Shiur #04: Zakhin

by Rav Yair Kahn
     After  deriving  shelichut  from  a  combination  of sources, the Gemara suggests that this concept could have been  derived  from  the  verse, "nasi  echad"  (Bemidbar 34:18),  which assigned each tribal leader  the  task  of allocating  portions in Eretz Yisrael to the  members  of his  respective tribe. The Gemara initially assumed  that each  leader  functioned  as a  shaliach,  acquiring  the appropriate  portions on behalf of his  tribe.  But  this suggestion  is  then  rejected,  as  these  leaders  also acquired  portions in Eretz Yisrael destined for  minors, who are excluded from shelichut.     

     The  Gemara  then proposes that the ability  of  the leaders  to  acquire on behalf of the general population, including  minors,  is  the source  for  the  halakha  of zekhiya. This halakha, which states, "zakhin le-adam she- lo  be-fanav," means that one can make an acquisition for another in his absence, in cases where the acquisition is beneficial for the intended recipient. In this  shiur  we will   examine  the  nature  of  this  halakha  and   its relationship  to  shelichut, an issue which  was  debated among the Rishonim.

1. Assumed Shelichut

     The simplest way to understand zekhiya is to view it as an application of an accepted halakha, i.e. shelichut. In other words, in cases of a transaction that is clearly to  the advantage of a certain party, we can assume  that had he been present, the beneficiary would have appointed a   shaliach  to  achieve  that  benefit.  This  presumed appointment   merely  replaces  the  actual   appointment normally  required  in  cases of shelichut  (see  Tosafot Ketubot 11a s.v. matbilin). The result, however,  is  the same,  insofar  as  one  person acts  on  the  behalf  of another.
    

     Many  Rishonim adopted this approach and accordingly concluded  that  zekhiya  is  effective  only  in   cases allowing  for  actual shelichut. Thus,  minors,  who  are excluded  from shelichut, are excluded from  zekhiya,  as well.  This  position is supported by a  Gemara  in  Bava Metzia (71b) which claims: "A minor - is it not true that although  he is not included in shelichut, he is included in  zekhiya  mi-derabbanan!"  Thus,  zekhiya  applies  to minors only by force of rabbinic enactment; on the  level of Torah law, however, ketanim are excluded from zekhiya.

     However, the simple reading of our Gemara would seem to  contradict this conclusion. The Gemara concedes  that shelichut cannot be derived from the verse, "nasi echad," since  the tribal leaders also acquired portions of  land on  behalf  of  minors, who are excluded from  shelichut. Nevertheless, the Gemara suggests that the  leaders  were able  to  employ  the halakha of zekhiya  to  acquire  on behalf  of the minors. Apparently, zekhiya can be applied to minors although they are excluded from shelichut.  

2. An Independent Institution

      Based  on this question, the Rashba concluded  that zekhiya, which is applied in our sugya to minors,  cannot be  viewed as presumed shelichut. It is unclear, however, how   the  Rashba  explains  the  correspondence  between zekhiya  and  shelichut documented in the sugya  in  Bava Metzia.  (In  his commentary on Bava Metzia,  the  Rashba prefers a variant reading which alleviates this problem).

     The  Ba'alei ha-Tosafot, who understood  zekhiya  as presumed  shelichut,  did  not  explicitly  address   the problem  arising from our sugya. Perhaps  we  can  defend their  view based on their position regarding  a  related sugya. Tosafot in Gittin (64b s.v. shani) understood that a   minor  can  be  zokheh  on  behalf  of  others.  This conclusion  seems  to  counter  their  position   viewing zekhiya as presumed shelichut. After all, minors are  not only  incapable  of  appointing a shaliach,  they  cannot serve as a shaliach, either (see Gittin 23a). In order to resolve this problem, Tosafot claim that the exclusion of minors, which is derived from teruma, applies only to the shelichut  of  trumah.  Since minors  are  unable  to  be mafrish teruma, they are likewise incapable of serving as a  shaliach for that purpose. They are, however,  capable of  acquiring  possessions (in cases  of  "da'at  acheret makneh"),  and  they are hence eligible  to  serve  as  a shaliach  to  acquire for another. According to  Tosafot, our  sugya disqualifies minors from appointing a shaliach even  to  make acquisitions because the act of appointing demands da'at; as such, a minor cannot assign a shaliach. Zekhiya,  on  the other hand, can be applied  to  minors, since  it  is  based  on  presumed appointment  and  thus sidesteps the need for an actual act of appointment which entails da'at.

      However,  the simple reading of our sugya indicates that  minors  are  excluded from  shelichut  in  absolute terms.  Furthermore,  the Ba'alei  ha-Tosafot  themselves were  divided  as  to whether minors  are  excluded  from shelichut (see Tosafot B.M. 10b s.v. isha). Therefore, if we  are to understand that zekhiya is presumed shelichut, it  is  more reasonable to interpret our sugya  like  the Ran,  who  suggested a ingenious approach to resolve  our problem.  Like the Rashba, he maintained that minors  are entirely excluded from shelichut. Nonetheless, he managed to  explain our sugya according to the understanding that zekhiya  is based upon shelichut. He did this by  weaving the  very  question  of the nature of  zekhiya  into  the fabric   of  the  Gemara  itself.  If  zekhiya   has   an independent Biblical source, we are free to treat  it  as
an  independent halakha, rather than just an  application of  the standard halakha of shelichut. Consequently, when the  Gemara  suggests that zekhiya is derived from  "nasi echad," it may also entertain the possibility that minors are included. As zekhiya has its own source in the Torah, it  need  not  depend  on  the guidelines  of  shelichut. However,  the conclusion of our sugya, that "nasi  echad" does not teach us zekhiya, compels us to view zekhiya  in terms of shelichut. Thus the Gemara in Bava Metzia, which excludes minors and gentiles from zekhiya since they  are not  included in shelichut, is consistent with our sugya, which concludes that zekhiya has no independent source.

     In  summary,  the Rishonim divided  into  two  camps regarding the understanding of zekhiya. While some viewed it  as an application of shelichut, others rejected  this approach and viewed it as an independent institution.      However, the Rishonim who refuse to view zekhiya  as an  application of shelichut fail to explain how  zekhiya works.  The Ketzot (105,1) explained that these  Rishonim viewed  the  me-zakeh as a "yad" (literally,  "hand,"  an extension  of the beneficiary) who can acquire on  behalf of  the  beneficiary.  One who functions  as  a  yad  for another  retains  his self-identity. It is  the  me-zakeh himself  who  performs  the act of acquisition,  only  he chooses  to  do  so  in order to benefit  his  friend.  A shaliach,  on  the  other hand, is  appointed  and  hence represents the beneficiary. Through the shaliach,  it  is the me-shalei'ach, not the shaliach, who performs the act of acquisition.

3. The Category of Shelichut

      We may suggest a third approach to this issue as to the  relationship  between zekhiya and shelichut.  Though conceptually   distinct  from  shelichut,   zekhiya   may nevertheless be viewed as a variation of the  concept  of shelichut. In fact, the Ramban agrees that zekhiya is not based  on  shelichut, but nonetheless limits  zekhiya  to those  included in shelichut. Based on the sugya in  Bava Metzia, he claims that according to Torah law, minors and gentiles  -  who are excluded from shelichut  -  are  not included  in  zekhiya,  either. (Zekhiya  is  applied  to minors  only  according to rabbinic  law.)  Although  the Ramban  rejected the understanding of zekhiya as  implied shelichut,  he nevertheless considered it an  application of  the general concept of shelichut by which one can act on  behalf of another. Even if we don't assume  that  the zocheh   would  have  appointed  a  shaliach,   one   can nevertheless  acquire an object for another.  Zekhiya  is still  within  the parameters of the broader  concept  of shelichut and thus inapplicable to those who are excluded from it, though it is not shelichut in the narrow sense.

     We are left with three ways of interpreting zekhiya. The  first  views zekas presumed shelichut. At the  other extreme  we  find  those  who  consider  zekhiya  totally unrelated  to  shelichut. The Ketzot goes so  far  as  to suggest  that even gentiles are included in the  category of  zekhiya, although they are undoubtedly excluded  from the entire concept of shelichut. Based on the Ramban,  we offered  a  more moderate suggestion, whereby zekhiya  is not  based  on the assumption that the beneficiary  would have  appointed a shaliach, but nonetheless  falls  under the general category of shelichut. This category includes all  cases in which one acts on behalf of another.  As  a member  of this group, zekhiya is limited to the  general laws governing shelichut.

4. Apotropis

      The Gemara concluded that zekhiya cannot be derived from  the verse "nasi echad" and claimed that this  verse is  the  source of "apotropis" (a guardian  appointed  to care  for  orphans). In order to appreciate this halachic institution,  let  us consider a discussion  in  Masekhet Gittin  that raises the issue of the legal status of  the apotropis. The Mishna (52a) requires the guardian to take teruma  and  ma'aser  from the fruits  belonging  to  the orphans  under  his  charge.  The  Gemara  questions  the guardian's ability to designate teruma, as only the owner of the produce or his shaliach is eligible for this task. As  the  Gemara cites, the word "atem" (you) used by  the Torah  in  the context of teruma (Bemidbar 18)  indicates that only the owner or an agent acting on his behalf  can separate teruma (This assumption was discussed in  detail in  Shiur #2). The Gemara suggested that the guardian can be  mafrish  so as to provide food for the orphans  under his  charge.  (Separating teruma and ma'aser renders  the fruit  permissible for consumption, until this  is  done, the  orphans may not partake of their fruit.) This answer perplexed  the  Rishonim, as it  leaves  the  problem  of ownership   unresolved.  Even  if  we   acknowledge   the necessity  to  allow  the guardian  to  be  mafrish,  his authority to do so remains questionable.

      Tosafot (Gittin 40b s.v. ve'katav) propose that the sages  awarded the guardian ownership in order  to  allow him  to be mafrish. This is accomplished by invoking  the principle of "hefker beit din hefker," empowering the Bet Din  to  grant  or revoke legal ownership.  Once  awarded ownership, the authority of the guardian to be mafrish is unequivocal.

      The  Ramban  (in  Gittin 52a) offers  an  alternate suggestion.  He  claims  that  the  halakha  of   zekhiya authorizes the apotropis to be mafrish on behalf  of  the orphans.  According  to  the  Ramban,  when  the   Gemara concluded  that  we derive the institution  of  apotropis from "nasi echad," this verse then becomes the source for the  halakha  of  zekhiya, as  well.  This  is  also  the implication  of Rashi in his comments on our sugya  (s.v. ela).

     The  Ramban's position assumes that the guardian can be zokheh on behalf of the orphans, who are minors. Thus, the  Ramban's understanding of apotropis is dependent  on his  position  that  zekhiya is not  presumed  shelichut. (This  position  of the Ramban in Gittin is  not  totally consistent  with his opinion voiced in Bava  Metzia  71b, where  he  excluded minors from zekhiya despite the  fact that we should not view zekhiya as presumed shelichut. An attempt at resolving this contradiction goes well  beyond the  scope of this shiur; any suggestions, however, would be   greatly   appreciated.)  Tosafot,   therefore,   who understood zekhiya as presumed shelichut, which seemingly cannot  be  applied to minors, could never have  accepted such an approach.

      The Ramban's approach also assumes that one can  be mafrish  teruma  with  the consent  of  the  owner,  even without  the  formal  appointment  of  shelichut.  In  an earlier  shiur (#2), we noted that this is, in fact,  the position of the Ramban. However, the Rashba, who  (as  we have seen) agreed with the Ramban that zekhiya is not  an application  of  normal shelichut, could not  adopt  this interpretation  of  apotropis.  After  all,  the   Rashba maintained (as mentioned in shiur #2) that only the owner or  his  shaliach  has the authority  to  be  mafrish;  a guardian  whose  authority evolves  solely  from  zekhiya would lack this authority.

      Sure  enough, we find that the Rashba (Gittin  52a) offered  an  alternate  explanation  for  the  apotropis' ability to take teruma: "Yad apotropis ke-yad ha-yetomin" -  the hand of the guardian is considered the hand of the orphans.  This  seems  to  indicate  that  although   the guardian   lacks  actual  ownership  over  the   orphans' property,  his  position empowers him  to  act  on  their behalf. His status grants him the authority of ownership, though he lacks actual possession. In this regard, he  is similar  to the gizbar (treasurer), who has the authority to  buy  and  sell  on  behalf of  the  temple  treasury, although it is clear that the ownership is divine.

      In  summary,  we  encountered three  approaches  in understanding  apotropis. According  to  the  Ramban,  an apotropis  operates by virtue of the halakha of  zekhiya. Thus,  our Gemara actually concludes that the verse "nasi echad" serves as the source for zekhiya. Tosafot maintain that  an  apotropis  is  awarded ownership  in  order  to properly   care  for  the  children  under  his   charge. According  to  the Rashba, the guardian's status  affords him the authority of ownership, but not actual possession
over the estate.

Sources and Questions for Shiur #5: