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§ 20. THE GREAT WAR WITH ROME A.D. 66-74(?)

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I. The Outbreak and Triumph of the Revolution A.D. 66

The outbreak of the long threatened revolt was provoked by an act of Florus which, although no worse than many others, was felt more keenly because it injured at the same time the religious sensitivities of the people. Whereas he had until then robbed the citizens, he now ventured to relieve the Temple treasury of seventeen talents. At this, the patience of the people came to an end. There was a great uproar and a couple of wits had the idea of ridiculing the procurator's greed by passing round baskets and collecting donations for the poor unfortunate Florus. Hearing of this, he quickly made up his mind to take bloody revenge for their mockery. He came to Jerusalem with a detachment of soldiers and, despite the entreaties of the chief priests and men of rank, turned over part of the city to be sacked by his troops. A great number of citizens, among them Roman knights of Jewish birth, were seized at random, scourged and crucified. Even the petitions of Queen Berenice, who happened to be in Jerusalem, were unable to check the fury of the procurator and his soldiers.¹

This took place on 16 Artemisius (Iyyar, April/May) of A.D. 66.²

On the following day, Florus demanded that the citizens should give a ceremonious welcome to two cohorts on their way back from Caesarea, and thereby prove their submissiveness and repentance. Although the people were disinclined to do so, the chief priests nevertheless saw to it that, for fear of worse, they agreed to this humiliation. They went out in solemn procession to meet the two cohorts and presented friendly greetings. But the soldiers, apparently under instructions from Florus, offered none in return. At this, the people began to grumble and shout insults against Florus. The soldiers immediately seized their swords and drove the crowds back into the city, killing continuously. A fierce street battle then developed during which the people succeeded in gaining possession of the Temple mount and in cutting the connexion between it and the Antonia fortress. Florus could see that he was too weak to subdue the masses by force. He therefore withdrew to Caesarea, leaving only one cohort behind in Jerusalem and having made the city leaders responsible for the restoration of law and order.³

King Agrippa was at that time in Alexandria. When he heard of the

1. *B.J.* ii 14, 6-7 (293-308).
2. *B.J.* ii 15, 2 (315); cf. ii 14, 4 (284). *Ant.* xx 11, 1 (257) (in Nero's 12th year). Though Josephus uses the Macedonian names of the months he actually means the Jewish months; these correspond only approximately to the Julian calendar. For further details, see Appendix III.
3. *B.J.* ii 15, 3-6 (318-22).

disturbances he hurried back to Jerusalem, summoned the people to a meeting at the Xystus (an open square in front of the palace of the Hasmonaeans where he lived), and delivered a long and impressive speech to the crowd with the aim of persuading them to give up their hopeless, and therefore unreasonable and reprehensible resistance.⁴ The people declared themselves ready to return to obedience to the emperor. They began to rebuild the corridors between the Antonia and the Temple which they had demolished, and to collect the tax arrears. But when Agrippa demanded that obedience should be shown to Florus also, the Jews' patience was exhausted. He was rejected with scorn and contempt and was obliged to return to his kingdom with his task unachieved.⁵

Meanwhile, the rebels had succeeded in occupying the fortress of Masada. In addition, at the instigation of Eleazar, the son of Ananias the High Priest, it was now decided to suspend the daily sacrifice for the emperor and to accept no more sacrifices whatever from Gentiles. The suspension of the sacrifice for the emperor was tantamount to an open declaration of revolt against the Romans. All the attempts of the leading men, chief priests and Pharisees to persuade the people to revoke this dangerous measure were fruitless. They adhered to their resolution.⁶

When the peace party—primarily the chief priests, the Pharisaic notables, and those related to the Herodian house—saw that nothing was to be achieved by amicable means, they decided to resort to force. First they approached King Agrippa for support. He sent a detachment of three thousand cavalry under the command of Darius and Philippus and with their aid the peace party gained control of the upper city, while the rebels retained possession of the Temple mount and the lower city. A bitter conflict now raged between the two factions. But the king's troops were too weak to withstand the infuriated mob and were obliged to evacuate the upper city. To take vengeance upon their opponents, the rebels set fire to the palaces of Ananias the High Priest and of Agrippa and Berenice.⁷

4. *B. J.* ii 16, 1-5 (345-404); cf. 15, 1 (309-14). The statistical details introduced by Josephus into this speech of Agrippa, were probably obtained from an official record; see L. Friedländer, *De fonte quo Josephus, B. J.* ii 16, 4 *usus sit* (1873); A. von Domaszewski, 'Die Dislokation des römischen Heeres im Jahre 66 n. Chr.', *Rhein. Mus.* 47 (1892), pp. 207-18.

5. *B. J.* ii 17, 1 (405-7).

6. *B. J.* ii 17, 2-4 (408-21). On the fortress of Masada, see below, p. 511. On the daily sacrifice offered for the emperor, see vol. II, § 24, iv; cf. C. Roth, 'The Debate on the Loyal Sacrifices A.D. 66', *HThR* 53 (1960), pp. 93-7.

7. *B. J.* ii 17, 4-6 (421-9). The troops sent by Agrippa were *ὑπὸ Δαρείῳ μὲν ἐπάρχῳ [ὃν ἱππάρχῳ], στρατηγῷ δὲ τῷ Ἰακίμου Φιλίππῳ*, *B. J.* ii 17, 4 (421). Philip was thus the commander-in-chief. He was the grandson of the Babylonian Zamaris who during the time of Herod the Great had founded a Jewish colony in Batanaea,

A few days later—it was the month of Lous (Ab, July/August)—they succeeded in capturing the Antonia fortress also; and then began to lay siege to the upper palace (of Herod), where the troops of the peace party had taken refuge. Resistance was impossible here too, so when Agrippa's troops were guaranteed safe conduct, they gladly accepted. The Roman cohorts escaped to the three fortified towers of the palace (named Hippius, Phasael and Mariamme). The rest of the palace was set ablaze on the 6th Gorpiaeus (Elul, August/September) by the rebels.⁸ On the following day, the High Priest Ananias, who had been in concealment, was seized in his hiding-place and murdered.⁹ The one weak support now remaining to the peace party was the Roman cohort besieged in the three towers of Herod's palace. In the end, it too had to yield. In return for surrendering their arms, the soldiers were guaranteed a free withdrawal. But the rebels, who were now masters of the entire city, crowned their victory with murder. Scarcely had the Roman soldiers withdrawn and laid down their arms, when they were treacherously set upon and cut down to the last man.¹⁰

While the triumph of the revolution was thus being decided in Jerusalem, bloody battles were taking place in many other cities inhabited by both Jews and Gentiles. Where the Jews were in the majority, they massacred their Gentile fellow-citizens, and where the latter had the upper hand they struck down the Jews. The effects of the revolt in the homeland extended as far as Alexandria.¹¹

Finally, after long delay and preparation, Cestius Gallus, the governor of Syria, made a move to put down the disturbance in Judaea. With the 12th legion, two thousand picked men from other legions, six cohorts and four *alae* of cavalry, as well as a sizeable number of auxiliaries obligatorily supplied by friendly kings (among them Agrippa), he started out from Alexandria, marched by way of Ptolemais, Caesarea, Antipatris and Lydda—where he arrived at the feast of Tabernacles in the month of Tishri (September/October)—and finally, by way of Beth-Horon, arrived at Gibeon, fifty stadia from Jerusalem, where he

Ant. xvii 2, 3 (29). On him, see also *B. J.* ii 20, 1 (556); iv 1, 10 (81). *Vita* 11 (46-61); 35 (177-8); 36 (179-84); 74 (407-9). On an inscription from Deir esh-Shair, Waddington read *Δομήδης [Δ]αρίῳ ἐπάρχῳ βασιλέως μεγάλου Ἀγρίππᾶ*. . . Le Bas & Waddington, *Inscr.* III, no. 2135. The man would then be identical with our Darius; but OGIS 422 reads *Δ(ι)ομήδης [Χ]άρη(τ)ος*.

8. *B. J.* ii 17, 7-8 (430-40); cf. v 4, 4 (172-83). The leader of Agrippa's troops, Philip, was later called to account because of his behaviour, *Josephus, Vita* 74 (408-9).

9. *B. J.* ii 17, 9 (441).

10. *B. J.* ii 17, 10 (449-56). Cf. Meg. Taan. § 14: 'On the 17th Elul the Romans withdrew from Judah and Jerusalem' (ed. Lichtenstein, *HUCA* 8-9 (1931-2) pp. 304-5, 320; Derenbourg, *op. cit.*, pp. 443, 445).

11. *B. J.* ii 18, 1-8 (457-98).

pitched camp.¹² An attack made by the Jews from Jerusalem brought the Roman army into great danger but was eventually repulsed.¹³ Cestius moved closer to the city and encamped on Mount Scopus, seven stadia from Jerusalem. Four days later, on the 30th Hyperberetaeus (Tishri), he occupied the northerly suburb of Bezetha without encountering resistance, and set it on fire.¹⁴ But when a subsequent assault on the Temple mount failed, he abandoned further attempts and withdrew.¹⁵ Josephus cannot explain this withdrawal. Probably, Cestius realised that his forces were inadequate for an assault on the strongly fortified and boldly defended city. He was to learn the extent of Jewish resolution and determination in battle during the course of his retreat. In a gorge near Beth-Horon through which his route led, he suddenly found himself surrounded on all sides by Jews, and was attacked with such force that his retirement developed into a rout. It was only by leaving behind a great quantity of his equipment, in particular valuable war material which later proved useful to the Jews, that he was able to escape to Antioch with the nucleus of his army. With great jubilation the returning victors entered Jerusalem on 8 Dios (Marheshvan, October/November).¹⁶

12. *B.J.* ii 18, 9-10 (499-509); 19, 1 (513-16). Γαβαώ is the Gibeon mentioned frequently in the OT (=El-Jib, north-west of Jerusalem). Cf. Abel, *Géog. Pal.* II, pp. 335-6.

13. *B.J.* ii 19, 2 (517-22).

14. *B.J.* ii 19, 4 (527-30). The Σκοπός is mentioned again in *B.J.* ii 19, 7 (542), v 2, 3 (67), 3, 2 (106-8); *Ant.* xi 8, 5 (329) εἰς τόπον τινα Σαφὶν (so the best MSS.) λεγόμενον τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο μεταφερόμενον εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν γλῶτταν Σκοπὸν (so Niese) σημαίνει. יְצִיָּה is an Aramaizing expression for יְצִיָּה, as the place is called in the Mishnah, mPes. 3:8. From here, there was a fine view of the city, *Ant.* xi 8, 5 (329); *B.J.* v 2, 3 (67-8). The suburb Βεζεθά is referred to again in *B.J.* ii 15, 5 (328); v 4, 2 (151); 5, 8 (246). (Niese would add to this list, *B.J.* ii 19, 4 (530), but the text there is uncertain). It is the most northerly suburb enclosed by the so-called wall of Agrippa, *B.J.* v 4, 2 (151). The interpretation 'New City', given by Josephus, *B.J.* ii 19, 4 (530); v 4, 2 (151), is linguistically not without difficulty; one would rather have expected 'Place of olives' (בית ית' אלה). Cf. C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel according to St. John* (1955), pp. 209-11; J. Jeremias, *The Rediscovery of Bethesda* (1966), pp. 11-12.

15. *B.J.* ii 19, 5-7 (533-45).

16. *B.J.* ii 19, 7-9 (540-55). It is remarkable that Josephus places this event still within Nero's 12th year, *B.J.* ii 19, 9 (555). Since, until the end of the first century A.D., the regnal years of an emperor were calculated from his day of accession (according to Mommsen) and Nero came to the throne on the 13th October A.D. 54, his twelfth year extended only until the 13th October A.D. 66. But 8 Marheshvan falls, with rare exceptions, after the 13th October. For this reason, Niese, *Hermes* 28 (1893), pp. 208 ff., assumed that Josephus calculated Roman regnal years in the Jewish fashion, always beginning the year with Xanthicus (Nisan), i.e., in the Spring (that Niese in fact presupposes not the Jewish, but the Tyrian calendar, is irrelevant). According to Niese (*l.c.*, p. 212), Nero's first year was to be counted from the Spring of A.D. 55 (*sic*), as has been observed in, for example, the chronological schema of Porphyry and Eusebius

In face of the exhilaration which now seized Jerusalem the spokesmen for peace were obliged to remain silent. After such decisive blows a change of attitude was unthinkable. Even those opposed to the war were swept along by the force of the circumstances. The inveterate pro-Romans left the city. All the rest were won over to the side of the rebels, partly by force, partly by persuasion (τοὺς μὲν βία . . . τοὺς δὲ πειθοί).¹⁷ They now began to organize the revolution methodically and to prepare for the expected Roman attack. It is characteristic that, in contrast to the later period of the war, the men in whose hands power lay at this stage belonged entirely to the upper classes. It was the chief priests and eminent Pharisees who led the country's defence organization. A popular assembly held in the Temple elected the provincial commanders. Two men, Joseph ben Gorion and the High Priest Ananus, were entrusted with the defence of the capital. Jesus ben Sapphias and Eleazar ben Ananias, both of High Priestly lineage, were sent to Idumaea. Almost every one of the eleven toparchies into which Judaea was divided received its own commander. Galilee was given Josephus son of Matthias, the future historian.¹⁸

Without doubt, the most difficult and demanding task of all fell to Josephus. For the first Roman attack was to be expected in Galilee. The appointment of Josephus to this vital command reflected his prominent position within the aristocratic society of Judaea. It is this fact which explains why a man who besides his innate intelligence could boast only of a religious education, should suddenly be required to form an army from the untrained Galilean population and with it withstand the attack of legions experienced in war led by seasoned generals. According to his own account, he set about his insoluble task with enthusiasm. For the government of Galilee he appointed on the pattern of the Jerusalem Sanhedrin a council of seventy men to deal with serious legal matters and capital cases; for less important disputes

(see above, p. 126: the full calendar year following the accession is counted as the first). These assumptions are, however, extremely improbable since it is more than doubtful that Josephus is to be credited with his own highly artificial method of calculation; he would surely, simply have used the customary one of that time. The most probable explanation seems to be that he made a slip here; he says in *B.J.* ii 14, 4 (284) that the war began in the twelfth year of Nero and thinks that that same year is still current. The date is in fact very close to the limit of the twelfth year.

17. *B.J.* ii 20, 1 (556), 3 (562).

18. *B.J.* ii 20, 3-4 (563-8); *Vita* 7 (28-9). In the latter passage Josephus has the temerity to claim that the purpose of his mission was the pacification of Galilee. As is clear from what has been said, the conduct of the war was in the hands of the commune of Jerusalem (τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἱεροσολυμιτῶν, *Vita* 12 (65), 13 (72), 38 (190), 49 (254), 52 (267), 60 (309), 65 (341), 70 (393) and, as its representative, the Sanhedrin: τὸ συνέδριον τῶν Ἱεροσολυμιτῶν . . . *Vita* 12 (62).

a council of seven was appointed in every town.¹⁹ He intended to demonstrate his zeal for the Torah by destroying the palace of Tiberias ornamented with unlawful animal figures. But the revolutionaries had already anticipated him.²⁰ He endeavoured to meet military needs by, above all, fortifying cities. All the more significant towns of Galilee—Jotapata, Tarichea, Tiberias, Sepphoris, Gischala, Mt. Tabor, even Gamala in Gaulanitis, and many smaller places—were made more or less defensible.²¹ But it is with a special pride that he boasts of his efforts to organize the army. He claims to have called up no less than 100,000 men and to have trained them on the Roman model.²²

While Josephus was thus preparing for war against the Romans, bitter and armed opposition rose against him in his own province. Its moving spirit was John of Gischala, a daring, reckless partisan filled with burning hatred for the Romans and determined to fight them to the last. But while he had sworn death and destruction to the tyrants, he was himself a tyrant in his own circle. To be subordinate was intolerable to him. And least of all could he obey Josephus, whose cautious conduct of the war seemed to him no better than friendship with Rome. He accordingly bent all his efforts towards removing the man he hated and to persuading the people of Galilee to be disloyal to him.²³ His mistrust of Josephus was in fact not unjustified. Josephus knew the Romans too well to believe in a real and final success of the rebellion. From the outset, his heart was not wholly in the cause he represented and at times he somewhat uncautiously permitted this to be seen. On one occasion, some youths from the village of Dabaritta having taken valuable spoil from an official of King Agrippa, Josephus ordered the booty to be handed over to him with the intention—if we may believe him—of returning it to the king when a favourable opportunity presented itself. When the people realized this plan, their mistrust, already stimulated by John of Gischala, rose to the point of

19. *B.J.* ii 20, 5 (570); *Vita* 14 (79). Whether Josephus created the council (cf. *B.J.*) or recognised an existing organisation (cf. *Vita*) remains unsure, but the latter alternative is more likely.

20. *Vita* 12 (65).

21. *B.J.* ii 20, 6 (573-4), *Vita* 37 (188). Of the seven places named, Sepphoris never sided with the revolt but while it was without Roman protection adopted a vacillating position. Thus it attended to the building of its walls, and then when Roman troops were available allowed them to enter. Three of the six remaining cities or strongholds—Tarichea, Tiberias and Gamala—belonged to the territory of Agrippa, and after internal conflicts partly went over to the side of the revolt. A special position was adopted by Gischala, where John the son of Levi, the later hero of the revolt, seized control. He was dissatisfied with Josephus's tepid attitude and did not, therefore, hand over to him the fortification of the city but took it in hand himself.

22. *B.J.* ii 20, 6-8 (572-84).

23. *B.J.* ii 21, 1-2 (585-94); *Vita* 13 (71-6).

open insurrection. In Tarichaea, where Josephus was staying, there was a serious riot. The traitor's life was threatened. It was only by the most excruciating self-humiliation and low cunning that Josephus was able to avert the danger.²⁴ Some time later in Tiberias he evaded by flight the murderers sent against him by John of Gischala.²⁵ In the end, John contrived to obtain from Jerusalem the dismissal of Josephus. Four dignitaries were sent for this purpose to Galilee, and were provided with a detachment of 2500 men so that, if necessary, they could enforce the resolution. But Josephus succeeded in having the decree rescinded and the four emissaries recalled. When they would not comply, he had them arrested and sent home to Jerusalem. The inhabitants of Tiberias who continued to rebel were put down by force, and peace was temporarily restored.²⁶ When the city defected once more a few days later, this time in favour of Agrippa and the Romans, it was again subdued by a ruse.²⁷

Meanwhile, Jerusalem had not remained inactive. There too preparations were made to receive the Romans. The wall was strengthened, war materials of every kind were made ready, and the young people trained in the use of their weapons.²⁸

Thus the spring of A.D. 67 arrived, and with it the time of the expected Roman onslaught when the young republic would suffer its baptism of fire.

2. The War in Galilee A.D. 67

Nero received in Achaea the news of the defeat of Cestius.²⁹ Since the continuation of the war could not be left to the defeated general—he seems in any case to have died soon afterwards³⁰—the difficult task of subduing the Jewish revolt was transferred to the experienced Vespasian, who made provision for the campaign while it was still winter. Whereas he himself travelled to Antioch and marshalled his

24. *B.J.* ii 21, 3-5 (595-613); *Vita* 26-30 (126-48).

25. *B.J.* ii 21, 6 (614-19); *Vita* 16-18 (84-96).

26. *B.J.* ii 21, 7 (620-30); *Vita* 38-64 (189-335), esp. 38-40 (189-203), 60-64 (309-35).

27. *B.J.* ii 21, 8-10 (632-46); *Vita* 32-34 (155-73). According to *Vita* 66-68 (381-9), the *πρωτοι της βουλης* of Tiberias sent once again to Agrippa for a garrison. Because of its mixed population, Tiberias was partly pro- and partly anti-Roman, cf. *Vita* 9 (33-42), which is why it sometimes appears as an ally of King Agrippa, and sometimes of John of Gischala. But it is difficult to say anything certain about its attitude in detail because Josephus's account is deliberately distorted.

28. *B.J.* ii 22, 1 (648-9).

29. *B.J.* ii 20, 1 (558); iii 1, 1 (1-3).

30. 'Fato aut taedio occidit', Tac. *Hist.* v 10. In the winter of A.D. 66-7, Cestius Gallus was still in the province. See *Vita* 8 (31), 43 (214), 65 (347), 67 (373-4), 71 (394 ff.).

H.J.P.—17

army there, he sent his son Titus to Alexandria to bring him the 15th legion.³¹ As soon as the season allowed, he set off from Antioch and marched to Ptolemais where he meant to await Titus. But before Titus arrived, emissaries from the Galilean town of Sepphoris appeared before Vespasian asking for a Roman garrison.³² Vespasian hastened to meet their request. A detachment of 6000 men under the leadership of Placidus was sent to the town as a garrison. Thus, without striking a blow the Romans were in possession of one of the most important and heavily fortified places in Galilee.³³ Soon afterwards, Titus came with his legion. The army now at Vespasian's disposal consisted of three complete legions (5th, 10th and 15th), twenty-three auxiliary cohorts, six *alae* of cavalry, and finally the auxiliaries provided by King Agrippa, King Antiochus of Commagene, King Soaemus of Emesa and King Malchus II of Nabataea: in all, some 60,000 men.³⁴

When everything was organized, Vespasian set out from Ptolemais and pitched camp on the border of Galilee. Josephus had already taken up a position near the village of Garis, 20 stadia from Sepphoris, *Vita* 71 (395), to await the Roman attack there. The military proficiency of this army proved itself immediately doubtful. As Vespasian's approach became known, the courage of most of the Jewish troops failed even before the Romans became visible; they scattered in all directions. The lowlands of Galilee were abandoned without a sword having been raised and Josephus found himself compelled to flee with the rest to Tiberias.³⁵ Vespasian had now only to conquer the fortresses.

Josephus at once reported to Jerusalem and requested that, if the war was to continue at all, they should send him an army 'of equal quality to the Romans', a plea which came too late.³⁶ The main part

31. *B.J.* iii 1, 2-3 (4-8). According to the traditional text of *B.J.* iii 1, 3 (8), Titus had to bring two legions from Alexandria, τὸ πέμπτον καὶ τὸ δέκατον. But it is said of the return of Titus to Vespasian, *B.J.* iii 4, 2 (65) κακεὶ (i.e., at Ptolemais) καταλαβὼν τὸν πατέρα δυοὶ τοῖς ἄμα αὐτῷ τάγμασιν, ἦν δὲ τὰ ἐπισημότερα τὸ πέμπτον καὶ τὸ δέκατον, ζεύγνυσι τὸ ἄχθὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πεντεκαδέκατον. This can only mean that Titus combined the 15th legion, which he had brought from Alexandria, with the 5th and the 10th which were with Vespasian. This also agrees with the fact that, according to Suet. *Div. Tit.* 4, Titus was commander of a legion (*legioni praepositus*), i.e. the 15th. Thus *B.J.* iii 1, 3 (8) should probably be corrected to τὸ πεντεκαδέκατον. Niese and Thackeray adopt the reading, τὸ πέμπτον καὶ δέκατον.

32. *B.J.* iii 2, 4 (30-4). Sepphoris had already acquired a Roman garrison before Vespasian arrived, *Vita* 71 (394); *B.J.* iii 2, 4 (30-1). Whether this had in the meantime withdrawn, or was only now relieved and strengthened, is not wholly clear. See vol. II, § 23, i.

33. *B.J.* iii 4, 1 (59), *Vita* 74 (411). On Placidus, who was in Galilee prior to Vespasian's arrival, see *Vita* 43 (215).

34. *B.J.* iii 4, 2 (64-9).

35. *B.J.* iii 6, 2-3 (115-31).

36. *B.J.* iii 7, 2 (138-40).

of his army had taken refuge in the strong fortress of Jotapata.³⁷ He too arrived there on 21 (?) Artemisius (Iyyar, April/May), to conduct the defence in person.³⁸ By the evening of the next day, Vespasian reached the city with his army, and then began the famous siege, described by Josephus at length, of the not unimportant mountain stronghold. The first assaults brought no result. It was necessary to resort to a regular siege. For a long time a stubborn struggle made the outcome doubtful. Military skill and experience achieved for the one side what the courage of despair, and the astuteness of its commander-in-chief, did for the other. For though a general Josephus may not have been in the proper sense of the term, he was certainly a master of minor tricks and stratagems. He relates with immense gratification how he deceived the Roman generals over a water shortage in the city by having clothes dripping with water hung on the battlements; how he ensured food supplies by dressing his people in skins and sending them out to creep past the Roman sentries at night; how he broke the force of the battering ram by lowering sacks filled with chaff; how he poured boiling oil on the soldiers, or tipped boiled fenu-greek onto the assault ramps, thus making the attackers lose their foothold. But the city's fate was not to be averted, either by such tricks or by the boldness of the sorties, in one of which Vespasian himself was wounded. After the besieged had given of their utmost, a deserter betrayed the fact that fatigue was so great that even the sentries were no longer able to stay awake till morning. The Romans made use of this. In absolute silence, Titus one morning scaled the wall with a small detachment, struck down the sleeping sentries and penetrated the city. The legions followed, and the surprised garrison only noticed the Roman entry when they were no longer able to repulse them. Whoever fell into Roman hands, armed or unarmed, men or women, were struck down or enslaved, and the city and its fortifications were razed to the ground. It was on 1 Panemus (Tammuz, June/July) in A.D. 67 that this most important Galilean fortress fell into Roman hands.³⁹

37. Jotapata is referred to in the Mishnah (Arak. 9:6) as יִתְּפָטָה. It is described there as an ancient city, surrounded by walls since the time of Joshua. Its location was re-discovered in 1847 by E. G. Schultz at Jefat, due north of Sepphoris. See ZDMG 3 (1849), pp. 49 ff., 59 ff. Cf. Abel, *Géog. Pal.* II, p. 366.

38. *B.J.* iii 7, 3 (142). Since according to *B.J.* iii 7, 33 (316) and 8, 9 (406), the siege lasted 47 days, and according to *B.J.* iii 7, 36 (339), ended on 1 Panemus, the date 21 Artemisius cannot be correct. Niese, *Hermes* 28 (1893), pp. 202 ff., works out the 47 days by reckoning from 17 Artemisius, as Vespasian's siege-works began four days before Josephus's arrival, *B.J.* iii 7, 3 (142), and by giving 31 days to Artemisius and Daisius. But *B.J.* iii 7, 3 (142) is not concerned with siege-works, but with the building of a road before the siege started.

39. *B.J.* iii 7, 4-36 (145-339).

Josephus had found shelter with forty comrades in a cavern. When he was discovered, he wished to surrender to the Romans, but was prevented from doing so by his companions. They left him only the choice of dying with them, either by their hand or his own. By some kind of ruse—he claims to have proposed that they should kill each other in an order established by lot, and by the luck of the draw to have been the last man remaining—he contrived to escape and carried out his decision to surrender to the Romans.⁴⁰ Brought before Vespasian, he assumed the role of a prophet and foretold the general's future elevation to the throne. The result of this, at least was that, although fettered, he was treated more considerately.⁴¹

On 4 Panemus, Vespasian broke camp and left Jotapata, marching first by way of Ptolemais to Caesarea, where he allowed his troops to rest.⁴² While they were recovering from the exertions of the siege, the general travelled to Caesarea Philippi, to his ally King Agrippa, and there took part in festivities for twenty days. After this, he ordered Titus to fetch the legions from Caesarea Maritima and advanced on Tiberias, which, when faced with the Roman army, voluntarily opened its gates and for Agrippa's sake was treated leniently.⁴³ From there he went on to Tarichea.⁴⁴ By a bold stroke on

40. *B.J.* iii 8, 1-8 (340-92).

41. *B.J.* iii 8, 9 (408); Dio lxvi 1; Suet. *Div. Vesp.* 5. According to Zonaras, *Annal.* xi 16, Appian, in the 22nd book of his *Roman History*, also mentioned the Jewish oracle referring to Vespasian (= Appian, ed. Viereck, Roos, F 17). The matter is discussed in detail by W. Weber, *Josephus und Vespasian* (1921), pp. 44 ff., where other references are also given. It is noteworthy that rabbinic tradition ascribes the same prophecy to R. Yohanan b. Zakkai. Cf. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 43, n. 5; J. Neusner, *A Life of Yohanan ben Zakkai Ca. 1-80 C.E.* (1970), pp. 157-66; *Development of a Legend* (1970), pp. 115-19, 163. For similar oracles given by pagan priests to Vespasian and Titus, see Tac. *Hist.* ii 4; ii 78; Suet. *Div. Vesp.* 5; *Div. Tit.* 5.

42. *B.J.* iii 9, 1 (409).

43. *B.J.* iii 9, 7-8 (443-61).

44. *Tarichéu* or *Tarichéa* (both spellings occur) obtained its name from the curing of fish carried out there, Strabo xvi 2, 45 (764). It is first mentioned during the time of Cassius who, during his first administration of Syria in 52-51 B.C., took the city by force, *Ant.* xiv 7, 3 (120); *B.J.* i 8, 9 (180), and returned there during his second administration (in 43 B.C. he wrote to Cicero 'ex castris Taricheis', Cicero, *ad Fam.* xii, 11). According to Jos. *Vita* 32 (157), it lay thirty stadia from Tiberias; it was situated on the Lake of Gennesaret at the foot of a hill, *B.J.* iii 10, 1 (462); Pliny (*NH* v 15/11) places it at the southern end of the lake ('a meridie Tarichea'). The town must therefore have stood on the site, or in the neighbourhood of, Kerak (Beth Yerah). Cf. Robinson, *Biblical Researches in Palestine* II, p. 387; Guérin, *Galilée* I, pp. 275-80. On the other hand, some writers have deduced from Josephus that Tarichea lay north of Tiberias, in the proximity of Mejdal (Migdal Nunayya). Cf. H. Graetz, *MGWJ* (1880), pp. 484-7, and more recently W. F. Albright, *AASOR* II/III (1923), pp. 29-46, followed by M. Aviyonah, *Atlas of the Period of the Second Temple, the Mishnah and the Talmud*

the part of Titus, this too fell into the hands of the Romans at the beginning of Gorpiaeus (Elul, August/September).⁴⁵

In Galilee, only Gischala and Mount Tabor (Itabyrion) now remained in the hands of the rebels; and in Gaulanitis, the important and strongly fortified Gamala.⁴⁶ It was to this last place that Vespasian next turned his attention. The siege soon appeared to be successful. The Romans managed to storm the walls and force their way into the city. But here they met with such bitter resistance that they were forced to withdraw with very heavy losses. The set-back was so severely felt that it needed all Vespasian's authority to restore the morale of the soldiers. Finally, on 23 Hyperberetaeus (Tishri, September/October), the Romans again broke into the city, and on this occasion were able to occupy it completely.⁴⁷ During the siege of Gamala, Mount Tabor was also taken by a detachment sent there.⁴⁸

Vespasian left the capture of Gischala to Titus with a detachment of

(1966), map 85. But the course of Vespasian's march described by Josephus does not prove that Tarichea was situated north of Tiberias. Vespasian evidently went from Scythopolis, therefore from the south, to Tiberias, *B.J.* iii 9, 7 (446). But there is no ground for supposing that he continued his march towards the north. Rather, after occupying Tiberias, he pitched his camp at Ammathus 'between Tiberias and Tarichea', as appears from a comparison of *B.J.* iv 1, 3 (11) with iii 10, 1 (462). But since the warm springs of Ammathus (cf. the rabbinic *אממת*, vol. II, § 23 i) are clearly south of Tiberias, Vespasian after the occupation of Tiberias must have turned again towards the south. Those who place Tarichea to the north of Tiberias must do the same to Ammathus. They must then, if they wish to be consistent, deny the identity of the Ammathus mentioned by Josephus and the modern Hammam, a fact that cannot be reasonably questioned. Cf. vol. II, § 23, i. See, however, Abel, *Géog. Pal.* II, pp. 476-7, emphasising the absence of mountains in the neighbourhood of Kerak, a fact irreconcilable with *B.J.* iii 10, 1 (464) *ὑπάρχειος*.

45. *B.J.* iii 10, 1-5 (462-502). Suet. *Div. Tit.* 4, ascribes to Titus the conquest of Tarichea and Gamala, the latter place wrongly. After Tarichea was taken by surprise, some of the inhabitants escaped in boats on the lake. Vespasian sent after them on rafts and they all met their death, either by the sword or in the water. This is presumably the 'victoria navalis' celebrated on coins and in the triumphal procession of ships, *B.J.* vii 5, 5 (147) *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ νῆες εἶποντο*. . . . Cf. Eckhel, *Doctr. Num.* vi, p. 330; *BMC Roman Empire* ii (1930), nos. 597, 599, 616-17 (but see p. xlvi).

46. *B.J.* iv 1, 1 (2). Gamala is mentioned in the Mishnah (Arak. 9:6) among the cities walled since Joshua's time. Historically, its existence can be proved from the time of Alexander Jannaeus, *B.J.* i 4, 8 (105); *Ant.* xiii 15, 3 (394). Josephus describes it as a city in lower Gaulanitis, *πόλις Ταριχεῶν ἄντικρυς ὑπὲρ τὴν λίμνην κειμένη*, *B.J.* iv 1, 1 (2). He states that it stood on a hill that fell away sharply on both sides and in front and was only level at the rear; on the southerly slope, the houses were built close together, one over the other. It is probably to be located near the village of Jamli, in the immediate neighbourhood of Tell el-ehdēb, by the Nahr er-rukād. See Abel, *Géog. Pal.* II, p. 325.

47. *B.J.* iv 1, 2-10 (9-83), esp. 10 (83).

48. *B.J.* iv 1, 8 (54-61; esp. 61).

1000 cavalry. He himself led the 5th and 15th legions into winter quarters at Caesarea; the 10th he placed at Scythopolis.⁴⁹ Titus made light work of Gischala. On the second day of his presence before the walls of the city, the citizens voluntarily opened the gates, John with his band of Zealots having secretly left the city the night before and fled to Jerusalem.⁵⁰

Thus towards the end of A.D. 67 the whole of northern Palestine was once again subject to the Romans.

3. From the Subjugation of Galilee to the Siege of Jerusalem A.D. 68-69

The fiasco of the first year of the war was disastrous for the leaders of the rebellion. The fanatical nationalists ascribed—not without justification—the unfortunate course of events to a lack of drive in the conduct of the war. They therefore turned all their efforts to obtaining control of the situation and displacing their former leaders. As these would not voluntarily vacate their posts, a fearful and bloody civil war broke out in Jerusalem in the winter of A.D. 67-68.

The head of the fanatical nationalists or Zealots, to use their own name, was John of Gischala. After escaping from Titus, he went to Jerusalem with his troop, in about the beginning of November 67, and tried to rally the people to his side and to stimulate them to carry on the war with greater force and daring. He had no trouble in winning over the young men. And since all sorts of militant elements from the country were in any case pouring into the city, the Zealot party soon had the upper hand.⁵¹ Their first move was to get rid of those suspected of pro-Roman sympathies. A number of the most prominent, among them Antipas, a member of the Herodian house, were locked up and murdered in prison.⁵² Another High Priest was then chosen by lot, for the previous ones all belonged to the aristocratic party. This Phannias (or Phanni, Phanásus, Pinhas) from Aphthia had not the least under-

49. *B.J.* iv 2, 1 (84-7).

50. *B.J.* iv 2, 2-5 (92-120). Gischala (Heb.: גִּישְׁחָלָה) is also named in the Mishnah (Arak 9:6) among the cities walled since Joshua's time. Its name means, 'Fat Soil'. It did in fact produce first-class oil, *Vita* 13 (74-5); *B.J.* ii 21, 1 (591-2); *tMen.* 9:5; *bMen.* 85b. According to Jerome, it was the home of the parents of the Apostle Paul, *de viris illustr.* 5 (PL xxiii, 615). In the Jewish tradition of the Middle Ages, it was famed for its graves of rabbis and its ancient synagogue. Identical with el-Jish in Northern Galilee, it is situated about 6 miles north-west of Safed. Some ruins of the ancient synagogue still remain. See Abel, *Geog. Pal.* II, p. 338.

51. *B.J.* iv 3, 1-3 (121-37).

52. *B.J.* iv 3, 4-5 (135-46; esp. 140).

standing of the High Priestly office, but he was a man of the people, and that was the main thing.⁵³

The authorities, in the persons of Gorion son of Joseph,⁵⁴ the famous Pharisee Simeon ben Gamaliel,⁵⁵ the two High Priests Ananus son of Ananus and Jesus son of Gamaliel, tried for their part to rid themselves of the Zealots by force. They exhorted the people to put an end to their wild behaviour.⁵⁶ A speech delivered by Ananus to this effect did in fact encourage some of them to fight the Zealots.⁵⁷ These were in the minority, and were obliged to withdraw into the inner forecourt of the Temple where, since there was no wish to storm the sacred gates, they were carefully guarded.⁵⁸

To obtain support, the Zealots secretly sent messengers to the war-like Idumaeans and urged them to join them in an alliance on the pretext that the ruling party in Jerusalem was surreptitiously in league with the Romans. The Idumaeans appeared before the walls of the city, but as word had been received of their association with the Zealots they were not admitted.⁵⁹ During the night following their arrival there was a fearful storm; the wind howled and the rain poured in torrents. Screened by this, the Zealots managed to open the gates to their allies.⁶⁰ Hardly had the Idumaeans set foot in the city when they too began to rob and murder, faithfully supported by the Zealots. The establishment was too weak to offer resistance. The triumph of a reign of terror in Jerusalem was declared. Zealot fury, and that of the Idumaeans in league with them, was directed mainly against the prominent, respected, and well-to-do. All the leaders of the rebellion were disposed of as alleged friends of Rome. Conspicuous among those who fell victim to their blood lust were the High Priests Ananus and Jesus.⁶¹ Once, to give an appearance of legality to their savage operations, they even staged the farce of a formal trial. But when the court summoned for the purpose acquitted the accused, Zacharias ben Baruch, he was killed

53. *B.J.* iv 3, 6-8 (147-57; esp. 155-6). Cf. Derenbourg, *op. cit.*, p. 269; J. Jeremias, *Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus* (1969), pp. 192-3. On the variations of the High Priest's name, see vol. II, § 23, iv.

54. *B.J.* iv 3, 9 (159). But he is probably identical with the Joseph ben Gorion, mentioned above (p. 489).

55. See also *Vita* 38-39 (190-8), 44 (216-27), 60 (309 ff.); W. Bacher, *Die Agada der Tannaiten* I (*1903), pp. 12, 74, 86, 234; II (1890), pp. 322, 385; Derenbourg, *op. cit.* pp. 270-2, 474 ff.; A. Guttmann, *Rabbinic Judaism in the Making* (1970), pp. 182-4.

56. *B.J.* iv 3, 9 (159-61).

57. *B.J.* iv 3, 10 (163-92).

58. *B.J.* iv 3, 12 (196-207).

59. *B.J.* iv 4, 1-4 (224-82).

60. *B.J.* iv 4, 5-7 (283-300).

61. *B.J.* iv 5, 1-3 (305-33).

by a couple of Zealots with the sarcastic cry: 'You have our vote too'.⁶²

When the Idumaeans had had enough of murder and, moreover, realized that the allegedly imminent treachery would only slanderously implicate law-abiding citizens; they wished to have nothing more to do with the Zealots and left them.⁶³ But the Zealots continued their reign of terror with even less restraint. Gorion fell under their lash also. The party of the well to do, and the authorities generally, were by now so intimidated that there was no longer any thought of resistance. John of Gischala was all-powerful in the city.⁶⁴

It may have been at this time, if not earlier, that the Christian community fled from Jerusalem. They left the city 'as a result of divine guidance' and travelled to the Gentile, and therefore undisturbed, city of Pella in Peraea.⁶⁵

Vespasian's generals were of the opinion that these conditions should be exploited and the capital attacked immediately. They believed that with the fighting going on in the city, it could be taken with ease. Not so Vespasian. He considered it wiser to allow full vent to the internal struggle, which would thus lead to exhaustion.⁶⁶ To give the capital time to destroy itself, he directed his next operations against Peraea. He set off from Caesarea even before the good season had arrived, occupied Gadara, which had requested a garrison as protection against the anti-Roman elements in the city, on 4 Dystrus (Adar, March), and then returned to Caesarea.⁶⁷ A detachment of 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry which he left behind under the leadership of Placidus completed the subjugation of the whole of Peraea as far as Machaerus.⁶⁸ With the arrival of better weather,⁶⁹ Vespasian once again set off from Caesarea, this time with the greater part of his army, occupied Antipatris, captured Lydda and Jamnia, posted the 5th legion outside Emmaus, made successful forays throughout Idumaea, then turned back northwards by way of Emmaus and marched through Samaria to Neapolis (Shechem) via Corea, where he arrived on 2 Daisius (Sivan,

62. *B.J.* iv 5, 4 (334-43). This Zacharias has also been identified (erroneously) with the man named in Mt. 23:35; Lk. 9:51.

63. *B.J.* iv 5, 5 (345-52); 6, 1 (353).

64. *B.J.* iv 6, 1 (355-65).

65. Euseb. *HE* iii 5, 2-3. Epiphanius, *Haer.* 29, 7; *De mensuris*, 15. The emigration took place *κατὰ τινα χρησμόν τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκίμου δι' ἀποκαλύψεως ἐκδοθέντα κ. τ. λ.* (Euseb. *HE* iii 5, 3). On Pella, see vol. II, § 23. Cf. S. G. F. Brandon, *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church* (1957), ch. ix.

66. *B.J.* iv 6, 2-3 (366-7).

67. *B.J.* iv 7, 3-4 (413-19). On Gadara, see vol. II, § 23, i. Because of the description *μητρόπολις*, *B.J.* iv 7, 3 (413), only the well-known Gadara can be meant, though the context seems to favour a more southern location.

68. *B.J.* iv 7, 4-6 (419-39).

69. *B.J.* iv 8, 1 (443) *ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ἔαρος*.

May/June), and then to Jericho.⁷⁰ At Jericho and Adida he stationed Roman garrisons, while Gerasa (?) was taken and destroyed by a detachment under the command of Lucius Annius.⁷¹

The country was now sufficiently subjugated for the siege of the capital to begin. Vespasian therefore turned back to Caesarea and had just started preparations when news arrived of Nero's death (9 June A.D. 68). With this, the situation suddenly changed. The future of the whole empire was uncertain. He accordingly suspended his military projects and decided to await further developments. When news came in the winter of A.D. 68/9 of Galba's elevation to the throne, he sent his son Titus to Rome to pay homage to the new emperor and await his commands. But Titus had reached no further than Corinth when he heard of Galba's assassination (15 January A.D. 69), at which he returned to his father in Caesarea. Vespasian continued for the time being to play a waiting game.⁷²

Soon, however, circumstances compelled him once again to take action. A certain Simon Bar-Giora, 'son of the proselyte',⁷³ a man of the same cast of mind as John of Gischala, inspired by the same fierce desire for freedom and just as intolerant of authority, had profited from the cease-fire to assemble a band of followers with whom he roamed the southern districts of Palestine, robbing and looting. Wherever he went, devastation marked his path. Among other exploits he made a surprise attack on Hebron and made off with a valuable haul of plunder.⁷⁴

Vespasian therefore found it necessary to occupy Judaea even more completely than before. On 5 Daisius (Sivan, May/June) A.D. 69, after letting a full year pass without operations, he set off once again from Caesarea, subjugated the districts of Gophna and Acrabata and the

70. *B.J.* iv 8, 1 (449). On Corea, see above, p. 238. The other towns are known. The 5th legion probably stayed in the fortified camp at Emmaus until A.D. 70, cf. *B.J.* v 1, 6 (42); 2, 3 (68). The inscriptions of soldiers of this legion discovered at Emmaus thus apparently derive from this period (CIL III 6647; 14155¹¹⁻¹²). On all three, the man in question is termed 'mil(ēs) leg(ionis) V Mac(edonicae)'. For further evidence see RE XII, col. 1575, and cf. L.-M. Vincent, F.-M. Abel, *Emmaüs* (1932); pp. 319-25.

71. *B.J.* iv 9, 1 (486). On Adida, see above, p. 186. It seems dubious whether 'Gerasa' can be the famous Hellenistic city of the Decapolis, since this was certainly on the Roman side; see C. H. Kraeling, *Gerasa* (1938), pp. 45-6. L. Annius is possibly L. Annius Bassus, PIR² A 637.

72. *B.J.* iv 9, 2 (497-9). For further details on the journey of Titus, see Tac. *Hist* ii 1-4.

73. Josephus constantly writes *υἱὸς Γιώρα*. The form *Βαργιορᾶς*, Bargiora, appears in Dio lxxvi 7, 1, and Tac. *Hist.* v 12. (Tacitus erroneously ascribes this surname to John). *ܘܢܝܘܪܐ* is the Aramaic form of *בן גורא* 'proselyte'. See vol. III, § 31, v.

74. *B.J.* iv 9, 3-8 (503-29). Cf. O. Michel, 'Studien zu Josephus', NTSt 14 (1967/8), pp. 402-8.

towns of Bethel and Ephraim, and approached the vicinity of Jerusalem, while his tribune Cerealis conquered and destroyed the city of Hebron, which had offered resistance. With the exception of Jerusalem and the fortresses of Herodium, Masada and Machaerus, all Palestine was now subject to Rome.⁷⁵

Even before Simon saw himself prevented from continuing his raids through Idumaea by this campaign of Vespasian, the gates of the capital had already opened to him. Here, until the spring of A.D. 69, John of Gischala had played the all-powerful tyrant. Josephus has fearful tales to relate of the anarchic state of affairs prevailing in Jerusalem under his regime.⁷⁶ The people, who had for a long time cursed his rule, saw in the arrival of Simon Bar-Giora a favourable opportunity to get rid of their tyrant. On the suggestion of the High Priest Matthias, Simon was invited to enter the city. He readily accepted the invitation and marched into Jerusalem in the month of Xanthicus (Nisan, March/April), A.D. 69. But whereas the people had hoped to be freed by him from the tyranny of John, they now found themselves with two tyrants, who although they fought each other, nevertheless regarded moneyed citizens as their common enemy.⁷⁷

Vespasian had scarcely returned to Caesarea when news arrived that Vitellius had been raised to the throne as emperor. It then occurred to the legions in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, that they could provide the empire with an emperor just as well as their comrades in the West, and that Vespasian was more worthy of the throne than the gormandising Vitellius. On 1 July A.D. 69, Vespasian was proclaimed emperor in Egypt. A few days later the Palestinian and Syrian legions followed suit. Before the middle of July, Vespasian was recognized as emperor throughout the entire east.⁷⁸

He now had other things to do than prosecute the war against the rebellious Jews. After receiving embassies at Berytus from many Syrian and other cities, he travelled to Antioch and from there sent Mucianus overland to Rome with an army.⁷⁹ He himself went to Alexandria. During his stay there he received word that his cause in

75. *B.J.* iv 9, 9 (550-5). On Gophna and Acrabata, see vol. II, § 23, i. On Bethel and Ephraim, see above pp. 175 and 182.

76. *B.J.* iv 9, 10 (556-65).

77. *B.J.* iv 9, 11-12 (573-7); v 13, 1 (527-33).

78. *B.J.* iv 10, 2-6 (592-620); *Tac. Hist.* ii 79-81; *Suet. Div. Vesp.* 6. Tacitus and Suetonius assert that the Egyptian legions were the first to proclaim Vespasian emperor; according to Josephus, those of Vespasian led the way. Further, according to Tacitus, the proclamation took place 'quintum Nonas Iulias'; according to Suetonius, 'Idus Iul.' After his proclamation as emperor Vespasian gave Josephus his freedom in thankful remembrance of his prophecy, *B.J.* iv 10, 7 (623-9).

79. *B.J.* iv 10, 6 (621); 11, 1 (630-2); *Tac. Hist.* ii 81-3.

Rome had triumphed and that Vitellius had been murdered (20 December A.D. 69). But he stayed on in Alexandria until the beginning of the summer of A.D. 70,⁸⁰ whilst his son Titus, to whom he had entrusted the continuance of the Jewish war, led an army to Palestine.⁸¹

In Jerusalem during this time the internal disruption had grown even worse. Instead of the two parties of John and Simon, there were now three; a new party under Eleazar, Simon's son, had split off from John's party. Simon dominated the upper city and a large part of the lower city; John, the Temple mount; and Eleazar, the inner forecourt of the Temple. All three were locked in ceaseless fighting and had turned the city into a continuous battlefield. In addition, they were rash enough to destroy by fire the enormous stores of grain in the city in order to prevent each other from obtaining it, not realizing that they were thereby robbing themselves of the means of defence.⁸² Meanwhile, Titus made preparations for the siege.

4. The Siege and Capture of Jerusalem A.D. 70⁸³

The army at Titus's disposal consisted of four legions. Apart from his father's three legions, the 5th, 10th, and 15th, he also had the 12th, which had already been in Syria under Cestius and had started the war so unfortunately. In addition, he had the numerous contingents of the allied kings.⁸⁴ The commanders of the legions were Sextus Vettulenus Cerealis for the 5th legion, A. Larcius Lepidus Sulpicianus for the 10th, M. Tittius Frugi for the 15th; the commander of the 12th is not named. At Titus's side as supreme adviser was Tiberius Iulius

80. According to Josephus, *B.J.* iv 11, 5 (658), Vespasian wished to set off for Rome *λήξαντος τοῦ χειμῶνος*. Tacitus, however, states that he waited in Alexandria for the summer winds and the prospect of a safe voyage (*Hist.* iv 81 'stato aestivis flatibus dies et certa maris opperiebatur'. On his route, see esp. *Jos. B.J.* vii 2, 1 (21-3). But he did not reach Rome until in the second half of A.D. 70. See W. Weber, *Jos. u. Vesp.*, pp. 250 ff.

81. *B.J.* iv 11, 5 (658-63). On Titus's march from Alexandria to Caesarea, see Chamblu, *Philologus* 51 (1892), pp. 729 ff. On the constitutional position of Titus during the war, see *RE* VI, cols. 2700-13.

82. *B.J.* v 1, 1-5 (2-35); *Tac. Hist.* v 12. On the destruction of the grain stores, see also the rabbinic tradition (bGit. 56a; *Eccl.R.* 7:11) in Derenbourg, *op. cit.*, p. 281. On provisioning during the siege see A. Büchler, 'Zur Verproviantierung Jerusalems im Jahre 69/70 n. Chr.', *Gedenkbuch zur Erinnerung an David Kaufmann* (1900), pp. 16-43.

83. The short report of Dio, lxxvi 4-6, on the siege of Jerusalem gives a few details absent from Josephus. They are however insignificant, and we cannot be certain where they should be inserted into Josephus's account. Cf. also W. Weber, *Jos. u. Vesp.*, pp. 185 ff.

84. *B.J.* v 1, 6 (41-2); *Tac. Hist.* v 1.

Alexander, the former procurator of Judaea.⁸⁵ While a part of the army received orders to meet him outside Jerusalem, Titus himself set off with the main force from Caesarea⁸⁶ and reached the walls of the Holy City a few days before Passover of A.D. 70.⁸⁷

Titus had hurried on ahead of the legions with 600 cavalry to reconnoître, and in doing so had advanced so far that he had run into serious danger from an attack by the Jews. It was only thanks to his own bravery that he escaped.⁸⁸ Generally speaking, the Romans had painful experiences of their opponents' fanatical courage from the moment of their arrival. While the 10th legion which had marched from Jericho was still occupied with fortifying its camp on the Mount of the Olives, it was attacked with such ferocity that it almost suffered total defeat. It was only through the personal intervention of Titus that the legion was brought to stand its ground and repulse the attack.⁸⁹

But the fighting between the parties in the city had still not abated. With the Romans standing before the gates, another massacre took place during the Passover festival. Eleazar's party had opened the gates of the Temple forecourt to the festival visitors. John of Gischala exploited this to smuggle in his men with concealed weapons and they fell on Eleazar and his men without warning. Taken unawares, they were too weak to resist and were forced to yield the forecourt to John's

85. *B.J.* vi 4, 3 (237). On the officers mentioned, see L. Renier, 'Mémoire sur les officiers qui assistèrent au conseil de guerre tenu par Titus . . .', *Mém. Inst. de France* 26, 1 (1867), pp. 269-321. On the individuals (1) Sex. Vettulenus Cerialis, see below, p. 515; (2) (A.) Larcus Lepidus (Sulpicianus), *PIR*² L 94; (3) 'Titus' Frugi is properly Tittius Frugi, *PIR*¹ T 208; (4) Tiberius Iulius Alexander (see above, pp. 456-8) is described by Josephus τῶν στρατευμάτων ἄρχων, *B.J.* vi 1, 6 (46), πάντων τῶν στρατευμάτων ἐπάρχων, *B.J.* vi 4, 3 (237). On the basis of this Mommsen restored the Aradus Inscription (CIG III, p. 1178, n. 4536 f. = Hermes 19 (1884), p. 644 = OGIS 586 = IGR III 1015 [Τιβερίου Ἰουλίου Ἀλλ[ε]ξ[άνδρου ἐπι]άρχου [Ἰουδαίου στρατοῦ]. Tiberius Iulius Alexander was thus 'Chief of the General Staff'. The position of this official of equestrian rank in an army commanded by a senatorial general was similar to that of the *praefectus praetorio* in an army commanded by the emperor himself. Cf. CIL III 6809. Indeed, a papyrus, P. Hibeh 215, does in fact describe him as γενομένου καὶ ἐπάρχου πραι[τωρίου]. This may refer to his role in Titus's army or to an actual tenure of the Praetorian Prefecture in Rome; for the latter view E. G. Turner, *JRS* 44 (1954), pp. 54-64; cf. *PIR*² I 139. See now IGLS 4011.

86. *B.J.* v 1, 6 (40).

87. As appears from v 3, 1 (98-9); cf. v 13, 7 (567). It was once supposed that the elder Pliny was also in Titus's army as ἀντεπίτροπος of Tiberius Iulius Alexander, following Mommsen's restoration of the Aradus Inscription (CIG III, p. 1178, n. 4536 f.), see n. 85 above. But the identification is untenable. See most recently R. Syme, 'Pliny the Procurator', *HSCPh* 63 (1965), pp. 201-36.

88. *B.J.* v 2, 1-2 (47-66).

89. *B.J.* v 2, 4-6. (71-97)

supporters. From then on, there were again only two parties in Jerusalem, those of John and of Simon.⁹⁰

To understand the siege which now followed, it is necessary to possess a general idea of the layout of the city.⁹¹ Jerusalem lay on two hills, a higher western one, and a smaller one to the east, divided by a deep ravine running from north to south, the so-called Tyropoeon. On the larger western hill stood the upper city, on the smaller eastern hill, the lower city. The latter was also called the 'Acra' because it was here that the fortress of Jerusalem built by Antiochus Epiphanes had formerly stood.⁹² North of the Acra lay the site of the Temple, the extent of which had been considerably enlarged by Herod the Great. Adjoining the Temple area on its northern side was the Antonia fortress. The Temple site was surrounded on all four sides by a strong wall and thus constituted a small fort in its own right. The upper and lower cities were enclosed by a common wall which joined the western wall of the Temple area, then ran westward, swept around the upper and lower cities in a great southern curve, and finally came to an end at the south-eastern corner of the Temple site. Furthermore, the upper city must have been separated from the lower city by a wall running from north to south along the Tyropoeon. For Titus, when already in possession of the lower city, still had to direct his battering-rams against the wall of the upper city. On the west, south and east, the outer wall stood on high precipices; only to the north was the ground reasonably level. Here, there was a second wall forming a northerly curve and enclosing the older suburb; and then, in a still wider northerly sweep, a third wall begun by Agrippa I and only completed during the revolt when necessity demanded it. This third wall enclosed the so-called New City or suburb of Bezetha.⁹³

As the city's layout itself demanded, Titus directed his offensive against the northern side, hence against the outermost third, or from the standpoint of the attackers, first wall. It was only then, as the battering-rams began their work at some three points, that the internal fighting ended and both parties, those of John of Gischala and Simon Bar-Giora, joined forces. In one of their attacks they fought with such success that it was due only to the intervention of Titus (who himself shot down twelve of the enemy) that the machines were saved.⁹⁴ After fifteen days' work, one of the powerful battering rams knocked a hole

90. *B.J.* v 3, 1 (99-105); Tac. *Hist.* v 12.

91. Cf. the description in *B.J.* v 4 (136-83).

92. For the site of the Acra see above, pp. 154-5.

93. On Bezetha, cf. above, p. 488.

94. *B.J.* v 6, 2-5 (258-90); Suet. *Div. Tit.* 5 'duodecim propugnatores totidem sagittarum confecit ictibus'.

in the wall, the Romans broke in, and on 7 Artemisius (Iyyar, April/May) obtained control of the first wall.⁹⁵

The assault on the second wall began. Five days after the capture of the first, this too gave way before the onslaught of the Roman battering-ram. With a picked band, Titus moved in but was repulsed by the Jews. Four days later, however, he took it again, and this time retained control of it permanently.⁹⁶

He now threw up two ramparts against the upper city and two against the Antonia; each of the four legions had one rampart to build. Simon Bar-Giora conducted the defence of the upper city, John of Gischala that of the Antonia.⁹⁷ While the works were in progress, Josephus was ordered to call on the city to surrender.⁹⁸ This had no result, but food had already begun to run short and many of the poorer inhabitants went out to look for something to eat. Whoever fell into the hands of the Romans was crucified in full view of the city so as to strike terror into the besieged, or was driven back into the city with mutilated limbs.⁹⁹

On 29 Artemisius (Iyyar, April/May), the four ramparts were completed. Simon and John had been biding their time until they were finished in order to direct all their energy to demolishing these products of exhausting and laborious toil. John of Gischala dealt with those set against the Antonia by digging under them a tunnel supported by posts, to which he then set fire. As a result, the ramparts fell in and were destroyed in the blaze. Two days later, Simon Bar-Giora fired and destroyed the ramparts against the upper city also.¹⁰⁰

Before attempting to construct new ramparts, Titus resorted to another device. He ringed the whole city with a continuous stone wall (*τείχος*) so as to cut off supplies and starve it out. The task was completed with amazing speed within three days. Numerous armed guards prevented anyone from emerging.¹⁰¹ As a result, starvation in the city reached fearful proportions: Josephus's imagination was fertile, but even if only half of what he says is true, it was still horrible enough.¹⁰²

95. *B.J.* v 7, 2 (299-302).

96. *B.J.* v 7, 3-4 (303-30); 8, 1-2 (331-47).

97. *B.J.* v 9, 2 (358); cf. *II*, 4 (467-72).

98. *B.J.* v 9, 3-4 (362-419).

99. *B.J.* v 10, 2-5 (424-45); *II*, 1-2 (446-59).

100. *B.J.* v 11, 4-6 (466-85).

101. *B.J.* v 12, 1-32 (499-511); cf. *Lk.* 19:43.

102. *B.J.* v 12, 3 (512-18); 13, 7 (567-72); vi 3, 3-4 (193-213). Cf. *Aboth de R. Nathan A*, 6 (ed. Schechter, p. 32); cf. *bGit.* 56 ab. One famous story is that of Maria of Beth-Ezob who, driven by hunger, devoured her own child. See *B.J.* vi 3, 4 (201-13); Euseb. *HE* iii 6; Jerome, *ad Joel* 1:9 ff. (CCL lxxvi, p. 170). But the eating of one's own children is a customary part of the portrayal of the horrors of war: thus as a threat: *Lev.* 26:29, *Dt.* 28:29, *Jer.* 19:9, *Ezek.* 5:10; or as history, 2 *Kg.* 6:28-9, *Lam.* 2:20, 4:10; *Bar.* 2:3.

But only a Josephus can, in such circumstances, reproach John of Gischala for applying the sacred oil and wine to profane purposes.¹⁰³

In the meantime, Titus also built new ramparts, this time four against the Antonia. Owing to the complete devastation of the surrounding district, the timber for these had to be brought from a distance of 90 stadia (4½ hours journey).¹⁰⁴ After twenty-one days of labour they were completed. An attack on them made by John of Gischala on 1 Panemus (Tammuz, June/July) misfired because it was not carried out with the same vigour as before, whereas the Romans had redoubled their vigilance.¹⁰⁵ Scarcely had the Jews withdrawn when the battering rams began to beat against the wall, at first without much success. Nevertheless, it was so badly shattered by the blows that it soon afterwards subsided of its own accord at the spot where the rams had been at work. Even so, the storming operation was still difficult because John of Gischala had already erected a second wall behind it. On 3 Panemus, after a rousing speech by Titus, a Syrian soldier named Sabinus tried with eleven comrades to scale the wall, but fell with three of them in battle.¹⁰⁶ Two days later (5 Panemus) some twenty to thirty others combined to renew the attempt. They scaled the wall secretly by night and struck down the first sentries; Titus pressed on quickly after them and drove the Jews back to the Temple zone. The Romans were indeed driven back from there, but they captured the Antonia, which was at once razed to the ground.¹⁰⁷

In spite of war and famine, the daily morning and evening sacrifice had continued to be offered regularly. But on 17 Panemus it finally had to be suspended, though even then not so much due to the famine as the lack of men.¹⁰⁸ Since a further call for surrender by Josephus brought no result, and a night assault on the Temple area by a picked military detachment proved a failure,¹⁰⁹ Titus now made preparations for a full-scale attack. The Temple formed a fairly regular square surrounded by stout walls along the inside of which ran colonnades. Within this great area, the inner forecourt, which was likewise surrounded on all sides by strong walls, formed a second line of defence offering safety to the besieged even after the loss of the outer court. Titus had first to secure control of the outer walls. Once again four

103. *B.J.* v 13, 6 (562-6). Cf. *mMid.* 2:6, referring to the 'Chamber of the House of Oil' situated in the south-west corner of the Court of the Women where the wine and oil were stored.

104. *B.J.* v 12, 4 (522-4).

105. *B.J.* vi 1, 1-3 (3-25).

106. *B.J.* vi 1, 3-6 (26-67).

107. *B.J.* vi 1, 7-8 (68-92); 2, 1 (93).

108. *B.J.* vi 2, 1 (94). Cf. *mTaan* 4:6, 'On 17 Tammuz the daily offering (*תמידי*) ceased'. This is listed among the five disasters which took place on that day.

109. *B.J.* vi 2, 1-6 (94-148).

ramparts were erected, the building materials for which had to be brought from a distance of 100 stadia (5 hours journey),¹¹⁰ On 27 Panemus, while this work was going on, a number of Romans met their death. Deceived by the Jews' retreat from the top of the western colonnade, they climbed it. But it had been crammed with combustible materials, and once the Romans were up, the Jews set fire to the colonnade. The blaze spread with such rapidity that the soldiers were unable to escape and perished in the flames.¹¹¹

When on 8 Lous (Ab, July/August) the ramparts were finished, the rams were produced and the siege operation began. But they could do nothing against the gigantic walls. To achieve his aim, Titus therefore fired the gates and thus opened a way into the outer Temple court.¹¹² On the following day (9 Ab), when the gates were completely burnt down, he held a council of war at which it was decided to spare the Temple.¹¹³ But a day later (10 Ab), the Jews mounted two attacks in quick succession from the inner forecourt. In repelling the second of these, one of the soldiers previously busy extinguishing the blaze in the colonnades, threw a brand into a chamber of the Temple proper.¹¹⁴ When Titus was informed of this, he hurried to the scene, the generals and legions after him. He gave orders to extinguish the blaze. But in the wild battle which now developed, his commands were ignored and the flames took an ever-increasing hold. He still hoped to save at least the inner Temple, and repeated the orders to extinguish the fire. But in their fury, the soldiers no longer paid attention to his commands. Instead of putting it out, they threw in new firebrands and the whole magnificent edifice fell prey to the flames with no hope of its being saved. Titus was just able to inspect the interior before it was overwhelmed.¹¹⁵

110. *B.J.* vi 2, 7 (149-51).

111. *B.J.* vi 3, 1-2 (177-92).

112. *B.J.* vi 4, 1-2 (220-35). The use of fire is also mentioned by Dio lxvi 6, 1, but he ascribes it to the Jews, who employed it to hinder the Romans from advancing. This seems very improbable.

113. *B.J.* vi 4, 3 (237-43).

114. *B.J.* vi 4, 4-5 (244-53).

115. *B.J.* vi 4, 6-7 (254-66). According to the foregoing, the date of the Temple fire is 10 Lous = Ab, as Josephus also expressly states, *B.J.* vi 4, 5 (250). Rabbinic tradition, however, places the destruction of the Temple on 9 Ab (mTaan. 4:6), and in fact on the eve of that day (bTaan. 29a), i.e. by our reckoning, on 8 Ab. It thus regards as the day of the destruction the day on which Titus fired the gates of the Temple. Rabbinic tradition records (bTaan. 29a) that it was precisely at the 'going out' of the Sabbath that the Temple was destroyed. Dio represents Jerusalem as destroyed ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τοῦ Κρόνου ἡμέρᾳ . . . (lxvi 7, 2).

Josephus's narrative, quoted above, presents Titus as striving to preserve the Temple proper, *B.J.* vi 4, 3 (241-3). An alternative view is that of Sulpicius Severus, *Chron.* ii 30, 6-7; 'Fertur Titus adhibito consilio prius deliberasse, an

While the Romans butchered all who fell into their hands, children and the aged, priests and people, and deliberately fanned the terrible conflagration so that nothing would be spared, John of Gischala with his Zealot band managed to escape into the upper city. The Temple had not yet burnt out before the legions had set up their standards in the outer court and hailed their general as Emperor.¹¹⁶

The destruction of the Temple did not, however, mean that the conquest was completed. The upper city, the final sanctuary of the besieged, still remained to be taken. Titus once again called on Simon and John to capitulate. But the besieged demanded a free withdrawal, which could not be granted them.¹¹⁷ At Titus's command, those parts of the city occupied by the Romans—Ophlas, the Archives, the council chamber, the lower city as far as Siloam—were now set ablaze, while in the upper city the tyrants engaged in murder and plunder.¹¹⁸

templum tanti operis everteret. Etenim nonnullis videbatur, aedem sacratam ultra omnia mortalia illustrem non oportere deleri, quae servata modestiae Romanum testimonium, diruta perennem crudelitatis notam praeberet. At contra alii et Titus ipse evertendum in primis templum censebant, quo plenius Iudaeorum et Christianorum religio tolleretur: quippe has religiones, licet contrarias sibi, isdem tamen ab auctoribus profectas; Christianos ex Iudaeis extitisse: radice sublata stirpem facile perituram.' With a somewhat different motivation, Orosius, vii 9, 5-6, also ascribes the destruction to Titus. This view, which would suggest that Josephus may have deliberately altered the account to clear Titus of the 'nota crudelitatis', is upheld by W. Weber, *Josephus und Vespasian* (1921), pp. 72 ff., following J. Bernays, *Ueber die Chronik des Sulpicius Severus* (1861), pp. 48-61 = *Ges. Abhandlungen* II, pp. 159-81, etc. Cf. Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.* V (1885), 538 ff. = ET II, pp. 217 ff., and H. Montefiore, 'Sulpicius Severus and Titus' Council of War', *Historia* 11 (1962), pp. 156-70. In support of the latter view it may be urged that the account in Josephus was written to 'whitewash' Titus, whereas his conduct elsewhere (e.g., in the slaughter of thousands of Jews in the 'games') does not suggest that he would be any less brutal here. Valeton has drawn attention to the fact that the false impression in Josephus is conveyed by his failure to mention (a) that in the War Council it was expressly resolved to occupy the Temple, and thus, if need be, to take it by force, if not also to destroy it; and (b) that the Temple was occupied by the Jews, and consequently had to be stormed. Both follow from Dio lxvi 6, 1-3, and indirectly also from Josephus himself, *B.J.* vi 4, 5 (249); 5; i (271-80). But whatever may have been the case, a definite directive on the part of Vespasian (which Valeton claimed) cannot be discovered. If there had been one, the Council of War would have been superfluous; see I. M. J. Valeton *Verslagen en Mededeelingen der K. Akad. van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde*, 4, reeks, deel 3 (1899), pp. 87-116.

116. *B.J.* vi 5, 1-2 (271-87). For the hailing of Titus as Emperor, see *B.J.* vi 6, 1 (316); Suet. *Div. Tit.* 5; Dio lxvi 7, 2; Oros. vii 9, 6. On the significance of the proceedings, see esp. Suet., *loc. cit.* (Titus was suspected of wishing to defect from Vespasian and make himself the independent ruler of the East). Further details RE VI, col. 2490.

117. *B.J.* vi 6, 2-3 (323-53).

118. *B.J.* vi 6, 3 (353-5); 7, 2-3 (363-73).

Since there was no prospect of a voluntary surrender, it was once again necessary to erect ramparts. They were thrown up at the north-western corner of the upper city near Herod's palace, and at the north-eastern corner, close to the so-called Xystus. Their construction began on 20 Lous (Ab, July/August) and finished on 7 Gorpiaeus (Elul, August/September). The battering-rams soon breached the wall and the soldiers forced their way in with little difficulty; the besieged in their desperate condition were no longer able to offer serious resistance.¹¹⁹ Some of them tried to fight their way through the surrounding walls at Siloam. But they were repulsed and fled into underground galleries. Meanwhile the entire upper city was occupied by the Romans. The military standards were set up and the hymn of victory sung. The soldiers ranged through the city, murdering, burning and looting. After a siege of five months during which laboriously, step by step, they had gained one position after another, on 8 Gorpiaeus the whole city was at last in the hands of the victors.¹²⁰

Those of the inhabitants who had not yet fallen victim to famine or sword, were executed or sent to the mines, or reserved for gladiatorial combat. The handsomest and strongest of the men were selected for the triumph. Among the refugees compelled by hunger to emerge from the underground galleries was John of Gischala. As he begged for mercy, his life was spared, but he was sentenced to life-long imprisonment. Simon Bar-Giora, who was not arrested until some time later, was kept as a victim for the triumph.¹²¹ The city was levelled to the ground. Only the three towers of Herod's palace—Hippicus, Phasaël and Mariamme—and one part of the wall were left standing, the first as memorials to the city's former strength, the other as protection for the garrison remaining behind. The hard-won victory was celebrated by Titus with a panegyric addressed to the army, rewards for outstanding acts of valour in battle, a sacrifice of thanksgiving and a festive banquet.¹²²

5. The Sequel to the War A.D. 71-74(?)

While the 10th legion remained behind in Jerusalem as a garrison, Titus marched with the rest of the army to Caesarea Maritima, where

119. *B.J.* vi 8, 1-5 (274-407).

120. *B.J.* vi 8, 5 (407); 10, 1 (435). For preliminary reports of recent archaeological evidence of the destruction of Jerusalem see B. Mazar, *BA* 33 (1970), pp. 47-60; N. Avigad, *IEJ* 20 (1970), pp. 6-8.

121. *B.J.* vi 9, 2 (415-19), 4 (427-34); vii 2, 1-2 (21-36).

122. *B.J.* vii 1, 1-3 (1-17). The so-called Tower of David in Jerusalem incorporates the remains of one of these three towers (Phasaël).

the booty was deposited and the prisoners placed in custody.¹²³ From there, Titus went to Caesarea Philippi, where some of the prisoners were made to take part in fights with wild animals and gladiatorial games.¹²⁴ At Caesarea Maritima, where he returned once more, he celebrated the birthday of his brother Domitian (24 October), again with spectacular games. Similarly, at Berytus he celebrated his father Vespasian's birthday (17 November). After a rather protracted stay in Berytus,¹²⁵ Titus marched to Antioch, celebrating in the cities through which he passed with shows in which the Jewish prisoners were forced to kill each other in gladiatorial combats. A brief halt in Antioch was followed by a further march to Zeugma on the Euphrates; from there, he returned to Antioch, and from there travelled to Egypt. At Alexandria he discharged the legions. Seven hundred prisoners distinguished for their handsome appearance, together with the ring-leaders Simon and John, were reserved for the triumph.¹²⁶ Titus then sailed for Rome,¹²⁷ where he was received by his father and the people with jubilation and celebrated (in A.D. 71) a joint triumph with his father and brother despite the fact that the Senate had granted each of them a triumph of his own.¹²⁸ In the course of it, Simon Bar-Giora,

123. *B.J.* vii 2-3 (5, 17, 20). At the time of Cassius Dio (the beginning of the third century A.D.), the 10th legion was still based in Judaea, Dio lv 23, 4. Eusebius is the first to mention it as the garrison of Aela on the Red Sea (*Onomast.* ed. Klostermann, p. 6). Inscriptions referring to it have been found at Jerusalem, e.g., CIL III 6638; 6659=12090; 14155³, 23; AE 1904, 202; 1939, 157; cf. 1926, 136; 1928, 36; 1964, 189. Cf. ILS 9059 referring to the discharge in A.D. 93 of veterans 'qui militaverunt Hierosolymnis (sic) in leg. X Fretense'. Cf. RE XII, cols. 1673-5 and B. Lifshitz, 'Sur la date du transfert de la legio VI Ferrata en Palestine', *Latomus* 19 (1960), pp. 109-11. See also *IEJ* 14 (1964), pp. 244, 250-2 (*vexillationes* at Caesarea); D. Barag, 'The Countermarks of the *Legio Decima Fretensis*', in *The Patterns of Monetary Development in Phoenicia and Palestine in Antiquity*, ed. A. Kindler (1967), pp. 117-25; *idem*, 'Brick Stamp-Impressions of the Legio X Fretensis', *Bonn. Jahrb.* 167 (1967), pp. 244-67 (= *Eretz Israel* 8 (1967), pp. 168-82, in Hebrew).

124. *B.J.* vii 2, 1 (23-4).

125. *B.J.* vii 3, 1 (39).

126. *B.J.* vii 5, 1-3 (96-118).

127. Chamblu placed Titus's arrival in Rome in 'about the middle of June 71', *Philologus* 44 (1885), 507-17. See RE VI, col. 2706.

128. *B.J.* vii 5, 3-7 (119-58); Dio lxvi 7, 2. The triumphal arch of Titus, which still stands, was not erected 'divo Tito' until after his death. The Jewish War is not commemorated in the inscription on the Arch of Titus (CIL VI 945=ILS 265). On the other hand, another Arch which stood in the Circus Maximus and was destroyed in the 14th or perhaps the 15th century, bore the following pompous and, as far as the earlier history of Jerusalem is concerned, untrue inscription (dated A.D. 81 and preserved in Codex Einsiedlensis): 'Senatus populusque Romanus imp. Tito Caesari divi Vespasiani f. Vespasian[o] Augusto . . . quod praeceptis patri(s) consiliisq(ue) gentem Iudaeorum domuit et urbem Hierusolymam omnibus ante se ducibus regibus gentibus aut frustra petitam aut omnino intem[pt]atam delevit', CIL VI 944=ILS 264. Coins of Vespasian, Titus and

the enemy leader, was by ancient custom carried from the procession to prison, and there executed.¹²⁹ Among the prizes of war carried in the triumphal march were the two precious golden objects from the Temple at Jerusalem—the Table of Shewbread and the Seven-branched Candlestick.¹³⁰ Vespasian deposited these in the Temple of the Goddess of Peace (*Ἐιρήνη*, Pax) which he had rebuilt,¹³¹ but which was later burnt down under Commodus.¹³² It is not known what happened to them afterwards. They were probably taken to Africa by Geiseric when the Vandals sacked Rome in A.D. 455, and from there transferred to Constantinople by Belisarius when he destroyed the Vandal empire in A.D. 534.¹³³

Domitian have also been found bearing the words: *Ἰουδαίας ἐλωκυίας, devicta Iudaea, Iudaea capta*. *BMC Roman Empire* II (1930), p. 473; *BMC Palestine*, pp. 276-9; Reifenberg, *Ancient Jewish Coins* (1947), pp. 59-60; Meshorer, *Jewish Coins of the Second Temple Period*, pp. 107-9.

129. *B.J.* vii 5, 6 (153-5); Dio lxvi 7, 2. Simon was taken 'to the place adjoining the Forum', *B.J.* vii 5, 6 (154), *εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐσύρετο τόπον* . . . Havercamp rightly comments here: '*scil.* carcerem, quem Livius dicit Foro imminere'. The *carcer Mamertinus* was situated by the Forum. It was here, in its lower part, the *Tullianum*, that for example Jugurtha and the Catilinarian conspirators were strangled. Cf. *RE* s.v. 'Tullianum', and Platner and Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (1929), s.v. 'carcer'.

130. *B.J.* vii 5, 5 (148). Both are represented on the Arch of Titus in Rome. Cf. W. Eltester, 'Der Siebenarmige Leuchter und der Titusbogen', *Festschrift J. Jeremias* (1960), pp. 62-76; L. Yarden, *The Tree of Light* (1971), pp. 5-7.

131. *B.J.* vii 5, 7 (158-62). The temple of Pax was not dedicated until A.D. 75 (Dio lxvi 15, 1). Vespasian kept a Book of the Law taken from Jerusalem and the purple curtains from the Temple in his palace, *B.J.* vii 5, 7 (162).

132. Herodian i 14, 2.

133. On the later fate of these items of spoil, see F. Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter* I (1886), pp. 204-7; also Yarden, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. Among the treasures accumulated by Alaric in Carcassone were 'precious objects belonging to King Solomon', namely articles adorned with gems brought from Jerusalem by the Romans (*πρασιά γὰρ λίθος αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ ἐκαλλώπιζεν, ἅπερ ἐξ Ἱεροσολύμων: Ῥωμαῖοι τὸ παλαιὸν εἶλον* . . . Procop. *de bello Gothico* i 12, 42. But other things, and among them, as it seems, the Temple vessels, must have remained in Rome, for in the sack of Rome in A.D. 455, Geiseric took among other things: *κεμήλια δλόχρυσά καὶ διάλιθα ἐκκλησιαστικά, καὶ σκεύη Ἑβραϊκά, ἅπερ ὁ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ Τίτος μετὰ τὴν ἄλωσιν Ἱεροσολύμων εἰς Ῥώμην ἤγαγεν* . . . Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. de Boer, I (1883), p. 109; cf. Georgius Cedrenus, ed. Bekker, I, p. 606; Anastasius *Biblioth.*, in de Boer's edition of Theophanes, II, 109. It was these items that Belisarius brought to Constantinople in A.D. 534 from Carthage (Procopius, *de bello Vandalico* ii 9, 5 *ἐν οἷς καὶ τὰ Ἰουδαίων κειμήλια ἦν, ἅπερ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ Τίτος μετὰ τὴν τῶν Ἱεροσολύμων ἄλωσιν εἰς Ῥώμην ἤγαγεν* . . . So also, Theophanes, *Chronographia* (ed. de Boer), I, 199, and Anastasius, *Biblioth.* (*ibidem*) II, 138. Procopius goes on to say that when a certain Jew saw these objects, he drew the attention of one of the emperor's trusted men to the fact that their unlawful possession had been the downfall of Rome and Carthage. Justinian therefore sent them at once to Jerusalem (*ἐς τῶν Χριστιανῶν τὰ ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ἱερά* . . .).

The capture of the capital certainly entitled Titus to the celebration of a triumph. But Palestine was still not completely subdued, for the fortresses of Herodium, Machaerus and Masada remained in rebel hands. Their reduction was assigned to Lucilius Bassus, the governor of Palestine at that time. In the case of Herodium he seems to have succeeded without difficulty.¹³⁴ The siege of Machaerus lasted longer.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, it too surrendered before any attack was necessary, against a guarantee of free withdrawal. The decision to capitulate seems to have been brought to a head by the capture of a young man named Eleazar who had distinguished himself in the defence. Bassus threatened to crucify him in full view of the city, and the Jews surrendered the city to prevent this.¹³⁶ Meanwhile Lucilius Bassus died, and it fell to his successor, Flavius Silva, to capture Masada.¹³⁷ The Sicarii, under the leadership of Eleazar son of Yair and descendant of Judas the Galilean,¹³⁸ had established themselves in this fortress at the very beginning of the war, and since then controlled it. The siege was extremely difficult, since the rock on which the city was built was so high and precipitous on every side that it was almost impossible to bring up siege instruments. Only on one side, and even then only after difficult and elaborate preparations, could a battering-ram be set up. When it had breached the wall, the defenders had already erected another barricade behind it of wood and earth which, owing to its elasticity, could not be destroyed by the ram. But the Romans managed to overcome this obstacle also by the use of fire. When Eleazar saw that there was no longer any hope of resisting the assault, he addressed the garrison, asking them first to kill their own families,

134. *B.J.* vii 6, 1 (163).

135. Machaerus (Gr.: *Μαχαρούς*—so Josephus, Strabo xvi 2, 40 (763), and Steph. Byz. s.v.) reflects the Semitic *מכור* or *מכבר* (cf. mTam. 3:8; see J. Levy, *Neuhebr. Wörterbuch* III, pp. 111 f.; M. Jastrow, *Dictionary* II, p. 781b). According to *B.J.* vii 6, 2 (171), Machaerus was originally fortified by Alexander Jannaeus. Gabinius demolished the fortress, *Ant.* xiv 5, 4 (89); *B.J.* i 8, 5 (167-8). It was re-fortified by Herod the Great, *B.J.* vii 6, 2 (172). On its importance, see Pliny, *NH* v 16/72 'Machaerus, secunda quondam arx Iudaeae ab Hierosolymis'. It was situated on the southern border of Peraea, *B.J.* iii 3, 3 (46-7), next to Nabataean territory, *Ant.* xviii 5, 1 (112). It is doubtless present-day Khirbet el-Mukawer. See above, p. 344, n. 20.

136. *B.J.* vii 6, 1-4 (163-209).

137. On Masada (*מצדה*) 'mountain stronghold', in Strabo xvi 2, 44 (764), corrupted to *Μουσάδα*, see in particular the monograph of Y. Yadin, *Masada: Herod's Fortress and the Zealots' Last Stand* (1966), together with the preliminary reports in *IEJ* 15 (1965), pp. 1-120. The Roman siege-works of A.D. 73 are still to be seen. Cf. I. A. Richmond, 'The Roman Siegeworks of Masada, Israel', *JRS* 52 (1962), pp. 142-55. The excavation of the site, conducted between 1963 and 1965, by a group of archaeologists under the leadership of Y. Yadin, has strikingly confirmed much earlier information, known only from Josephus.

138. *B.J.* ii 17, 9 (447), vii 8, 1 (252-3).

and then one another. This was done. When the Romans entered, they discovered with horror that no work remained for them to do. Thus the last bulwark of the revolt was conquered, in April of probably A.D. 74.¹³⁹

After the fall of Masada, further Jewish disturbances occurred in Alexandria and Cyrene; those in Alexandria led to the closure of the temple of Onias at Leontopolis.¹⁴⁰ But these last spasms of the great revolt in the homeland are, by comparison, barely worth mentioning. Palestine's fate was sealed with the conquest of Masada. Vespasian held the land as his private possession and leased it out to his own advantage.¹⁴¹ He allotted landed property in Emmaus near Jerusalem to some eight hundred veterans.¹⁴² The former Temple tax of two

139. *B.J.* vii 8, 1-7 (252-388); 9, 1-2 (389-406). See also Yadin, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-201. On the Ben Yair ostrakon, cf. p. 201. Note V. Nikiprowetsky, 'La mort d'Eléazar fils de Jaire et les courants apologétiques dans le *de Bello Judaico* de Flavius Josèphe', *Hommages Dupont-Sommer* (1971), pp. 481-90. According to *B.J.* vii 9, 1 (401), the mass suicide of the garrison of Masada took place on 15 Xanthicus (Nisan, March/April), i.e. on the feast of Passover. The year is not mentioned. But since just prior to this, vii 7, 1 (219), there is a reference to the fourth year of Vespasian, it has always been thought that the conquest of Masada must have occurred in the spring of A.D. 73. But two new inscriptions giving the career of Flavius Silva show that he can not have gone as *legatus* to Judaea before A.D. 73. See p. 515 below.

140. *B.J.* vii 10-11 (409-42), *Vita* 76 (424). See vol. III, §-31, iv.

141. *B.J.* vii 6, 6 (216-17) κελύων πᾶσαν γῆν ἀποδοῦσαι τῶν Ἰουδαίων οὐ γὰρ κατέκειν ἐκεῖ πόλιν ἰδίαν αὐτῷ τὴν χώραν φυλάττων. . . . The nature of Vespasian's treatment of the land, and its legal background, remains obscure. See A. D. Momigliano, *Ricerche sull'organizzazione della Giudea sotto il dominio romano* (1934), pp. 85-9; S. Applebaum, 'The Agrarian Question and the Revolt of Bar Kokhba', *Eretz Israel* 8 (1967), pp. 283-7 (Hebrew). Some land in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem was assigned to the 10th legion, cf. *Vita* 76 (422).

142. *B.J.* vii 6, 6 (217) ὀκτακοσίους δὲ μόνοις ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιάς διαφευμένοις χωρίον ἔδωκεν εἰς κατοίκησιν, ὃ καλεῖται μὲν Ἀμμαοῦς, ἀπέχει δὲ τῶν Ἱεροσολύμων σταδίων τριάκοντα. . . . Since the reading τριάκοντα is supported by 6 MSS. in Niese's edition, with only one reading ἑξήκοντα, the question naturally arises whether this latter is not an assimilation to Lk. 24:3. Accordingly, our Emmaus cannot be identical with the Emmaus attested elsewhere, about 160-70 stadia from Jerusalem and known since the time of Julius Africanus (early 3rd century A.D.) as Nicopolis (cf. vol. II, § 23, ii, and the literature noted there). Admittedly, Sozomenus maintains that the latter had already received the name Nicopolis μετὰ τὴν ἄλωσιν Ἱεροσολύμων καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων νίκην, *Hist. eccles.* V 21, 5; and the coins from Emmaus-Nicopolis are supposed to have an era dating from A.D. 70 (see Belley, in *MAIBL*, 30 (1764), pp. 294-306; Eckhel, *Doctr. Num.* III, p. 454; Mionnet, *Description de médailles ant.* V, pp. 550 ff., Suppl. VIII, 376. de Saulcy, *Num. de la Terre Sainte*, pp. 172-5, 406, pl. VI, 3-5; *BMC Palestine*, pp. lxxix-lxxx. But in spite of the figure given by Josephus for the distance from Jerusalem, a number of writers (e.g. Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung* I (1881), p. 428; Gelzer, *Julius Africanus* I, pp. 5-7) identified the military colony of Vespasian with Emmaus-Nicopolis, thus following Sozomen (who in any case may well have merely inferred the identity from the name 'Nicopolis'). Another view

drachmas was from then on extracted from all Jews for the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus.¹⁴³ The people of Palestine were impoverished and fearfully reduced by the seven-year war. A Jewish authority (in the earlier sense) no longer existed. The only centre left to the people was the Torah. They now rallied around it with anxious and scrupulous fidelity, in the unwavering hope that it might once again, in a political community and indeed in the world itself, acquire practical validity and use.

is represented by Eusebius and other chroniclers, who state quite definitely that Nicopolis was not founded until the time of Julius Africanus, and only then received its name. Cf. Euseb. *Chron. ad ann. Abr.* 2237, ed. Schoene, II, 178 ff. = *Chron. paschale*, ed. Dindorf I, p. 499, where it is put in the time of Elagabal; or, Syncellus, ed. Dindorf I, p. 676, in the time of Severus Alexander; cf. generally also, Jerome, *De viris illustr.* 63 (PL xxiii, 673-5), and an anonymous notice probably stemming from the *Church History* of Philip of Side, c. A.D. 430 (ed. de Boer, TU V, 2 (1888), p. 169, 174 f.). The *locus classicus* in Eusebius, *Chron.*, ed. Schoene II, pp. 178 ff., according to the Armenian text reads: 'In Palaestina antiqua Emaus restaurata est Nicopolisque vocata cura (praefectura) et interpellatione Iulii Africani chronographi ad regem'; according to Jerome, *Chron.* ed. Helm, p. 214, 'In Palaestina Nicopolis quae prius Emmaus vocabatur urbs condita est, legationis industriam pro ea suscipiente Iulio Africano scriptore temporum', following the *Chronicon paschale*: Παλαιστίνης Νικόπολις ἢ πρότερον Ἐμμαοῦς ἐκτίσθη πόλις, πρεσβεύοντος ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς καὶ προϊσταμένου Ἰουλοῦ Ἀφρικανοῦ τοῦ τὰ χρονικά συγγραφεμένου. . . . In support of this, writers before Elagabal use only the name Emmaus (so Pliny, *NH* v 14/70; Ptolemy v 16, 7; etc.). Similarly, Josephus, who frequently mentions Emmaus, never once comments that it is also called Nicopolis, although he does often make observations of that sort. None the less, the coins seem to show that the name 'Nicopolis' was in use in the period A.D. 70-221; *BMC Palestine, loc. cit.*, though cf. Vincent & Abel, *Emmaüs*, pp. 321-3. Against the identity of Emmaus-Nicopolis with Vespasian's military colony, however, the following facts seem decisive: (1) Josephus refers to the military colony as though it were a place otherwise unknown (χωρίον δ καλεῖται Ἀμμαοῦς. . .), whereas the other Emmaus was very well known, and is often mentioned by Josephus at earlier points in *B.J.*; (2) Josephus does not say that Vespasian's military colony was named Nicopolis; (3) for Emmaus-Nicopolis, every characteristic of a colony is absent. Thus, our Emmaus is most probably identical with that mentioned in the NT (Lk. 24:13), even though the distances in both cases—30 and 60 stadia—are only roughly correct. It is quite likely that the military colony is to be identified with Kulonieh (Colonia) near Jerusalem. See Abel, *Géog. Pal.* II, pp. 314-16. Both Talmuds (ySukk. 54b, bSukk. 45a) associate Colonia (קלנייא) with Moza, a place situated in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem and mentioned in mSukk. 4:5, but no great weight need be attached to this view.

143. *B.J.* vii 6, 6 (218); Dio lxvi 7, 2. For the evidence on the Jewish tax see M. S. Ginsburg, 'Fiscus Iudaicus', *JQR* 21 (1930/1), pp. 281 ff.; CPJ I, pp. 80-8; II, pp. 119-36, 204-8 (the most important treatment); cf. I. A. F. Bruce, 'Nerva and the Fiscus Iudaicus', *PEQ* 96 (1964), pp. 34-45.