Shiur #9:

May A Na'ara appoint a Shaliach?                    

by Rav Yair Kahn

      In  the previous shiur, we discussed the case of  a na'ara  who is in the custody of her father. We developed two  ways of viewing the status of the daughter regarding gittin  and  kiddushin. According to  one  approach,  the father,   whom  the  Torah  appoints  as  the  daughter's guardian,  is the only party empowered with the authority to  betroth  her or receive her get. The second  approach maintains  that  the daughter herself  assumes  the  lead role,  while the father is merely a supporting  actor  by virtue of his role as guardian.

     This  week  we  will examine this issue  within  the context of a revealing discussion that took place between Rava  and Rav Nachman. Rava asked Rav Nachman if a na'ara has the ability to appoint a shaliach to receive her get. Initially, the gemara explained that this question hinges on  the daughter's status as reflected by her ability  to receive her own get:

     "Is  she  similar to her father's  arm,  or  to  her      father's domain - similar to her father's arm,  such      that  just as her father can appoint a shaliach,  so      can  she,  or  similar to her father's domain,  such      that  she is not divorced until the get reaches  her      hand?"

      The gemara then questions the possibility that  the na'ara  resembles  the father's domain (chatzer)  because one  cannot acquire an object via a chatzer that  is  not under  his control. (We will discuss this issue at length a   bit   later.)  The  gemara  therefore  rejects   this formulation in favor of a more plausible one:

     "In  truth, it is clear that she is similar  to  her      father's  arm, and this is the question: is  she  as      powerful as her father's arm in that she can appoint      a shaliach, or not?"

In  conclusion, Rav Nachman responded that a na'ara lacks the ability to appoint a shaliach.

     Regarding the question of the daughter's status vis- à-vis her father, this sugya seems to explicitly conclude that  the father is the primary receiver and the daughter plays  but  a  secondary role. This is clearly  indicated according to the initial formulation of the debate:

     "Is  she  similar to her father's  arm,  or  to  her      father's domain?"            According  to  Rav Nachman's conclusion,  too,  that only  a  father  may  appoint  a  shaliach,  whereas  the daughter  lacks this authority, the daughter  appears  to play a secondary role. Admittedly, one could suggest that according  to Rava, who entertains the possibility  of  a na'ara's appointment of a shaliach, the daughter  is  the primary receiver. As we noted in the previous shiur, this is  in  fact  the interpretation of the Ramban.  However, this  explanation  is not supported  by  the  formulation offered to explain Rava:

     "In  truth, it is clear that she is similar  to  her      father's  arm, and this is the question: is  she  as      powerful as her father's arm in that she can appoint      a shaliach, or not?"

This  suggests that even Rava concedes that the  daughter is no more than an "arm" of the father.

     This  conclusion  accommodates the position  viewing the  father as the primary receiver, but, as we noted  in the previous shiur, many Rishonim consider the yad (power or  authority over the daughter's marital status) of  the daughter  as  the  basic yad, while the father  may  also receive the get for the daughter as her guardian. How are we  to interpret our gemara so as not to contradict  this position?

      We will return to this problem later in this shiur. At this point, we will focus our attention on a seemingly unrelated issue that appears in our sugya. We noted  that the  gemara initially suggests that the na'ara is  to  be considered  the  domain (chatzer)  of  her  father.  This notion is rejected because one cannot make an acquisition through a chatzer that is not under his control.  As  the daughter has a mind of her own, she, and not her  father, enjoys control over items in her possession.

     This  problem  is raised in another sugya  regarding the possibility of divorcing a woman by placing a get  in her  servant's hand. The gemara in Masekhet Gittin  (78a) states:

     Rava  said: If he wrote her a get and placed  it  in      her  servant's hand, then if he was asleep while she      guarded him, then the get is valid; if he was awake,      it is not a get, as this is considered a 'chatzer ha-      mishtameret she-lo le- da'ata' [a domain  not  fully      guarded in accord with the owner's knowledge].   Why      is  the  get valid if he sleeps and she guards  him?      This  is  a  'walking domain,' and a walking  domain      cannot  effect acquisition!  And if you would  argue      that this case is different because he [the servant]      sleeps  [and  thus  we  would  not  consider  him  a      'walking  domain'], did not Rava say  that  whenever      one  cannot  acquire when he walks, neither  can  he      acquire  when  he stands or sits [and  thus  even  a      sleeping  servant  must  be  considered  a  'walking      domain']?  The halakha is that [Rava referred  to  a      case]  when  he  is  bound  [and  therefore  has  no      possibility of mobility]."                                                                The  gemara raises two separate problems.  First,  a servant cannot function as a chatzer of his owner because he  has a mind of his own; therefore, the chatzer is  not under the control of the owner. Secondly, a chatzer  must be immobile; a chatzer that is even potentially mobile is a  chatzer mehalechet and cannot function as a chatzer to effect an acquisition.            Many  Rishonim claim that these two problems  demand independent solutions. In order to solve the problem of a chatzer mehalechet, which applies to an animal as well as a  servant (see B.M. 9b), one must bind the chatzer  such that  it  has  no  possibility of moving.  However,  when unbound,  even  asleep,  it  is  potentially  mobile  and considered  a  chatzer mehalechet. Regarding  an  animal, this  is  sufficient. However, with respect to a servant, who  has  a mind of his own, despite being bound,  he  is considered  a chatzer she'eina mishtameret le-da'ata.  In order  to become a chatzer mishtameret, a fully "guarded" chatzer,  he must be asleep. In conclusion, therefore,  a servant  can  function as a chatzer only if  he  is  both bound and asleep.            From  this  we can conclude that chatzer  mehalechet and    chatzer   she-eina   mishtameret   le-da'ata   are independent problems (see Rosh, Gittin 8:5). The  problem of  mehalechet concerns the parameters of a chatzer  with respect  to  kinyanim.  The  idea  of  acquiring  objects located  in  one's domain is derived from the ability  to acquire objects placed in one's hand, and can be extended to other forms of property as long as they parallel one's hand  in terms of their basic characteristics. Therefore, property  with the potential for mobility independent  of the owner cannot be considered a chatzer.            The  problem  of eina mishtameret le-da'ata  can  be viewed  as  the general problem of eina mishtameret  (see B.M.  11a),  which applies to any chatzer  which  is  not enclosed  by a fence and is therefore unguarded. However, the phrase "eina mishtameret le-da'ata" indicates that we deal  with a different problem. Moreover, the application to a servant who is bound hand-and-foot but awake clearly shows that the problem is not rooted in the owner's  lack of  physical  control. Therefore, it seems reasonable  to suggest  an  alternate explanation. Perhaps,  our  rabbis felt  that  a  human  being,  even  if  he  is  someone's property,  can  never be considered  the  domain  of  the owner, due to his independent will and consciousness.  As long  as  he  is  awake  and aware, he  is  existentially independent,  even while physically and monetarily  under the  control  of  another. So long  as  he  retains  this independence,  we cannot view him as totally  subservient to  another  and  he  cannot  function  as  his  chatzer. However,  once his consciousness fades and he is overcome by  sleep, we can temporarily ignore his independence and view him merely as the property of the owner.            In  summary,  we  solve the problem  of  independent mobility by tying the slave, while slumber is enlisted to enable us to ignore his independent consciousness.

     Based  on  this  analysis, I  was  troubled  by  the question  posed in our sugya. Why did our  gemara  reject the application of chatzer to the daughter because she is not  mishtameret le-da'at aviha? Why not raise  the  more general  and problem of mehalechet? I was also  perplexed by  a  comment of the Ramban in the sugya of "ketana she- nitkadesha  she-lo  le'da'at  aviha"  (a  minor  who  was betrothed without her father's knowledge - 44b):

     "Although she is a minor and does not possess a yad,      this  applies only after her father's death; in  her      father's lifetime, however, she is his yad.  She  is      thus no less than a chatzer, which acquires on one's      behalf without his knowledge when it is in his  best      interest.   Therefore,  the betrothal  takes  effect      when he gives his consent."            The Ramban explains that the daughter, while still a minor, can be considered the arm of her father and is  no worse  than his chatzer. At first glance, this  statement is  in  stark  contrast to our sugya, which  rejects  the possible application of chatzer to the daughter. Even  if we  suggest that there is no problem of mishtameret shelo le-da'at  aviha  with  respect to a  minor,  who  is  not considered  an  independent 'bat  da'at'  (intellectually capable party) according to halakha, we are still left to ponder   why  she  is  not  disqualified  as  a   chatzer mehalechet (see Rashba to 19a).             In  light  of the above, I would suggest  that  our sugya never intended to apply chatzer in the narrow sense to the case of a daughter. After all, no one ever claimed that  a  daughter is considered the monetary property  of the  father  and  thus comparable to a servant,  who  can function  as  the  domain of the owner. When  the  gemara suggests  that a daughter resembles her father's chatzer, it  means that she can be viewed as an address via  which the  father can receive the get. In other words, the  get must  be  given  to the father by virtue of  his  role  a guardian, and one way of delivering the get to him is  by placing it in the hands of his daughter.

      According to this interpretation, we understand why the   gemara   never  raised  the  problem   of   chatzer mehalechet.  After  all,  the daughter  does  not  really function  as  a  chatzer, and therefore  the  problem  of mehalechet  cannot apply. Nevertheless,  the  problem  of mishtameret  she-lo le-da'at aviha was raised.  Based  on our understanding, that a human being of independent mind cannot   be  totally  subservient  to  another,   it   is reasonable  that  this problem also prevents  a  daughter from being viewed merely as the address of her father.

     If  we accept this suggestion, we can easily explain the  Ramban's  comment, that as long as a daughter  is  a minor she can function as the arm of her father and is no less  than  his  chatzer. If we interpret the  Ramban  as referring to kinyan chatzer in the narrow sense, then  we cannot  understand how this can be applied to a daughter, who is independently mobile. However, if the Ramban means that  the daughter, while still a minor, can function  as the  arm of the father and receive the get on his behalf, then   no   problem   of   chatzer   mehalechet   arises. Furthermore,  the problem of mishtameret she-lo  le-da'at aviha  may  also not apply, since we are dealing  with  a minor,  who is not halakhically considered an independent bat da'at.            From  this perspective, we can reevaluate our sugya. Rava  asked whether a na'ara may appoint a shaliach.  The initial  formulation of the gemara posed the question  in the following terms: "Is she similar to her father's arm, or   to   her   father's  domain?"   According   to   our understanding, that chatzer aviha refers  not  to  kinyan chatzer  in the narrow sense, but rather to an additional address  through which the father receives the  get,  the alternative  of  yad  aviha must be  reinterpreted  as  a distinct  option. In other words, ke-yad aviya  does  not mean  "a  hand of her father," which would  merely  be  a paraphrase of "chatzer aviha," but rather "like the  hand of  her  father." The daughter is not merely a  recipient for  the father, but an independent recipient of the  get similar to her father.             The  gemara rejects the possibility that  an  adult woman  can function as an arm of her father, due  to  her independent   status  as  a  bat  da'at.   It   therefore reformulates Rava's question:

     "In  truth, it is clear that she is similar  to  her      father's  arm, and this is the question: is  she  as      powerful as her father's arm in that she can appoint      a shaliach, or not?"

According to our interpretation, the gemara at this point concedes  that the daughter is the independent  recipient of  the get. At first glance, then, we would assume  that the   daughter   can   appoint  a  shaliach,   as   well. Nonetheless, the question regarding her ability to do  so remains,  and  Rav  Nachman in fact  concludes  that  she cannot.

     In  order to explain Rav Nachman's opinion,  let  us return  to  the  dispute  between  Reish  Lakish  and  R. Yochanan  discussed  in the previous shiur.  R.  Yochanan granted  the  daughter  the  independence  to  personally receive   a   get,   but  denied  her  the   ability   to independently be betrothed. We suggested that R. Yochanan accepts  the  possibility  of  two  independent,  passive recipients  of a get, but does not allow for  the  active involvement  of two competing ba'alei davar  in  creating kiddushin.            According to the gemara, Reish Lakish argued with R. Yochanan,  brandishing a hekesh to claim that  the  Torah compared kiddushin to geirushin:

"Reish Lakish shouted like a crane, 'and she leaves  [her first  husband]; 'and she marries' [two words  juxtaposed to one another in the verse, implying a halakhic parallel between kiddushin and geirushin]. But nobody paid heed to him."

     But  the  logic of his claim is unclear.  Did  Reish Lakish reject R. Yochanan's position disallowing multiple ba'alei  davar? If so, then why is a hekesh required?  If he  accepted  R.  Yochanan's claim, how does  the  hekesh solve  this problem?  It therefore seems reasonable  that the  hekesh was used by Resh Lakish to show that the role of  the  woman in kiddushin corresponds to  her  role  in geirushin. Regarding both, the woman is not considered  a ba'alat  davar  in  the  active  sense.  True,  kiddushin differs  from geirushin in that it cannot be  imposed  on the   woman   against   her  will   as   can   geirushin. Nevertheless, the woman is merely asked to consent to the kiddushin which is performed solely by the man  (see  Ran to  Nedarim 30a s.v. ve-isha nami). Therefore,  according to  Reish Lakish, we cannot distinguish between geirushin and  kiddushin,  as  neither  involves  the  problem   of conflicting ba'alei davar.

      The  gemara enlists our mishna, which mentions only the  kiddushin of the father or his shaliach, to  support R. Yochanan's view. The mishna seems to indicate that the option  of the daughter's independent betrothal does  not exist.  The  gemara deflects this proof by claiming  that according to Reish Lakish, this mishna was authored by R. Shimon,  who  agrees with R. Yehuda regarding  shelichut. The  gemara's  mention of shelichut in this  response  is perplexing. The obvious answer should have been  that  R. Shimon  agrees with R. Yehuda regarding kiddushin.  Where did shelichut come into the picture?

     Perhaps, according to Reish Lakish, R. Shimon agreed with  the  majority  opinion that  a  na'ara  can  accept kiddushin,  since  this involves only a  passive  act  of consent.  However,  appointing a  shaliach  requires  the control and authority of ba'al davar. Only a ba'al  davar can  appoint a shaliach. Therefore, R. Shimon agreed with R.  Yehuda that regarding shelichut, the status of  ba'al davar is exclusive and limited to the father.            Similarly, we may claim that a daughter can function independently as a passive yad only with respect  to  the reception  of the get. However, the ability to appoint  a shaliach requires awarding her the active status of ba'al davar  and hinges on our allowing for the possibility  of competing  ba'alei  davar  - "alima  ke-yad  aviha."  Rav Nachman rejects the possibility of dual ba'alei davar and therefore denies the daughter the option of appointing  a shaliach.  According to him, since the  status  of  ba'al davar  was transferred to the father to act on behalf  of his  daughter within the context of his role as guardian, the daughter cannot be considered a ba'alat davar.            In  this  week's shiur, we dealt with  the  dialogue between  Rava and Rav Nachman, which at first glance  can only be interpreted if we conclude that the father is the primary  recipient  of the get. By  paying  attention  to nuances  and  d  we  suggested an  alternate  explanation consistent  with  the opinion that views  the  father  as secondary and awards the leading role to the na'ara.     

Sources for shiur #10

1.   Kiddushin 44b "Itmar . nitnu." 2.   19a "amar Rava amar Rav Nachman . lo shna." 3.   Tosafot  19a s.v. omer, Rosh ch. 1 siman 25. 4.   Rashba 44b s.v. itmar

Questions

1.   How can kiddushin of a minor (who lacks the required da-at)  be  effective even if the father agrees  ex  post facto? 2.    By  what halakhic rationale may a father allow  his daughter to betroth herself while still a minor? 3.    The  Rashba  compares the ability  of  a  minor  to betroth  herself contingent on her father's consent  with one,  who performed a kiddushin to take effect in  thirty days. What is flawed with this comparison?

Questions about the shiur may be addressed to  kiddushin@etzion.org.il .