Shiur #06: Appointing a Shaliach to Perform an Aveira                  

By Rav Moshe Taragin

Appointing a Shaliach to Perform an Aveira

      The gemara in Kiddushin (41-43) elaborates upon the various  halakhot  of shelichut.  One such  principle  is that  shelichut is invalid in the execution of an aveira. For  example,  if  Reuven appoints Shimon  to  murder  or physically  damage  someone, it is  Shimon  who  is  held legally  responsible.   Of course,  Reuven's  conduct  is reprehensible and he is certainly taken to task -  biydei shamayim; he will ultimately be punished by the  Heavenly courts for this behavior.  However, from a strictly legal standpoint, Shimon is held accountable.  As the gemara in Bava  Metzia  (10b) remarks "Divrei ha-rav ve-divrei  ha- talmid  divrei  mi  shom'in!! - one  should  pay  greater attention  to  God's wishes and less to  the  subordinate wishes of a human being."

      Though,  in  general, this rule - ein shaliach  li- devar aveira (there can be no shelichut representation in the  execution  of an aveira) applies across  the  board, there  exists  a category of exceptions.  The  gemara  in Kiddushin  (43) isolates three cases of aveira  in  which shelichut  is  effective.  The first case is  tevicha  u- mekhira  - the issur of slaughtering or selling a  stolen animal.   If  the  shaliach executes this  crime  at  the behest  of his meshaleach (his sender), he, and  not  the meshaleach  is obligated to pay the fine (4  times  or  5 times the worth of the animal).  Similarly, if one steals an  item of hekdesh in compliance with another's request, it  is  he  who  must  reimburse  hekdesh,  and  not  the meshaleach.  The third case relates to the prohibition of shelichut yad - illegally deriving benefit from a pikadon -  an  object  which was deposited to  be  watched.   The actual  shaliach  who  derives the benefit  and  not  the meshaleach is responsible (the gemara suggests that  many opinions only accept two of these three cases).  How  are we  to  understand these exceptions?  Why in these  cases does  the general rule of "ein shaliach li-devar  aveira" fail?

      The  simplest  route would be to  understand  these cases  exactly as such - as exceptions.  In each instance a  pasuk is cited as the source for the effectiveness  of shelichut.  One might propose that the rule pertaining to the  failure  of  shelichut in  cases  of  aveira  simply carries three built-in exceptions.

      Alternatively, one might claim that the rule of ein shaliach  li-devar aveira has absolutely  no  exceptions. The  failure  of  shelichut in cases  of  aveira  applies across the board.  In these few instances the reason  the meshaleach and not the shaliach is responsible is because the  mechanism of shelichut is unnecessary.   It  doesn't concern  us  that shelichut per se fails.  Responsibility is  ascribed  to  the  meshaleach for different  reasons. What  has changed is not the map of shelichut but  rather the   definition  of  these  aveirot.   This   suggestion requires a broader look at the nature of shelichut.

      Shelichut itself is one of the most intriguing  and useful  halakhic implements.  It allows an action  to  be physically  delegated  to  a  shaliach  even  if  it   is considered halakhically, as having being performed by the meshaleach.  For example, if Shimon is mekadesh  a  woman at  Reuven's  request, the woman is legally betrothed  to Reuven  and  not Shimon even though he was  the  one  who actually gave her a ring and pronounced "harei  at".   It goes well beyond the modern conception of "agents".  If I sign  a  proxy for my vote I have, in effect, transferred my  vote or right to vote to another.  That other is  not acting  on  MY  BEHALF  but AS  MY  BENEFICIARY  who  has obtained  my authority.  If children of a deceased  elect an  executor,  his division of property is not  in  their place.  He divides the estate and they acquire possession based  upon  his division.  Shelichut goes much  further. It  allows agency even in actions which require  personal involvement.   Theoretically a woman is only  married  to one  who  is actually mekadesh her.  In this case  Reuven did  not actually execute the marriage ceremony, but  the results  are  ascribed  to him.  This  is  the  magic  of shelichut.

      Understanding shelichut as such we must admit  that though  it  is  very impressive, it is only necessary  in cases  in  which  intimate, and personal involvement  are needed.   In these cases shelichut substitutes  for  this involvement.  However, in cases in which one doesn't have to  be  directly involved, shelichut becomes  irrelevant. For  example,  if  I ignore my pet lion who  proceeds  to escape  and trounce a person, in no way have I  performed the  act  of  damage.   The animal is  not  my  shaliach. However,  my  negligence  CAUSED  the  damage  and   this obligates me to pay.  In order to be liable I don't  have to actually perform damage; CAUSING it is sufficient.  In cases similar to this shelichut is unnecessary.

      Possibly,  in  these three exceptional  cases,  the reason  that  the  meshaleach and  not  the  shaliach  is responsible  is that these aveirot do not revolve  around personal  action.   One who causes hekdesh  items  to  be profaned has committed the sin of me'ila.  Similarly, one who  steals  an  item and then causes it  to  be  further damaged  has  committed  this  intensification   of   the original theft and is liable to a heavy fine.  In  truth, one  can NEVER appoint a halakhic shaliach to perform  an aveira.    The  shelichut  breaks  down  and  no   formal relationship  remains  between  the  meshaleach  and  the shaliach.  However, the shaliach only executed the  crime because   the  meshaleach  requested.   Being  that   the meshaleach is the 'first cause' of this crime, he is held accountable.   Shelichut as a formal  category  plays  no role.   Even in the wake of the failure of shelichut  the meshaleach is responsible because he EFFECTED this crime.

SUMMARY: -------------       We  have examined two patterns of understanding the culpability  of  the meshaleach.  Normally  in  cases  of aveira as the shelichut fails he is not responsible.   In several  exceptional cases he does pay.  Is that  because in these instances shelichut operates?  Or does it simply mean that his chiyuv in these instances is independent of shelichut.  He pays because he engendered this damage.

      The  first  method of testing this question  is  by scrutinizing the manner in which "shelichut' operates  in these  cases.  If it operates within the normal  patterns of  shelichut  we might assume that a full-blown halakhic shelichut  is  active  even though  an  aveira  is  being commissioned.   If, however, in these  cases  we  witness this  'arrangement' operating beyond  the  perameters  of standard shelichut, we might infer that shelichut is  not active  at  all.  We are merely assigning  guilt  to  the meshaleach  based  upon  his  effectuating  the  ultimate crime.

      The  gemara in Me'ila (21a) discusses the  form  of 'shelichut' when stealing from hekdesh.  In one case  the meshaleach asks a katan (a minor) to pilfer an item  from hekdesh.   The  mishna maintains that the  meshaleach  is chayav.   In general, a katan may not be appointed  as  a shaliach.   If  the  meshaleach  is  culpable   in   this scenario, this might indicate his guilt is not based upon shelichut.  Instead, he is responsible simply because  he caused this crime.  His role is not affected by the  fact that  his messenger was a katan.  He still generated this crime.

      A similar situation concerns a nochri (gentile) who executes  the wishes of his meshaleach.  The  Netivot  in Siman  182;1 addresses this concept and defends the  fact that  a  gentile  or  katan can be  this  'shaliach'.   A gentile,   as  well,  cannot  legally  be  considered   a shaliach.  If indeed we obligate the meshaleach  for  the deeds  of  his gentile messenger, we might have  evidence that  this  is not based upon conventional shelichut  but rather is a chiyuv which stems from the meshaleach's role in causing the aveira.

      A  second  form  of nafka mina might  surround  the culpability of the shaliach.  Again on a moral  level  he is certainly guilty.  Even though these three aveirot are exceptions and in these cases the 'shelichut' arrangement in  one  way  or  another is effective, we  still  cannot exonerate   the  shaliach.   Just  because   thmeshaleach ordered  a hit does not mean the shaliach should  fulfill his  wishes.  However, a legal question still remains  in terms  of  who  must make financial remuneration  to  the victim.  Obviously, as these cases are exceptions to  the general  failure of shelichut, the primary   compensation is  taken  from  the  meshaleach.  What  about  secondary compensation?  If the meshaleach is indigent or has  fled can  we  turn  to  the shaliach and request  payment?   A machloket  surrounding this point emerges from  a  debate between  the  Sema and the Ketzot in Choshen Mishpat  292 (se'if  katan  10  in  the Sema).  If  indeed,  in  these instances shelichut has operated effectively, we transfer the entire 'action' to the meshaleach and do not consider the shaliach as having perpetrated this aveira (again  on a  legal compensatory level, not a moral one).  If so, we would  not  except  him  to be the source  for  secondary payment.  If, however, shelichut has failed EVEN in these exceptional cases and the meshaleach is guilty because he has  caused  the  damage,  we might  still  obligate  the shaliach.  After all, he also participated in the affair. Given  the  breakdown of shelichut he is held accountable for  his  actions.   He  has no  halakhic  mechanism  for projecting  his action unto others or ascribing  them  to the meshaleach.

      A  final  question  would concern  the  case  where shelichut  is  commissioned for something which  contains multiple  aveirot.   What  if  a  shaliach  is  sent   to slaughter  a  stolen  animal  on  Shabbat.   This  action entails  two  issurim:  chillul Shabbat  and  tevicha  u- mekhira.   If the exception of shelichut in the  case  of tevicha  u-mekhira  entails the successful  launching  of shelichut  it  would  certainly fail  in  this  scenario. Indeed, tevicha u-mekhira per se do not subvert shelichut but the aveira of Shabbat, which is also integral to this action  should!!!  The meshaleach should  not  be  guilty because  the shelichut has been invalidated by the  issur Shabbat!!   On  the  other hand  if  the  chiyuv  of  the meshaleach  were  not  based upon  the  effectiveness  of shelichut  but upon his role on causing the  aveira  (and the  damage),  he  would  be  culpable  even  though  the shelichut is void.  Adding an extra issur to nullify  the shelichut  does not in any way change the  fact  that  he caused  the aveira and should be guilty.  The  Rambam  in Hilkhot  Geneiva  3:6 contends that in such  a  case  the meshaleach  is  not culpable.  Evidently, he  viewed  the standard  case of tevicha u-mekhira as an exception  -  a case  of aveira in which shelichut is operative.   Mixing an   additional  issur  invalidates  the  shelichut   and exonerates  the meshaleach from payment.  See the  Rambam in  Peirush  ha-mishnayot (Bava Kama perek  7)  where  he seems to imply the opposite.

 Sources for Shiur #7 will follow in a separate mailing.