Shiur #05: Shelichut le-Dvar Averia and the Heter Mekhira

Shiur given by Rav Mordechai Willig                 

Transcribed by Aaron Siegel

 I.  The  Source  of  Ein  Shaliach le-Dvar  Aveira  and  Its Ramifications

     In  Masekhet Kiddushin (42b), the Gemara introduces the concept  of  "ein shalich le-dvar aveira."  This means  that one  is held accountable for a transgression he commits even if   he   was  commissioned  to  do  so  by  another.    The meshalei'ach,  or dispatcher, is not punished  for  the  sin despite his having sent the violator to commit the act.  The Gemara raises two possible sources for this halakha.  First, it  suggests  a  "sevara," an intuitive,  logical  argument: "divrei ha-rav ve-divrei ha-talmid, divrei mi shomin?"  This literally translates as, "The words of the teacher  and  the words of the student - whom does one obey?"  In other words, the  dispatcher cannot be held responsible for commissioning the  act,  because he could not have expected the  shaliach, the  agent, to carry out the shelichut in violation  of  the Torah.  The dispatcher thus did not actually anticipate  the shaliach's  compliance with his request, as  it  involved  a transgression.   We  therefore  hold  the  shaliach  himself responsible, rather than the meshalei'ach.  In addition, the Gemara  also  cites textual sources from the Torah  for  the halakha of ein shaliach le-devar aveira.             Which source does the Gemara view as conclusive -  the sevara or the textual source?  This issue is debated by  the Rishonim.   Tosefot (42b, "amai") discuss a situation  where the  shaliach commissioned to commit the forbidden act is  a "shogeig" - he does not know that the action he is requested to  perform  is prohibited.  In such a case, of course,  the reasoning  of "divrei ha-rav ve-divrei ha-talmid"  does  not apply.  Since the shaliach is unaware that the Torah forbids this  action, we cannot excuse the dispatcher on the grounds that  he  could not have expected the shaliach to  disregard his command in deference to Torah law.  Tosefot indeed rules that  in  such  a  case  we assume "yeish  shaliach  le-dvar aveira"  -  the  meshalei'ach is  held  accountable.   Thus, according to Tosefot, the conclusive source for the  general rule  of ein shaliach le-dvar aveira is the sevara, the line of  reasoning of "divrei ha-rav ve-divrei ha-talmid. "  Were we  to  view  the verses cited by the Gemara as  the  actual source of the halakha, whether or not the shaliach is  aware of the forbidden nature of the act would be inconsequential.

     The Rema accepts Tosefot's position, that in conclusion the  Gemara bases the halakha of ein shaliach le-dvar aveira on  the sevara, rather than a Biblical source, and hence the principle  does  not  apply  to  a  situation  of   shogeig. Additionally, if the shaliach was known to violate the given prohibition without any apprehension, we would likewise cast responsibility  on the meshalei'ach, as  he  knew  that  the shaliach  would  have no qualms about committing  the  given act.   The  Ketzot and Shakh disagree, and  argue  that  ein shaliach le-dvar aveira constitutes a gezeirat ha-katuv,  an objective  halakha introduced by the Torah, and it therefore applies  to all cases, even if the agent does not know  that the  action  he  commits  is  prohibited,  and  even  if  he routinely transgresses the given violation.

      Tosefot  in  Bava  Metzia  (10b,  "de-amar")  raise  a different  issue concerning situations of shelichut  le-dvar aveira.   The  Gemara (here in Kiddushin and there  in  Bava Metzia)  addresses  only  the  question  of  accountability, whether  or not the meshalei'ach can be punished on  account of  the  act he commissions.  Tosefot introduce the question as to the efficacy of the forbidden act committed.  Consider a case of a shaliach commissioned to perform a forbidden act that  affords  a  given status.  Does ein  shaliach  le-dvar aveira  undermine  the  entire  shelichut,  such  that   the shaliach's  actions are meaningless and inconsequential,  or does  it merely place exclusive culpability on the shaliach, but  he  retains his status as such and his action  is  thus effective?   Tosefot  seem to present  two  different  views regarding this question.      Let us take a practical example.  The poskim discuss  a case  of  a  man who seeks to divorce his wife  against  her will,  which  is  forbidden by force  of  Rabbenu  Gershom's famous  edicts, and he commissions an agent to  deliver  the get.  Ein shaliach le-dvar aveira means that the husband  is not  punishable  for the act, since he  did  not  commit  it himself.  But does this delivery of the get through an agent indeed  end  the  marriage?  Does the  shaliach  retain  his status  as the husband's agent for this prohibited act,  and thus   he  effectuates  the  divorce,  or  does  the  entire shelichut  dissolve since we deal with something  forbidden? The  Noda be-Yehuda ruled that the divorce is not effective; in  his  view, an attempt to commit a sin through a shaliach cannot  produce a "chalut," a change of status.   This  case became the subject of an entire literature among the poskim.             This  issue  will  likely hinge on the  aforementioned discussion  concerning the source of  ein  shaliach  le-dvar aveira.  If we accept the sevara, whereby we assume that the meshalei'ach  never expected the shaliach to carry  out  the shelichut,  then the intended agent never actually  took  on the  status of a shaliach.  As such, any action he  performs on  behalf  of  the so-called meshalei'ach  is  ineffective, since the meshalei'ach did not seriously appoint him as  his shaliach.   If, however, the principle of ein  shaliach  le- dvar  aveira  originates from a gezeirat ha-katuv,  then  it seemingly pertains only to the issue of accountability;  the Torah   holds   the  shaliach  responsible,  and   not   the meshalei'ach.  This has no bearing, however, on  the  status of  the  shelichut.  The shelichut is still valid, and  thus the  action performed on behalf of the dispatcher is  indeed effective.

II. The Validity of the Heter Mekhira Sale

     Let   us  now  proceed  to  a  practical,  contemporary question that relates to this discussion.  Today in  Israel, many  people  circumvent  the laws of  shemita  through  the "heter  mekhira,"  a  formal sale of agricultural  lands  in Israel  to  non-Jews.   Among  the  many  issues  that  this mechanism raises is the prohibition of "lo techanem,"  which forbids selling land within Eretz Yisrael to gentiles.  Even if  we  accept the legal viability of the sale and its power to  render the laws of shemita inapplicable, many argue that the sale itself is prohibited.  The Israeli Chief Rabbinate, however, follows the lenient position and employs the  heter mekhira.   If  someone  disagrees  with  the  heter  mekhira specifically on this point, because of the prohibition of lo techanem,  would he be allowed to employ the  heter  mekhira once  the Rabbinate performs the sale?  Once he accepts  the viability of the heter mekhira, and objects only to the sale itself as it violates, in his view, lo techanem, perhaps  so long  as  others  conduct the sale he may employ  the  heter mekhira.             This  would seem to depend on the previous discussion. If  no  shelichut  can  technically  be  sustained  when  it involves a transgression, then here, too, we cannot view the Rabbinate  as  the individual's agent to sell the  farmland. As  far as he is concerned, then, the sale is not valid, and he  may not rely on the heter mekhira.  This indeed was  the position  of  the  Chazon Ish.  On the other  hand,  if  ein shaliach  le-dvar  aveira  applies  only  to  the  issue  of culpability,  but  has  no bearing  on  the  status  of  the shelichut, then this individual may accept the sale ex  post facto and rely on the heter.

      It  would  seem, however, that in this situation,  the individual may accept the sale regardless of whether or  not the shelichut is sustained when it involves a transgression. As  we  argued earlier, if the shelichut de facto  dissolves when  dealing with a forbidden act, this is so  because  the principle  of  ein shaliach le-dvar aveira is based  on  the argument of "divrei ha-rav ve-divrei ha-talmid. "  Since the meshalei'ach  did not expect the shaliach to carry  out  the mission, the shelichut is not valid to begin with.  We  also noted  tif  this line of reasoning forms the  basis  of  ein shaliach le-dvar aveira, then this principle would not apply when  the  shaliach  is  not aware that  the  given  act  is forbidden.   In  the  case under discussion,  the  Rabbinate follows the ruling of Rav Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor who held that  the  prohibition  of lo techanem  does  not  apply  to temporary  sales, such as that conducted before the  shemita year.    One  who  does  not  accept  this  leniency   would presumably  classify  those who do - including  the  Israeli Rabbinate  -  under  the  category  of  shogeig,   as   they mistakenly (in his view) consider the given act permissible. Thus,  the  argument of "divrei ha-rav ve-divrei  ha-talmid" cannot apply, and the shelichut remains intact.

      It turns out, then, that according to both sources  of ein  shaliach le-dvar aveira, the individual in such a  case could  rely on the Rabbinate's sale of the farmland.  If  we follow the textual source of the halakha, then the issue  is only one of accountability; the shelichut, however, is valid (as discussed earlier).  On the other hand, if we accept the logic  of  "divrei ha-rav ve-divrei ha-talmid,"  then  given that we deal here with a situation of shogeig, the shelichut is  not undermined by the fact that it involved a prohibited action.

     Indeed,  this  argument appears in the  work,  "Or  le- Tziyon"  (introduction to Shevi'it 4:5).  The  author  cites the  position  of Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank ruling leniently  in such  a  case  for a different reason, on the grounds  of  a "sefeik-sefeika," or "double doubt."  First, we are in doubt as  to whether shelichut is effective in situations when  it involves   a  transgression.   Secondly,  even  if   it   is ineffective, in cases of shogeig, such as in this  instance, the  shelichut remains in force.  Rav Frank thus employs the principle of "sefeik-sefeika," that whenever we confront two issues  regarding  which we are in doubt, and  either  issue will  yield a lenient ruling in a given case, we may  indeed rule  leniently.   The "Or le-Tziyon" notes,  however,  that when  dealing  with monetary issues, such as here,  when  we must  determine the legal status of the sale vis-?-vis  this individual, we cannot employ the "sefeik-sefeika" principle. But  the "Or le-Tziyon" adds that we may employ the argument discussed, that according to both sources of ein shaliach le- dvar  aveira  one  may  rely on the sale  conducted  by  the Rabbinate.

III. The Rambam's View

      The  "Or  le-Tziyon"  then proceeds  to  question  the validity  of  this  reasoning, based on  a  passage  in  the Rambam's  Mishneh Torah.  These comments, as  we  will  see, seem to indicate that the two issues discussed at the outset -  the  case of shogeig and the efficacy of the shelichut  - are  not  necessarily related.  Even if we assume  that  ein shaliach le-dvar aveira applies when the agent is unaware of the  prohibition  involved, we cannot  necessarily  conclude that  the  shelichut is legally binding.  This,  of  course, undermines the very foundation of the argument we advanced.

      In  Hilkhot Me'ila 7:1-2, the Rambam mentions that the principle of ein shaliach le-dvar aveira does not  apply  to me'ila  -  the  prohibition  against  the  personal  use  of property belonging to hekdesh (the Temple treasury).   Thus, if  a person orders his servant to take sacrificial meat and feed  it  to his guests, then the host, rather than servant, violates  the  prohibition of me'ila.  At first  glance,  we might  claim  that  this halakha flows  naturally  from  the standard guidelines of ein shaliach le-dvar aveira.   As  we know, the halakhot of me'ila apply only in cases of shogeig, when one unintentionally tampers with hekdesh.  Only in such a  case  is one required to pay the fine stipulated  by  the Torah.   This  punishment  does  not  apply  to  intentional violators.  It would seem, therefore, in light of  Tosefot's view  (as  discussed  earlier), that  ein  shaliach  le-dvar aveira  does  not  apply when the agent is  unaware  of  the prohibition, that it naturally can never pertain to  me'ila. The Rambam, however (in 7:2), clearly portrays me'ila as  an exception  to  the  general rule  of  ein  shaliach  le-dvar aveira.  The culpability of the dispatcher evolves not  from the  standard guidelines of ein shaliach le-dvar aveira, but rather from a special provision unique to the institution of me'ila.   We must conclude, then, that the Rambam  does  not accept Tosefot's ruling, and he maintains that even when the shaliach  is  unaware  of  the  prohibition  involved,   the principle of ein shaliach le-dvar aveira applies.

      Yet, in that same halakha, the Rambam indicates that a shaliach  loses his formal status as such when the shelichut involves a transgression.  Although, as mentioned, in  cases of  me'ila  the meshalei'ach is responsible, this  does  not apply when the me'ila act violates another transgression, as well.  The Rambam rules that if someone sends another person to  eat  forbidden sacrificial meat ("besar ola"), then  the shaliach  is  culpable  even for the  violation  of  me'ila. Since his action violates an additional prohibition, besides that of me'ila, we revert back to the standard principle  of ein   shaliach  le-dvar  aveira,  and  we  cannot  hold  the dispatcher   responsible  even  for  the  sin   of   me'ila. According  to  this ruling, the presence  of  an  additional violation undermines the shelichut even with respect to  the prohibition  of me'ila, where the shelichut would  otherwise be  maintained.   This  would seem to  imply  that,  in  the Rambam's  view,  shelichut  cannot  be  effective  when   it involves the violation of a prohibition.

      What emerges, then, is that the Rambam appears to deny the  correlation we suggested earlier between the issues  of shogeig  -  when the shaliach is unaware of the  prohibition involved - and the efficacy of the shelichut.  We had argued that  if ein shaliach le-dvar aveira applies even in a  case of shogeig, then it must originate from a gezeirat ha-katuv, and  thus  it  affects only the dispatcher's accountability, not  the validity of the shelichut.  The Rambam, the "Or le- Tziyon"  notes,  appears  to  hold  otherwise:  although  he applies ein shaliach le-dvar aveira to cases of shogeig,  he nevertheless  views  the shelichut as de  facto  invalidated when it entails a violation.

     In truth, however, we cannot conclusively determine the Rambam's view concerning this question on the basis of  this passage  alone.   For  elsewhere he  implies  that,  on  the contrary,   the   shelichut  is  sustained   even   when   a transgression is involved.  The context is the halakha known as  "dalet ve-hei."  A thief who steals a sheep or bull  and then  slaughters it (or sells it) must pay  the  owner  four sheep  or  five bulls in return.  Like me'ila,  the  law  of "dalet  ve-hei"  marks  an exception  to  the  rule  of  ein shaliach  le-dvar  aveira.  A thief  who  has  someone  else slaughter the stolen animal is himself liable for the  fine. In  Hilkhot Geneiva (3:6), the Rambam addresses a  situation of  a  thief who commissions another to slaughter the stolen animal  for him, and the shaliach does so on Shabbat (which, of  course,  violates the laws of Shabbat).   This  scenario appears  to  precisely  parallel  the  aforementioned   case described  in  Hilkhot Me'ila.  Here,  too,  a  meshalei'ach sends  a  shaliach  to  commit  a  forbidden  act  generally excluded from the principle of ein shaliach le-dvar  aveira, but the act entails an additional prohibition, as well.   As we   saw,  in  Hilkhot  Me'ila  the  Rambam  held  that  the additional prohibition invalidates the shelichut, such  that the  shaliach  is  accountable even  for  the  transgression normally  excluded  from the rule of  ein  shaliach  le-dvar aveira  (in  that case, me'ila).  Here, in Hilkhot  Geneiva, the   Rambam  rules  differently.   Although  the   shaliach violated  Shabbat when executing the shelichut, a  violation for  which  he  is  clearly held accountable,  this  has  no bearing on the liability for the "dalet ve-hei" fine.   With respect  to this fine, we view the shaliach as having  acted on  behalf  of the meshalei'ach, who is liable  because  ein shaliach le-dvar aveira does not apply to the obligation  of "dalet ve-hei."

      This  ruling,  of course, implies that  the  shelichut remains in force even when it involves a transgression,  and it appears to directly contradict the Rambam's own ruling in Hilkhot ila.

      The  Mishneh  le-Melekh (in Hilkhot Geneiva)  suggests that,  in  truth, when a violation is involved the shelichut dissolves,  as  implied  by  the Rambam's  view  in  Hilkhot Me'ila.  In Hilkhot Geneiva, however, the Rambam speaks of a situation  where the meshalei'ach did not request  that  the animal  be  slaughtered specifically on Shabbat.  He  simple commissioned  the shaliach to slaughter the  animal  at  his convenience; he never imagined that the shaliach would do so on  Shabbat.   That the shaliach decided to violate  Shabbat has  no impact on the shelichut, which pertains only to  the slaughtering of the animal per se.

      However,  in his commentary on the mishna, the  Rambam indeed  applies  this  ruling  even  to  a  case  where  the dispatcher  specifically ordered the  slaughtering  to  take place  on Shabbat.  Our question, then, remains: why is  the shelichut   not  immediately  negated  once  it  entails   a violation of Shabbat?

      The  Or  Samei'ach suggests a distinction between  the institutions  of me'ila and "dalet ve-hei."  Though  neither is included in the principle of ein shaliach le-dvar aveira, the  exclusion  of  me'ila  involves  a  much  more  drastic chiddush than that of the slaughtering of the stolen animal. First,  in  the situation of Hilkhot Geneiva,  the  shaliach slaughters  the animal on the thief's behalf; he derives  no benefit  from the forbidden action.  In the case of  me'ila, by  contrast, the shaliach was instructed to partake of  the forbidden  meat.  Although he formally acts as  a  shaliach, nevertheless  he derives personal benefit from  his  action. Thus,  the maintenance of the shelichut in this case is  far less intuitive, and the shelichut is more easily terminated. Additionally,  the shaliach in the case of  Hilkhot  Geneiva does  not have a status of a "bar chiyuva," meaning,  he  is not  included  in the specific prohibition the  meshalei'ach seeks to violate.  Only the thief himself is liable for  the special "dalet ve-hei" fine if he slaughters the animal.  By contrast, in the case in Hilkhot Me'ila, the prohibition  of me'ila,  which  the meshalei'ach instructs the  shaliach  to violate,  applies equally to them both.  This, too,  renders the  shelichut  in case of me'ila far more counterintuitive. As  the  shaliach  is  himself included in  the  prohibition against  eating  sacrificial meat, we are less  inclined  to view  him  as  merely  an  agent of his  meshalei'ach.   The shelichut  is  therefore more easily canceled  when  another violation is involved.

      The Sha'ar ha-Melekh raises yet another distinction to resolve  the  difficulty  in the Rambam.   In  the  case  of Hilkhot Me'ila, the shaliach eats a piece of forbidden meat, meat  that  is intended to be burnt on the altar  and  hence forbidden for human consumption.  Such meat has, by its very definition,  two  prohibitions  associated  with   it:   the prohibition against eating meat meant for the altar, and the prohibition  of me'ila - misusing the property  of  hekdesh. Thus, the two violations committed by the shaliach are  very much  interrelated.   As a result, the  involvement  of  one prohibition can easily affect the other with regard  to  the validity of the shelichut.  In Hilkhot Geneiva, by contrast, the  shaliach violates two entirely distinct prohibitions  - slaughtering stolen property, and Shabbat desecration.  Once we can separate the two prohibitions from one another, it is likely that the Shabbat violation, with respect to which the shelichut  is  annulled  (because of ein  shelichut  le-dvar aveira),  will  have  no affect on the  second  prohibition, slaughtering the animal.  The shelichut thus remains  intact for  purposes of the "dalet ve-hei" obligation, despite  the violation of a different prohibition.

      According to the approach of both the Or Samei'ach and the  Sha'ar ha-Melekh, the Rambam essentially holds that the shelichut   is   sustained   even   when   it   involves   a transgression.   Ein  shaliach  le-dvar  aveira   does   not undermine  the entire shelichut.  The case he  discusses  in Hilkhot  Me'ila,  which seems to imply otherwise,  marks  an exception  to  the general rule.  Whether we  adopt  the  Or Samei'ach's  approach or that of the Sha'ar ha-Melelkh,  the case  in  Hilkhot  Me'ila  is a unique  instance  where  the shelichut  can be more easily dissolved, either due  to  the independence  of the shaliach (Or Samei'ach) or  because  of the  inherent  relationship  between  the  two  prohibitions involved (Sha'ar ha-Melekh).

      In  light  of this, we may now reaffirm  the  line  of reasoning posited earlier to allow one to rely on the  heter mekhira  even  if  he  himself believes  that  the  sale  is prohibited.  We assumed that if ein shaliach le-dvar  aveira is  predicated on a gezeirat ha-katuv, and it  thus  applies even  to cases of shogeig, then the shelichut remains intact despite the fact that it involves a transgression.   The  Or le-Tziyon challenged this presumption based on the ruling of the  Rambam  in  Hilkhot  Me'ila,  which  implies  that  the shelichut  is dissolved, even though the Rambam applies  ein shaliach  le-dvar aveira to cases of shogeig.   As  we  have seen,  however, the Rambam in fact maintains that generally, the  shelichut remains intact.  We may therefore uphold  our assumption, and thus even one who personally does not accept the  ruling permitting the sale of farmland to gentiles  may still  accept  the validity of the sale after the  fact  for purposes of the heter mekhira.

Sources for shiur #6: 1. Kiddushin 42b, vi-haditanya shaliach...vi-zeh michayev. 2. 21a "shilach biyad cheresh...shlichutei." 3.  Rambam  Hil.  Geneiva 3:6. Rambam's  Commentary  on  the Mishna BK 7:2. 4. Netivot Hamishpat 182;1 till "vi-inach." 5. Sema 292;10; Ktzot 292;1 from "vi-hanireh" till "ela."

Questions: 1. Regarding which transgressions is there a specific source from which we derive the culpability of the meshaleach? 2.  In  these cases, is the meshaleach culpable even if  the shaliach was a minor or gentile? 3.  If  the mishaleach cannot pay, is the shaliach obligated to do so? 4.  Does shlichut apply if a person was sent to do an action which  entails  two  transgressions, one in  which  shlichut pertains and one in which it doesn't?