GEMARA KIDDUSHIN

Please pray for a refuah sheleimah for Moshe ben Penina.

                  Shiur #02: Shelichut                     by Rav Yair Kahn

 1.  The Parameters of Shlichut

      Our  sugya deals with the institution of  shelichut and   its  biblical  derivation.   Various  sources   are enlisted  in  this  process and the Gemara  explains  the necessity of each.  For example, the Gemara suggests that we  could not assume shelichut for kiddushin if the Torah had  only informed us of the ability to deliver a get via a messenger, since divorce, in contrast to marriage, does not  require  the  consent  of  the  woman.   The  Gemara continues   that   shelichut  regarding   hekdesh-related issues,  such  as teruma or korbanot, cannot  be  derived from  the  'mundane' paradigm of kiddushin or  geirushin. Furthermore, shelichut for geirushin and kiddushin  could not  be learned from teruma or korbanot, since the latter are  basically mental processes, whereas concrete  action is required regarding the former.  In order to develop  a deeper  understanding of the shelichut concept,  we  will attempt  to  explain  the  logic  that  underlies   these distinctions suggested by our sugya.

      We  will begin with the difference between  hekdesh and non-hekdesh areas of halakha.  In the previous shiur, we  established  that direct involvement  in  mitzvot  is preferable  to  delegating the  performance  to  another. Therefore,  we  cannot  assume that  the  institution  of shelichut was extended to areas of hekdesh, which require personal  participation.  It is  therefore  necessary  to introduce an explicit source, which applies shelichut  to areas such as teruma and korbanot.

      In  order  to  appreciate why shelichut  should  be limited  to  mental  processes,  let  us  glance  at   an additional  sugya that is critical for our  understanding of shelichut:

     "Given  that all tena'im [stipulations that a person      makes  when  performing a given  halakhic  act]  are      derived from where - from the tenai of the tribes of      Gad  and Reuven [see Bemidbar 32], a tenai that  can      be  fulfilled through a shaliach - such as  the  one      there  [in  the context of Gad and Reuven]  -  is  a      valid  tenai; that which cannot be fulfilled through      a shaliach is not a valid tenai." (Ketubot 74a)

Tosafot   (s.v.  "tenai")  assume  that  this   provision reflects  an  inherent connection between  shelichut  and tena'im:

     "This is the reason: since the action [to which  the      individual wishes to assign a stipulation] is within      his  power to such an extent that he can even  carry      it out through an agent, it stands to reason that it      lies  within his power to assign a tenai to  it,  as      well.    But  chalitza,  which  one  cannot  execute      through an agent, is not within his power to  assign      to  it  a tenai, either; thus, even if the condition      is not met, the action takes effect."

In  other  words, shelichut is only possible in areas  in which  the  individual is in control.  Where man  is  the creator   of  the  new  halakhic  status,  shelichut   is applicable.   However,  in  the  case  of  chalitza,  the brother  does  not permit his sister-in-law  to  remarry. Although  he must participate in chalitza, he is  not  in control.   He  merely takes part in the  ceremony,  which results  in her license to remarry.  His role  is  merely mechanical and may not even require his da'at; hence,  he is   unable   to  dictate  the  terms  of  the  chalitza. Similarly,  he lacks the authority to appoint another  to take his place.

      It  would  appear  that the  distinction  drawn  by halakha  between mental processes and those that  require action is rooted in this point.  It is self-evident  that man is the creator of changes in halakhic status that are determined  by  machshava.   Therefore,  man  who  is  in control  has the ability to appoint a shaliach.  However, the  authority  of  man  becomes  questionable  in  areas requiring  concrete  action.  Perhaps,  the  individual's role  in  these  instances  is  merely  mechanical,  thus eliminating  the possibility of shelichut.   Even  if  we view the individual as the source of the status change in situations   where  action  is  indispensable,   we   may nevertheless   consider  his  authority   as   diminished relative to areas where machshava alone suffices.  If so, it  would  be  impossible to extrapolate  shelichut  from areas  that are determined mentally to those which demand concrete action, as well.

       This   understanding  will  also   serve   us   in appreciating the third distinction raised by  our  sugya. Namely, shelichut may be limited to halakhic changes that are   effected   by  unilateral  action.    Clearly,   an individual possesses greater control over something  that he   effects  unassisted.   Therefore,  shelichut  cannot automatically   be  extended  to  areas  dependent   upon bilateral agreement.  Hence, an explicit biblical  source is  needed  to teach us that even in such areas,  man  is sufficiently in control to assign a shaliach.

2.  Two Types of Shelichut

       It  is  plausible  that  the  distinction  between bilateral  and  unilateral areas remains even  after  the Torah  introduces the application of shelichut  in  both. The Mordekhai in Kiddushin (#505) quotes the position  of the Kadosh from Radosh that a shaliach sent to deliver  a get  has the authority to appoint another shaliach in his place.   However, a shaliach sent to marry a woman  lacks this authority, since, in contrast to divorce, one cannot marry  a woman without her consent.  This position  seems to suggest that although shelichut applies in both areas, a  basic  difference nonetheless exists between the  two. In  fact,  we  may  even claim that the drasha  does  not merely  extend  shelichut  to bilateral  agreements,  but rather introduces a new type of shelichut which can apply to those areas.

     We may explain this position based on the insightful remarks  of the Ketzot concerning the precise  nature  of shelichut (188:2).  According to the Ketzot, the Rishonim debated  whether to consider a shaliach as merely  acting on  behalf  of the sender, or as actually replacing  him. The understanding of shaliach as a replacement awards him independent  status.  However, if he merely performs  the given  action  for the sender, his appointment  does  not imply independence.            On this basis, we may claim that only in the case of get,  where the husband has total control, can he  confer on  the  shaliach  independent  authority.   This  status allows  the  shaliach  not only to deliver  the  get  and activate  the geirushin, but also to appoint a  different shaliach  in  his  place.   However,  in  the   case   of kiddushin,  where  the  husband  is  dependent  upon  the woman's   consent,   he   cannot   grant   the   shaliach independence.   The Torah merely allows  him  to  send  a messenger to perform the act of kiddushin on his  behalf. The shaliach therefore lacks the independent authority to appoint  a shaliach in his place and can do no more  than the act of kiddushin itself.            In  summary,  the  Gemara discussed  three  possible sources  for  the concept of shelichut and  analyzed  the uniqueness of each source.  We sought to demonstrate  how the  unique  qualities of each source  could  affect  the extension of shelichut to other contexts.       3.  The Requirement of Shlichut to be mafrish Teruma

     Let  us  now inspect the specific case of teruma  in light  of  a  sugya  in Nedarim 36b.   The  Gemara  there discusses the rule posited in the Mishna allowing one  to separate  terumot and ma'asrot on behalf of  someone  who vowed not to receive any benefit from him:

     "[The  Mishna stated:] He may separate  his  terumot      and  ma'asrot with his knowledge.  To what case does      this  refer?   If we say that [he separates  teruma]      from  the grain belonging to the owner of the  stack      [of grain] on behalf of the owner of the stack, then      with  whose knowledge is this done?  If we say  with      his  own  knowledge, who appointed  him  a  shaliach      [licensing  him to separate the teruma]? Rather,  it      must  refer  to the knowledge of the  owner  of  the      stack - but does he not then provide benefit for him      by  carrying out his shelichut?  As Rava stated,  we      deal  here with a case of one who declares, 'Whoever      wishes  to  come  to separate teruma  may  come  and      separate teruma. '"

     The Gemara assumes that the individual from whom the noder  (the  one who took the vow) vowed  to  not  derive benefit  may  not function as a shaliach for  the  noder. However,  the  Gemaappears to conclude  that  he  can  be mafrish  (separate) the teruma if he  does  not  formally assume that role of shaliach.  This is accomplished via a general  announcement allowing anyone to be  mafrish  the teruma.   From  this discussion it seems  that  hafrashat teruma  is not limited to the owner of the produce.   One person can designate the produce of another as teruma  so long  as  he doesn't violate the wishes of the owner;  no assignment of shelichut is required.             This understanding is quite reasonable: after  all, prior  to  hafrasha the produce is in a state  of  tevel, which we may define as an actual or potential mixture  of teruma and chulin.  Therefore, hafrasha merely delineates the  teruma  within this mixture.  In  fact,  the  Talmud Yerushalmi (Terumot 1:1) entertains the possibility  that hafrasha  does  not  require ownership  (see  the  Gaon's commentary).    However,   this   position   appears   to contradict  the  very  foundations of  our  sugya,  which applies  the principle of shelichut in order  to  explain how   one  can  be  mafrish  teruma  for  another.    The application of shelichut assumes that only the  owner  or his agent can be mafrish the teruma.

      One solution to this problem is to suggest that  in actuality, only the owner or his messenger may be mafrish teruma, as suggested by our Gemara.  Nevertheless, if the owner does not single out a specific shaliach, then  even if  the mudar hana'a (the one from whom the noder may not derive  benefit)  chooses to fulfill the  shelichut,  the neder  is  not  violated.  Therefore, in  response  to  a general  announcement  allowing anyone  to  separate  the teruma,  the  mudar  hana'a  may  fulfill  the  shelichut without compromising the neder.  Tosafot (Gittin 66a s.v. "kol") suggest this approach:

     "Although the Gemara states. regarding someone  from      whom  another  may not derive benefit  that  he  may      separate  teruma  on his behalf with  his  knowledge      etc.,  and  the Gemara explains that this refers  to      one  who  declares,  'Whoever  wishes  to  come  and      separate teruma may come and separate teruma,'  this      does not mean that if he makes such a pronouncement,      he [the one separating the teruma] is not considered      fulfilling his shelichut.  Rather, specifically with      respect  to  a mudar hana'a we do not consider  this      shelichut, by which he would be viewed as  providing      benefit for him, since he did not personally  assign      him."

      The Rashba takes a different approach.  He concedes that according to the Gemara's conclusion in Nedarim, one may  be  mafrish  teruma for another even without  having been  appointed a shaliach.  However, he argues that this applies  only within the specific context of that Gemara, which discusses the possibility of designating one's  own produce  as  teruma  in order to render  the  produce  of another  permissible for consumption.  Since he owns  his produce, he has the power to designate it as teruma.  The Gemara's  question relates to one's ability to indirectly affect  the  produce  of  another via  this  designation. According    to   this   understanding,   ownership    is indispensable for hafrasha.  Hence, the Gemara in Nedarim is  consistent with our Gemara which demands shelichut to replace  the  requirement  of  ownership  to  allow   for hafrasha.

      By  contrast,  the Ramban (Gittin 66a)  adopts  our initial  understanding, and denies the need for ownership as  a  prerequisite  for hafrasha.  The  Ramban  requires permission,  not shelichut.  According to this  position, the  problem  posed  by our sugya, which  introduces  the institution  of  shelichut to enable one  to  be  mafrish teruma for another, resurfaces.

       Upon  closer  inspection,  the  Ramban's  position becomes  even  more  puzzling.  He tries  to  prove  that shelichut is unnecessary for hafrasha from the Gemara  in Bava  Metzia  which initially assumes  that  one  can  be mafrish for another:

     "Regarding  teruma,  even an expression  of  consent      suffices,  as  the Gemara states in  'Eilu  Metziot'      [Bava  Metzia  22a],  '[If the owner  finds  someone      separating  teruma  for him and says],  'You  should      have  taken  from the higher quality produce,'  then      if,  indeed  higher quality produce was found  [thus      proving  the  sincerity of the owner's comment,  and      hence his consent to the separation of teruma], then      the separation of teruma is valid.'"

However,  the  Gemara  explicitly  rejects  its   initial assumption,  and  concludes  that  formal  shelichut   is required:

     "Rava  interpreted it [that beraita] to  accommodate      Abayei's  position, as referring to a case where  he      appointed  him  a  shaliach.   Indeed,  this   seems      reasonable, for if it speaks of a case where he  did      not assign him as his shaliach, could the separation      of  teruma be valid?  The verse states, 'you -  also      you'  to  include one's agent [that he may  separate      teruma  only under the same conditions and terms  as      the owner himself].  Just as one separates only with      knowledge  [that he separates teruma], so  must  the      agent separate only with the owner's knowledge."

How  can  the  position of the Ramban be reconciled  with this sugya, let alone supported by it?

     Let us return to our Gemara.  The Gemara proves that the  institution of shelichut applies to teruma from  the Mishna  in  the  fourth  perek  of  Terumot  (mishna  4). However,  already in chapter 3, we find  a  Mishna  which establishes  the  ability  to be  mafrish  on  behalf  of another:

     "When  does this apply?  When he said nothing.   But      if   he  allowed  his  family  member,  servant   or      maidservant  to separate teruma, the  separation  is      valid." (Terumot 3:4)

Why  did  the  Gemara choose not to cite this  Mishna  as evidence  for  the  application of shelichut  to  teruma, selecting instead the Mishna in chapter 4?  Moreover, the Gemara cites a longer passage from the Mishna then  would appear  necessary.   It  would have  been  sufficient  to simply  quote, "If one tells his agent, 'Go and  separate teruma,'  he  separates in accordance  with  the  owner's intention  [the  amount he figures the owner  would  have given  as teruma]."  But the Gemara adds the continuation of  the  Mishna  -  "If  he does  not  know  the  owner's intention  [whether he would normally give  a  larger  or smaller amount], he  separates  the  average amount - one-fiftieth."   Why must the Gemara include this passage in its citation?

      We  can resolve all these difficulties by proposing that  according to the Ramban, two distinct paths can  be taken  to  be mafrish on behalf of someone else.   First, one  can be mafrish once the owner indicates his consent. In   addition,  the  owner  can  also  make  use  of  the institution of shelichut.  Where shelichut is applied, it is  as if the owner himself was mafrish.  Permission,  by contrast,  grants the non-owner ability to be mafrish  in accordance with the wishes of the owner.

     Based on the above, we can distinguish between these two tracts.  The option of a non-owner designating teruma is  contingent upon the subjective wishes of  the  owner. If  the  whims  of  the owner are not  accommodated,  the hafrasha  is  void.   Shelichut, on the  other  hand,  is established via a formal designation on the part  of  the owner.   Once  appointed,  the shaliach  is  required  to fulfill  his  shelichut faithfully and may  act  in  this capacity as long as he does not objectively violate  this trust.   Subjective whims of the owner are irrelevant  so long  as  the shaliach fulfills his task consistent  with the norms governing the specific shelichut.

      If we adopt this distinction, we can easily explain the  Ramban's  proof from Bava Metzia.  The  sugya  there addresses the question of whether one's intention can  be assumed  retroactively.  The Gemara attempts  to  resolve this question on the basis of the braita that appears  to allow   one  to  be  mafrish  for  another  without   his knowledge.    This   perhaps  indicates   that   eventual acquiescence retroactively legitimizes the hafrasha.  The Ramban  proves from this, that the owner's permission  is sufficient for hafrasha, since permission is parallel  in this  regard  to  intention, and can perhaps  be  applied retroactively.     Appointing   a   shaliach,    however, constitutes  a  specific,  halakhic  act,  which  demands expressed da'at and can only be effective proactively.

     The  Ramban  understood that  the  Gemara  does  not reject  this  basic premise.  Instead, it rejects  merely this   understanding  of  the  braita.   The  option   of permission   is  inapplicabif  the  hafrasha   does   not correspond to the whims of  the  owner.   According to the  braita,  the  owner's consent is indicated if, upon hearing of the hafrasha, he responds  that  better quality produce  could  have  been used.   Since the hafrasha of the non-owner does not,  in this  instance, correspond to the wishes  of  the  owner, shelichut  is  the only option left in understanding  the braita.  However, the initial premise, which assumed that permission suffices, was never overturned.

     Similarly,   the  sugya  in  Kiddushin  proved   the possibility of shelichut with regard to teruma  from  the Mishna  in chapter 4 of Terumot.  The Gemara goes through the trouble to cite the seemingly irrelevant detail, that if the shaliach is unaware of the amount the owner wishes to  be mafrish, he may assume the norm.  According to our understanding, only from this clause can  we  prove  that the  shelichut option is being exercised.  The mere  fact that  one  can  be  mafrish for  another,  which  already appears  in  chapter  3, can be explained  based  on  the permission  option.   However,  the  possibility   of   a legitimate  hafrasha  that does  not  correspond  to  the wishes  of  the  owner  forces  us  to  acknowledge   the application of shelichut to hafrashat teruma.

 Sources and questions for next week's shiur.

Sources:

1.   Kiddushin 41b "ela lo likhtov... Ka mashma lan."       Gittin 23b "amar Rav Asi... bnei brit." 2.   Rambam Hilkhot Sheduchin V'shutfin 2:1-2,       Rambam  Hilkhot Geirushin 3:15-16,        Shiltei Gibborim Gittin [12a in the pages of the Rif] #1 3.    Sanhedrin  72b Tosafot s.v. Yisrael,         Magen  Avraham Orach Chayim beginning of Siman 189,         Even Ha-ozer ibid. 4.   Rambam Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:11, 13:14-17.

Questions:

1.  Regarding  what point does the Riaz  argue  with  the Rambam? 2.  What  halakha  does  the Magen  Avraham  derive  from Tosafot in Sanhedrin? 3. Is an eved knaani considered a convert to Judaism? 4. What was the status of Shimshon's wives?