and the Assyrians were no longer likely to tolerate insubordination. Kummukh, Gurgum, and Melid submitted voluntarily and were allowed to keep their vassal kings. Unqi, however, rebelled in 738 and was captured, stripped of its wealth, and annexed as an Assyrian province. Farther north the ruler of Tabal prudently sent tribute, as did the rulers of a number of smaller states clustered around the routes through the Taurus, and even the king of the still-present Kashka. About 730, however, the king of Tabal, emboldened perhaps by a military success on the plateau, refused to pay his tribute. Without difficulty he was removed from his throne and replaced by a "son-of-a-nobody" whose loyalty to Assyria was presumably more certain. During these years, too, Que was annexed and placed under the supervision of an Assyrian governor.

The reign of Sargon II of Assyria (721–705) saw increased pressure on the Neo-Hittite states. In 718, Sargon had to punish one of the minor rulers of the plateau for nonpayment of tribute. About the same time, there were doubts about the ruler of Tabal; he was removed from his throne for some time and eventually replaced by his son, who was given an Assyrian princess in marriage in an attempt to secure his continued loyalty.

Mita of Mushki

Attempts at controlling the region were largely cosmetic, for they failed to tackle the real source of the trouble, one Mita of Mushki, who now appears (from the Assyrian point of view) as the chief disruptive influence. The Mushki, it will be remembered, were first encountered pressing against the Assyrian border in the Elazığ and Malatya regions in the period immediately following the destruction of the Hittite Empire, and they presumably remained somewhere in that area, playing only a minor role, until their dramatic entry onto the political scene under Mita. Not only did this ruler attempt to undermine Assyrian authority on the Anatolian plateau, but he even had the effrontery to enter into an intrigue with the ruler of Carchemish, who had for many years prudently paid his tribute to Assyria and had consequently been left to mind his own business. Such disloyalty could not remain unpunished. In 717, Carchemish was ingloriously taken over, its riches were appropriated, and it was reduced to the status of a minor provincial center.

Two years later, in 715, Mita seized some territory on the borders of Que, which had to be recaptured and restored to the governor of that area. Again two years later, in 713, the recently appointed king of Tabal was persuaded, despite his Assyrian marriage connection, to join Mita and Urartu in an anti-Assyrian alliance. Inevitably Tabal, too, became an Assyrian province. The next year, Melid was induced to revoke its loyalty and was reduced and handed over to the still-trustworthy state of Kummukh. Then, in 711, Gurgum was annexed after the murder (possibly inspired by Mita) of its client king. Finally, in 708, Kummukh was accused of anti-Assyrian activities and absorbed as an Assyrian province.

The Cimmerian Invasion

In the meantime, a remarkable change of heart had taken place. In 709, Mita, until then Assyria's most implacable opponent, intercepted a group of emissaries dispatched by the long-exiled king of Que in an attempt to persuade Urartu to stir up further trouble, and handed them over to the Assyrian governor of Que. Sargon naturally was delighted, for this meant that the few petty kingdoms remaining on the southern plateau could easily be squeezed out of existence by the combined pressure of Mushki and Assyria.

But the situation was not to be so simple. Mita's reasons for changing sides are obscure, but his move may well have been prompted, in part at least, by events beyond his control to the north and east, events that were to have a profound effect all over Anatolia for almost a century. In 714 the Cimmerians, a horde of fierce warriors from southern Russia, had broken through the Caucasus and descended on Urartu from the north. At the same time, Sargon had mounted a large-scale campaign which devastated the more southerly parts of that kingdom. The result was that even though Sargon and the Urartian king may have arranged a speedy truce in view of the Cimmerian danger, Urartu was totally unable to offer any resistance to the Cimmerians, who swept westward through the country and into north-central Anatolia. Both Mita and the Assyrians must have been very conscious of this new common threat—hence the sudden desire for friendship and cooperation.

Mushki and Phrygia

Before we follow the history of the Cimmerian presence in Anatolia, a word must be said on developments in the more westerly part of the plateau. Here, it will be remembered, the Phrygians had settled and established a kingdom centered on Gordion. During the eighth century there are plentiful signs of contact between western and central Anatolia, interpreted by some as an expansion of Phrygia into the central area, while others see it as an extension of central influence to the west. Others again are convinced that the Mushki who were to be found on the borders of Assyria in the twelfth century were already Phrygians expanding from the west and that therefore the kingdom of Mushki from then on is to be equated with Phrygia. (See also "Midas of Gordion and the Anatolian Kingdom of Phrygia" later in this volume.)

However one interprets the evidence, there is a general conviction (though little hard evidence to support it) that Mita of Mushki in the Assyrian texts is in fact the Midas of Phrygia who is well known in the Greek tradition and that Phrygia was thus heavily involved in the events that have just been described. If this is the case, we have to assume a Phrygian kingdom extending in the late eighth century as far as the Taurus Mountains and the Cilician Gates and in part at least taking over the dominant position that had been held by the Hittites some five hundred years earlier.

Cimmerian Success

Returning to Assyrian policy in Anatolia, we can see that the incorporation of the many petty states as provinces and the alliance with Mushki provided what it was hoped would be a firm frontier against the Cimmerian menace. In fact, however, it proved to be totally useless. In 705 continuing troubles forced Sargon to return to Tabal, and somewhere in that area, probably in a battle with a Cimmerian group, the Assyrian king was defeated and killed. Tabal was lost, and the Assyrian position in Melid and Que was extremely insecure. A revolt in Que had to be suppressed in 696, and it can be plausibly suggested that for a time it regained its independence under a restored royal line.

Meanwhile, the Cimmerians had moved toward the west, and about 695 they reached the heart of Phrygia. Here, too, they proved to be irresistible, and Gordion was destroyed by fire. Although the town soon regained its former prosperity, the political power of Phrygia was at an end.

The Rise of Lydia

The vacuum of political power in western Anatolia was to be filled by a new dynasty based farther south, at Sardis in Lydia. Gyges, the first ruler of this dynasty, was quick to adopt a policy of aggression against his neighbors, and soon destructive raids were mounted on the Greek settlements along the Aegean coast, particularly Smyrna (modern Izmir), Miletus, and Colophon.

He was, however, hard-pressed by the Cimmerians to the north and east, and he must have been greatly encouraged to hear in 679 that an Assyrian army had defeated them in southern Tabal. The Assyrians also inflicted a defeat on Khilakku and three years later suppressed another rebellion in Que. Although in the following year they failed to regain control of Melid and Tabal, it must have seemed to the Anatolian states that the Assyrians represented the only real hope of finally defeating the Cimmerians; in 668, embassies were received from Tabal, Melid, and Khilakku requesting military support.

These were followed by an embassy from Gyges in faraway Lydia, who in seeking friendship with a distant major power unknowingly followed a precedent set by the king of Arzawa in the same area more than seven hundred years before. He obviously hoped that with Assyrian aid he would be able to overcome the Cimmerians who were pressing on his borders. His hopes were vain, for although he managed to win a victory in the field and forward some of the spoils to Assyria, he was then foolish enough to renounce his alliance. About 652, when the Cimmerians advanced on Sardis, Gyges was defeated and killed in the ensuing battle. Thereafter, Lydia and the other Anatolian kingdoms staggered on under constant Cimmerian pressure until about 630, when an Assyrian victory in Que removed the threat in the southeast. It was not until just before 600, however, that Lydia under Alyattes finally succeeded in removing the Cimmerians from western Anatolia. (See also "Croesus of Sardis and the Lydian Kingdom of Anatolia" later in this volume.)

The End of Assyria

By the end of the seventh century, the situation in the east had changed yet again. The Assyrian Empire, weakened by its overambitious expansionist policy, was now in a period of terminal decline, and many of its northwestern territories, including central and eastern Anatolia, had



fallen to Scythian tribes, which had followed the Cimmerians across the Caucasus. Assyria itself was finally eliminated as a political power in 612, when its capital, Nineveh, fell to a combination of Babylonians, Medes, and Scythians, and the imperial lands were divided among the victors. As far as Anatolia was concerned, the main benefactors were the Medes, who in the next thirty years were able to absorb Tabal and the other plateau dependencies and to advance their borders as far as the Halys. South of the Taurus, Khilakku and Que (now known as Khume) maintained a precarious independence subject to constant pressure from Babylon.

LYDIANS, MEDES, AND PERSIANS

The semivacuum in the westcreated by the elimination of the Cimmerians had by now been filled by Lydia, for Alyattes had continued his predecessors' policy of aggression toward the Greek cities. He had also subjected the areas to the east of his country until he faced the Medes across the Halys. A battle fought between the Medes and the Lydians in 585 ended in a draw, and Alyattes and his successor, Croesus (circa 560–546), were able to continue the persecution and subjection of the Greek cities until Croesus was master of much of the Aegean coast. But plans to extend his rising power by expanding onto the islands had to be abandoned in favor of a campaign to the east, where the Persians, who had in the meantime replaced the Medes, were a growing threat. Croesus advanced across the Halys and fought an indecisive battle before returning to Sardis for the winter. To his surprise, Cyrus, the Persian king, quickly followed him and seized his capital (circa 546). Thus ended Lydian aspirations to power, and Anatolia became a part of the Persian Empire.

It is a little ironic that the unification of Anatolia, when it was finally achieved, was the work not of a native kingdom but of an external power. With the fall of Lydia to the Persians, the history of the native peoples of Anatolia becomes part of the two-hundred-year confrontation between Persians and Greeks that culminated in the conquests of Alexander the Great. Despite nominal Persian rule, many parts of Anatolia, especially those on the west and south coasts, were increasingly hellenized, while more remote areas tended to retain their native Anatolian cultures, languages, and desire for independence. Toward the east the Iranian presence had a stronger effect, but on the whole the Persian influence on Anatolia was only skin-deep. Indeed, after Alexander crossed the Hellespont (Dardanelles) and defeated the Persian army at the Granicus in 334, there were few signs of local pro-Persian resistance to his march through Anatolia and on into northern Syria. But the Macedonian takeover of Anatolia and the subsequent division of it between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies mark the beginning of a new era. Anatolia was from then on a part of the classical, rather than of the ancient near eastern, world.

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