Shiur #10: The Independent Betrothal of a Minor                    

by Rav Yair Kahn

      The  gemara  (44b) records a debate concerning  the possible  efficacy  of  kiddushin  accepted  by  a  minor without  the  knowledge of her father.  Rav  and  Shemuel maintain  that  the  girl requires  a  get,  due  to  the possibility that the father may acquiesce to  the  union. Ula,   on  the  other  hand,  does  not  entertain   this possibility, and subsequently does not demand  a  get  to allow  the  girl to marry someone else. Apparently,  this should  lead us to conclude that, were we to verify  that the   father  did  consent,  everyone  would  agree  that kiddushin performed with a minor is effective.

     This  conclusion is surprising. So long as she is  a minor, a girl remains under the legal jurisdiction of her father.  In theory, therefore, although our Sages limited this  option  (see  41a),  the  father  may  betroth  his daughter  even  without her consent.  However,  kiddushin performed  by  the  daughter appears,  at  first  glance, meaningless,  since  as  a  minor,  she  lacks  both  the authority  and  the required level of da'at (intellectual capacity) necessary for kiddushin.            Several  Rishonim understood that the  betrothal  is effective  only  if  we  can view  the  father,  not  the daughter, as actually participating in the kiddushin.  In order  to  justify this position, some Rishonim  enlisted the  sugya  in  the first perek (19a) of "tze'i  ve-kabli kidushayikh,"  which posits, "A person  can  say  to  his daughter: Go and accept your betrothal."  Accordingly, we may  explain  that Rav and Shemuel's safek  is  that  the father  may  have  agreed  to  the  match  prior  to  the kiddushin  and  explicitly  instructed  the  daughter  to receive  the  kiddushin  on his  behalf.  Similarly,  the Ra'avad explained our gemara as referring to a case where the  minor accepted the marriage proposal in the presence of  her father. Therefore, the silence of the father  can be  interpreted  as an implicit instruction  of  "go  and accept your betrothal." However, the Rashba rejects  both of these possibilities as incommensurate with our sugya.

      The  Ramban, as well, maintained that the kiddushin must  be  attributed to the father, not the daughter.  In his  opinion, this can be accomplished even if the father became  aware  of the kiddushin ex post facto  and  never instructed the daughter with regard to the kiddushin:

     "Though the betrothal and marriage of one's daughter      is detrimental to the father with respect to nedarim      and  the profits of her labor [over which the father      loses  rights with his daughter's marriage],  it  is      ultimately to his benefit to marry her off and it is      a  mitzva  charged upon him.  In such  a  situation,      when  we  see that he consents, something beneficial      to  the  individual may be performed on  his  behalf      even without his knowledge."       (This approach was discussed in last week's shiur.)

      Similarly, the Rid explained that the father became aware of his daughter's betrothal after the fact and only then  did  he explicitly offer his consent. Nevertheless, the  Rid suggested that according to Rav and Shemuel,  we may  view this eventual consent as reflecting the mindset of  the  father, thus revealing to us that this agreement existed  in  potential even at the time of the kiddushin. The   father  merely  lacked  the  information   of   his daughter's   betrothal.  Once  the  father  agrees   when supplied  with  this  information, we  can  consider  his consent retroactive, thus legitimizing the kiddushin.

     At first glance, this explanation of Rav and Shemuel poses  considerable  difficulty.  After  all,  since  the daughter  is  under the jurisdiction of her  father,  the party  with  whom  the kiddushin can be  enacted  is  the father.  Therefore, the consent of the father is critical and constitutes "da'at makneh," without which there is no kiddushin.  Hence,  the da'at of the father  effects  the kiddushin  and is required in an active sense; it  cannot be  substituted by presumed acknowledgment. (See  Tosafot Ri Hazaken 45b.) It therefore seems unreasonable to apply the consent of the father retroactively.

     In  fact, the Rid argued with our initial assumption and  claimed that Ula, who disputes Rav and Shemuel,  and does  not  require  a get in this case, totally  rejected their  position. Accordingly, even were we  to  ascertain that   the   father,  upon  hearing  of  his   daughter's kiddushin,  gave  his full consent, the  kiddushin  would still be invalid. Furthermore, according to the Rid, this position  of  Ula  is accepted as halakha.  Nevertheless, this  is of little comfort to us, as we are still in  the dark  regarding the opinion of both Rav and Shemuel,  two of  the  greatest  Amoraim, the pillars  upon  which  the Talmud was founded.             Aside  from the logical difficulty in applying  the da'at of the father retroactively, a closer inspection of the  gemara  reveals  an additional problem.  The  gemara seeks  to support the position of Rav and Shemuel from  a beraita  that  permits  a  father  to  sell  his  widowed daughter  as a maidservant to a kohen gadol (despite  the fact  that the kohen gadol cannot marry her, as she is  a widow;  generally,  a  father sells  his  daughter  as  a maidservant with the intent that the owner may marry  her when she reaches adulthood).  How, the gemara asks, can a situation  arise  whereby a father can sell  his  widowed daughter as a maidservant?  As only a minor can be  sold, she  must  have  been  married and widowed  as  a  minor. Presumably,  the gemara reasons, her father  had  married her  off.  However, the gemara continues, halakha forbids a father from selling his daughter as a maidservant after having  previously  married her off.  The  only  possible scenario, then, to which the beraita could have referred, is  a case where the girl married herself, rather than by her father.  The fact that the beraita speaks of her as a "widow" implies that this marriage was valid, despite the fact that she married independently, thus supporting  the position of Rav and Shemuel.

      This discussion in the gemara appears to call  into question   the   approach  taken  by  the  aforementioned Rishonim.  According  to the gemara,  although  a  father cannot  sell his daughter after having previously married her  off,  he  can  sell her after she had  been  married independently. Why can the father sell his daughter after he  consents  to  her marriage? After all,  according  to these Rishonim, through the father's consent he, not  the daughter, actually participates in the marriage,  and  we already  established  that a  father  may  not  sell  his daughter after having betrothed her!

       This   gemara   seems  to  suggest  an   alternate interpretation of our sugya, by which the  daughter,  not the  father, is the active participant in the  kiddushin. The  father  merely has to grant permission in  order  to allow  for the kiddushin of the daughter. Therefore,  the father  may sell the daughter even after agreeing to  her kiddushin, since this consent is not considered kiddushin itself  and hence the father himself never betrothed  his daughter, and never forfeited his right to sell her.

      This  understanding, though novel, finds additional support in the position adopted by the Rashba, who argues as follows:

     "We  may  explain  that perhaps the father  consents      when he hears [of the betrothal], such as if he kept      silent  when he heard [rather than objecting].  This      becomes similar to a case of [a groom who tells  the      bride,]  'You are betrothed to me on condition  that      your  father consents,' where she is betrothed  once      he  [the  father]  hears and does not  object,  even      though  it  did not take effect at the time  of  the      giving  [of the kiddushin money]. Here, even  though      the  money is gone before the father hears  [of  the      betrothal],  we nevertheless must concern  ourselves      [for  the possible consent of the father, and  hence      the  validity of the kiddushin], as it  resembles  a      situation [where the groom says,] 'You are betrothed      to  me after thirty days,' in which case even though      the  money is gone [before thirty days have passed],      she is betrothed."

     By  comparing our sugya to a case of kiddushin  that is  to  take effect in thirty days, the Rashba  indicates that  the  act of kiddushin had been completed  with  the daughter, befthe father enters onto the stage. True,  the kiddushin cannot take effect until the father agrees, but this  agreement  is  not  a requirement  of  the  ma'aseh kiddushin,  which  has already been  completed  with  the daughter. Hence, it is the daughter, not the father,  who is party to the kiddushin. The consent of the father is a requirement  that  is external to the ma'aseh  kiddushin, necessary merely to lend legitimacy and validity  to  his daughter's act.            At first glance, this approach seems absurd. How can we  separate  the  act  of  kiddushin  performed  by  the daughter from the intent supplied by the father?  Can  we consider  a mindless act complete, merely awaiting  da'at in  order  to  take  effect? Does the  ma'aseh  kiddushin exhaust  itself in the physical performance of placing  a ring on the hand of a woman in the presence of witnesses? Would   anyone  entertain  the  possibility  of  a  valid performance of kiddushin by placing a ring on the  finger of  a  sleeping woman, pending her consent? Anyone versed in  the  logic  of the halakhic system would  immediately detect the absurdity of this suggestion.

      In  order  to present our suggestion  as  a  viable option, we cannot view the ma'aseh kiddushin performed by the  daughter  as a mindless act. Hence,  we  must  award halakhic  significance to the daughter's  intent.  Though still  a minor, whose intentions do not meet the halakhic criteria  of da'at, she is nonetheless capable of  making decisions  which reflect her will. Apparently, this  will is   sufficient  to  infuse  meaning  into  the   ma'aseh kiddushin. In fact, the Rambam (Hilkhot Ishut  4:1)  uses the  telling  term, "ratzon" - will, when describing  the intention   required  of  the  woman   participating   in kiddushin. "Ratzon" denotes the personal, intimate, inner stirrings  of  a  soul, which applies to both  child  and adult.

      However,  though capable of "ratzon,"  a  minor  is unable to effect kiddushin without the father's approval. The Torah placed the daughter in the trust of her father, and  thus  the consent of the guardian - father  -  is  a necessary  requirement. Nevertheless,  this  approval  is external  to  the  act  of kiddushin  that  is  concluded between the chatan and the daughter.

      According  to this approach, we can also appreciate the proposal of the Rid, that the eventual consent of the father  can  be  applied retroactively. We rejected  this possibility,  assuming  that the explicit  da'at  of  the father was necessary to give meaning to the basic ma'aseh kiddushin.  However,  upon suggesting  that  the  ma'aseh kiddushin  is consumated with the daughter,  pending  the father's  approval, we are open to the  possibility  that this  approval,  which is not part of the  basic  ma'aseh kiddushin  can  be  presumed. Since  the  father  readily granted  his  permission upon learning of his  daughter's betrothal, we can assume this approval retroactively,  as well.

      Furthermore, we can employ this approach to explain the  sugya  of  "tze'i  ve-kabli  kidushayikh."   At  the beginning of this shiur, we assumed that this halakha  is based  on  some form of shelichut, by which the  daughter acts on behalf of the father. Indeed, this interpretation was  adopted  by a number of Rishonim (see, for  example, the  Rosh  ch.  1  siman 25). However, in  light  of  our analysis,  we  can  explain that  the  father  is  merely voicing  his approval, which in turn allows the  daughter to  marry  herself. Sure enough, this  seems  to  be  the interpretation suggested by Tosafot (19a s.v. omer).

SUMMARY

      Over  the  past  few weeks we have focused  on  the relationship   between  the  father  and   the   daughter regarding  gittin and kiddushin.  Until  this  shiur,  we dealt  with areas where a daughter would have the ability to  act independently were she not in the jurisdiction of her  father.   Thus we were able to discuss which  action was playing the lead role, the father or the daughter.

      In  today's shiur we discussed the betrothal  of  a minor,  who without her father lacks the independence  to marry  herself.  This led to our initial assumption  that the   father  is  the  primary  party.   However,  closer inspection of the sugya and various commentaries, led  us to  suggest  that even in this case the act of  kiddushin can  be  performed  by the daughter,  although  a  minor, pending the consent of her father.

 Sources and questions for shiur #11 will follow.