Shiur #01: "Mitzva Bo Yeter Mi-beshlucho"
by Rav Amnon Bazak
A. Introduction
The gemara at the beginning of the second chapter of
Kiddushin (41a) discusses the statement of the mishna: "A man
betrothes (a woman) either himself or through an agent;
a woman is betrothed either herself or through her agent." The gemara
comments:
"If one can betroth through an agent, do I need
[the
mishna to tell me that one can do so] himself?"
Rav
Yosef answers that the mishna here alludes
to the
principle of, "mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho"
- there
is an extra mitzva for one to personally perform the
act, rather than assigning an agent.
Rav Yosef
cites as examples the practice of two
amoraim to
personally involve
themselves in shabbat
preparations, rather than leaving all the work
for
others.
The gemara brings an additional opinion,
according to which this principle is not to be derived from
the
beginning of the mishna. In the case
of betrothal through an agent, this view argues, if the man does
not
know the woman there is even a prohibition involved: "A man
is prohibited to betroth a woman until he has seen her, in case
(when he meets her later on) he will see in her something that is
distasteful to him and she will be repugnant to him...."
It is for this reason that the mishna employs the word
"himself." However, we may still derive this
principle from the end of the mishna: "A woman is
betrothed either herself or through her agent." The word
"herself" teaches that "the mitzva is greater if she performs it
herself rather than through an agent."
In this article we shall examine the
nature and
scope of the principle that "it is a greater mitzva if he
performs it himself rather than through an
agent" -
"mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho."
B. Reason and scope of this Provision
Rashi comments as follows:
"For one who performs the mitzvot himself receives
a
greater reward."
The significance of physically engaging in
mitzvot
oneself may be understood in two different ways:
1. As pertaining to the person who performs the mitzvot:
i.e., if a person engages physically and exerts himself
in the performance of mitzvot, then he is fulfilling them
in the best possible way: "the reward is in accordance
with the effort." The Rambam comments as follows, in his
Perush Ha-mishnayot:
"Accordingly, 'herself' is mentioned before
'through
her agent,' because a person's
involvement in a
mitzva is more complete when he performs it
himself
than when he has someone else perform it for him."
2. The second possibility is that this principle pertains
to the mitzva: a person who takes the
trouble to
personally perform the mitzva shows greater honor to the
mitzva.
These two possibilities have
ramifications with
regard to the range of instances in which this principle
will apply. This principle is mentioned only in
our
sugya, and relates to only two mitzvot explicitly
-
kiddushin (betrothal) and Shabbat. (The scope of this
article does not allow for a full treatment of the debate
among the Rishonim as to whether or not kiddushin
is
actually a mitzva.)
There are three basic opinions in this regard:
1. The Ri Ha-zaken states at the beginning of the second
chapter of Kiddushin: "'It is a greater mitzva if
he
performs it himself' - ANY MITZVA that applies to him
should be performed by him personally, and not by
an
agent."
This approach seems to be the most widely accepted among
the poskim, and the halakha is codified accordingly by
the Magen Avraham (Orach Chayim 250:2), who writes: "This
principle applies to every mitzva - it is a
greater
mitzva if he performs it himself than through an agent."
2. The Pitchei Teshuva (ibid.) brings the opinion of the
Yad David on the Rambam (Hilkhot
Shabbat 4:6),
maintaining that the principle applies specifically to
the two mitzvot explicitly mentioned in the
gemara:
kiddushin and Shabbat.
The debate seems to revolve around the nature of the
reason behind this principle. According to the view that
the reason relates to the personal involvement of the
person in fulfilling the mitzva, there appears to be no
reason to differentiate between different types
of
mitzvot. Since the basis of the principle rests on the
process of the fulfillment of the given mitzva,
its
specific character is of no consequence. But for those
who maintain that the reason relates to the honor shown
to the mitzva, there may be room to argue
that the
principle pertains only to specific mitzvot.
According to the view of the Yad David,
which is
based on our sugya, the
principle is relevant
specifically to the mitzvot of kiddushin and Shabbat.
Concerning Shabbat, the reason is clear. The command to
"honor Shabbat" is one of the "four things that are said
of Shabbat" (Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 30:1),
and it
includes all the preparations for Shabbat
(ibid.,
halakhot 2-6). In the words of the Rambam in halakha 6:
"Even if a person holds a very important title and is not
accustomed to bringing things from the market or engaging
in housework, he is obligated to personally
perform
himself, such activities as are necessary for Shabbat,
for this is his honor." (Although the language here is
slightly ambiguous, we may understand the Rambam in light
of the parallel passage with the Shulchan Arukh - Orach
Chayim 250:1: "this is his honor,
that he honors
Shabbat.")
It is therefore understandable why specifically
in
the case of Shabbat, where there is a special mitzva of
'honor,' the principle of "mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho"
applies.
In the case of kiddushin, too, we can understand why
it is particularly important that the mitzva be performed
by the man himself. Although the sugya does not,
at
first glance, point to any clear connection between the
two halakhot, it nevertheless appears that they
have
their source in the same concept, that just as "a man may
not betroth a woman until he has seen her, in case (when
he meets her later on) he will see in her something that
is distasteful to him and she will be repugnant to him,'
and Hashem has commanded, 'You shall love your neighbor
as yourself," likewise, the mitzva of betrothing a woman
should be performed by the person himself, for this is an
integral part of the nature of kiddushin.
This arises explicitly from the
words of the
Maharshdam (Yoreh De'ah 95; the question under discussion
is whether a person must obey his father's command not to
marry a certain woman):
..."For (even) a lenient
rabbinical prohibition
overrides the mitzva of honoring one's parents,
and
all the more so the mitzva of marriage
(overrides
the mitzva to obey
his parents), which is
exceedingly great - to marry
the woman who is
suitable in his eyes. After all, for what reason did
the Sages say of this mitzva (of kiddushin) that 'it
is a greater mitzva if he performs it himself rather
than through an agent'?!"
The Maharshdam clearly sees
this principle as
inherently connected to the mitzva of marriage: "to marry
the woman who is suitable in his eyes." (The same idea as
applying to women is found in a revolutionary statement
of the Ran (teshuvat, 32) asserting that "the crux of the
mitzva of marriage for a woman is that it should be to
the person whom she desires.") In light of this approach
we may understand why this principle applies specifically
to marriage. (According to this approach, the gemara's
comparison between kiddushin and Shabbat should
be
understood as comparing only the actual halakha, whereas
the reasons for its application are completely different
in each case.)
c. A unique, "in-between approach" is to be found in the
Or Zaru'a (siman 128), who contends that theoretically,
the principle of "mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho" applies
to all the mitzvot. But then he asks, if this is so, then
why do we not make a point with regard to
shechita
(ritual slaughter of animals), separation of 'challa,'
circumcision, etc., to perform them ourselves rather than
through an agent? He answers as follows:
"Specifically concerning kiddushin our Sages
taught
that 'it is a greater mitzva if he peit
himself,'
for the agent derives no benefit at all
from the
betrothal; to the contrary, it is to his
detriment,
in that the woman is now forbidden to him.
But in
the cases of shechita, challa, etc., the mitzva will
be no greater if he performs it himself rather
than
through an agent, as indeed our Sages and
all the
nation, although they were proficient in
the laws
pertaining to shechita, they customarily allowed the
appointed one (the 'shochet') to
slaughter... and
the same applies to circumcision, where even if
the
father is trained [as a mohel], he may, as a
first
preference, ask someone else
to perform the
circumcision. Even though the
mohel derives no
benefit from the act of circumcision, neither
does
the child's father derive benefit, and so they
are
equal."
To explain his approach, it appears that
he, too,
believes that the principle pertains to the honor shown
to mitzvot, but in his view the principle arises not from
the unique character of the mitzva, but rather from the
PROCESS OF ITS PERFORMANCE. Thus, the principle applies
only when there is a discrepancy in motivation between
the dispatcher and his agent, when the dispatcher stands
to benefit (such as in kiddushin) and the agent does not
(in kiddushin, the agent actually loses). In such a case,
the mitzva will be performed with less enthusiasm by the
agent than it would be by the dispatcher himself, and the
honor shown towards the mitzva is thereby undermined. But
when there is no discrepancy in terms of motivation (even
if the respective parties are driven by
completely
different motives), then there is no difference in the
way the mitzva is performed - e.g. shechita, where the
dispatcher benefits (from the results) as does the agent
(from payment) - and so the principle does not apply.
C. The Nature of the principle
Earlier we mentioned Rashi's comment that "a
person
who engages in it personally receives a greater reward."
This would seem to show that the mitzva for a person to
perform the given act personally rather than through an
agent belongs more in the philosophical
realm: he
"receives a greater reward," suggesting
that this
principle makes no practical difference and
has no
practical ramifications.
The Ra'avad introduces a novel idea in this regard, as
quoted in the responsa of the Rivash (siman 82):
"You have asked further:
Suppose that Reuven
appoints an agent to betroth a certain woman to
him
in a different city, and the agent betroths her
to
Reuven as he should - for an agent generally carries
out his mission - and the berakha over the betrothal
is recited. Then the woman arrives with the agent to
Reuven's place to marry him. The woman and the agent
declare that she was betrothed to Reuven through the
agent; must the prospective groom then betroth
her
once again himself and recite the berakha over
the
betrothal a second time before entering the 'chupa,'
or not? You say that this very situation came before
you in Majorca and you wanted to recite the blessing
for the marriage, but the sage Rabbi Vidal
Ephraim
zt"l would not let you do
so until the groom
betrothed her once again himself. You said to
him,
'Hasn't the agent already betrothed her to him?
If
the groom betroths her once again,
then you are
casting doubt and aspersions
on the original
betrothal that was executed by the agent, and people
will say that betrothal through an
agent is not
valied betrothal.' And (you say that)
he replied
that the Ra'avad zt"l wrote in his halakhot
that a
person who betroths a woman through an
agent must
betroth her once again himself, based on
what our
Sages taught. 'mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho' - is
a
greater mitzva if he performs it himself rather than
through an agent. Nevertheless, in
order not to
pronounce Hashem's Name in vain, for a
person who
recites an unnecessary
berakha violates the
prohibition against invoking Hashem's Name in
vain,
he (ordered that Hashem's
Name should not be
mentioned in the blessing; he
should say only,
'Blessed are You, Hashem' rather than mentioning His
Name."
The Ra'avad's novel theory - that
a person who
betroths a woman through an agent must then betroth her
himself (albeit without mentioning a berakha) is at first
very difficult to understand. Indeed,
the Rivash
expresses his astonishment:
"What R. Vidal z"l, of blessed memory,
told you -
that the Ra'avad wrote that someone
who betroths
through an agent must betroth again himself at
the
time of the marriage, based on
what is written
"mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho" - I wonder how
such a
holy person as the Ra'avad could say such a
thing.
For (the gemara) there says
only that when he
initially comes to betroth her, it is
a greater
mitzva if he does so himself than if
he does so
through an agent. But once the woman
has already
been betrothed to him through his agent in front
of
witnesses, then what mitzva can
there be in
betrothing her again; she is already
betrothed to
him and the betrothal is valid. This
is wasteful
activity and futile effort. We may compare this
to
that which the gemara brings in this context,
that
Rav Safra would roast a head [of an animal] and Rava
would salt a fish [before Shabbat, to
personally
involved themselves in the mitzva]:
if it were
roasted or salted by someone else, he would not have
roasted or salted it again."
The Rivash raises two difficulties:
1. The principle of "mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho,"
applies only "le-khatchila" when first
performing the
act, but not after the fact (be-di'avad).
2. Once a man has already betrothed a woman through an
agent, she is betrothed to him and the betrothal
is
valid. The second betrothal is meaningless - it is no
more than "wasteful activity and futile effort."
The
question becomes even more pointed with
regard to
kiddushin itself: what turns the simple action of giving
a sum of money to a woman into an act of betrothal is the
halakhic effect that is created thereby: the woman is
thus forbidden to anyone else. But if the
woman is
already halakhically betrothed, then the
act of
"kiddushin" a second time is merely a meaningless act of
giving, for what can now turn that act of giving into a
halakhic act of kiddushin?
In order to understand the Ra'avad's comments, we must
address two questions:
1. It appears that according to the Ra'avad, the halakhic
principle of "mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho" is defined as
"hiddur mitzva" (a way of fulfilling the mitzva in
the
best possible way) or, in the words of R. Chaim
ben
Shemuel, a "mitzva min ha-muvchar" - mitzva of a higher
quality. In light of this we may evaluate the question
of the function served by the second betrothal, based on
the famous discussion of the Beit Ha-Levi (part 2, siman
47) concerning 'hiddur mitzva':
"For some time I have had a doubt concerning
someone
who held a qualified lulav on the
first day of
Sukkot, and then later on
comes upon a more
beautiful lulav - is he obligated to take the
nicer
lulav? For we may say that even though if,
in the
beginning, he had both of them
together then he
would have been obligated to take the nicer one, now
that he has already performed the mitzva
properly
with the first one - such that he no longer has
the
obligation of performing the mitzva - then in
what
way is the second
one to be considered an
enhancement or beautification, if
there is no
mitzva?"
The Beit Ha-Levi claims that question hinges on
the
debate among the Rishonim in the sugya in
Masekhet
Shabbat 133b concerning 'hiddur mitzva' in the case of
circumcision. The gemara brings the following beraita:
"The person who circumcises: so
long as he is
involved with the circumcision he should cut
again
(if there are some
remaining shreds of the
foreskin), whether [to
remove] shreds that
invalidate the circumcision [if
they are not
removed] or for shreds that do not
invalidate it.
After he has finished (the act of circumcision),
he
should cut again for
remaining shreds that
invalidate the circumcision, but for those that
do
not invalidate it, he should not cut again."
The Rishonim are divided as to how the beraita is to be
understood. The Tur (Y.D. 264) argues that this entire
halakha was stated only with regard to Shabbat, for since
the mohel has fihis work, and has removed the critical
pieces of the foreskin, he may not desecrate
Shabbat
again in order to remove remaining pieces which are not
critical (i.e., their presence does not invalidate the
circumcision). But during the week, clearly he should
circumcise again even after he has already finished, even
if the shreds that remain do not
invalidate the
circumcision, because of the principle of 'hiddur mitzva'
- "this is my God and I shall glorify Him."
The Rambam (Hilkhot Mila 2, par. 4,6), by
contrast,
applies this halakha not only to Shabbat, but generally,
as well. He maintains that even during the week one does
not go back to complete the circumcision after he has
stopped.
The Beit Ha-Levi claims that this debate hinges
on
the aforementioned question concerning 'hiddur mitzva.'
According to the Rambam, the principle of 'hiddur mitzva'
applies only at the time of the actual performance of the
mitzva; once the action is completed, the concept
of
'hiddur' will no longer apply. Therefore, even on
a
weekday there is no significance to the act the second
time. But the Tur argues that even after the completion
of the mitzva it is possible to beautify it further, so
long as the time frame for the mitzva has not passed. In
the case of circumcision, the mitzva is fulfilled for the
entire duration of the person's life. Therefore, to this
view, on a weekday the mohel must afterwards cut away
even those shreds that do
not invalidate the
circumcision.
If so, then the Rivash's
question against the
Ra'avad - that "mitzva bo yoter mi-beshlucho"
applies
only le-khatechila but not after the fact - would hinge
on this debate among the Rishonim. We contend that the
Ra'avad follows the line of the Tur, maintaining that
'hiddur mitzva' applies even after the act of performing
the mitzva is completed.
However, even the Tur says this
only concerning
circumcision, a mitzva which - as noted - is fulfilled
continuously throughout one's life, and is not a one-time
mitzva. It thus does not resemble kiddushin, a mitzva
that is fulfilled through a one-time act of betrothal.
But this relates to the Rivash's second question on the
Ra'avad - the significance of the act of giving once the
woman is already betrothed.
In response to this question it would appear that in
the opinion of the Ra'avad, the act of kiddushin
is
actually not a one-time act, but rather represents the
relationship of dependence that lasts from the act of
betrothal until the marriage (clearly, even according to
the Ra'avad, after the woman is fully married there is no
significance to the performance of kiddushin), similarly
to circumcision, in the opinion of the Tur. Proof for
this argument is to be found in the words of the Meiri on
our sugyah, quoting in the name of "some of the Geonim"
an opinion that the agent does not recite a blessing over
the kiddushin: "Even though an agent for the purposes of
the mitzva of 'teruma' recites the blessing, for
the
mitzva has been completed by him, in
the case of
kiddushin the mitzva is not complete until they enter
under the huppah, and only at that time should he (the
groom) recite the blessing, for the kiddushin as well,
since the chupa is a remnant of the mitzva."
Further support for this approach is to be found in the
Hagahot on Sefer HaTashbetz, siman 450 (quoted by the
Beit Yosef here in siman 35):
"If the original kiddushin was carried out
in the
absence of a minyan, he may betroth her again at the
time of the marriage in order to be able to
recite
the blessing of the betrothal before a minyan."
This halakha, too, can only be understood if we regard
the process of betrothal as lasting until the time of the
marriage.
We may therefore summarize as follows: according
to
the Ra'avad, the principle that "the mitzva is greater if
he performs it himself rather than through an agent": is
not only abstract, in the sense that "he
receives a
greater reward," but rather is included within the scope
of the principle of 'hiddur mitzva' - performance of the
mitzva in the best possible way.
The practical
ramification of this is that the groom should betroth the
woman himself personally at the time of the marriage, if
she was previously betrothed to him through an agent, in
accordance with the perception that the act of kiddushin
is actually a process that lasts until the chupa.
Sources for Shiur #2
1. Kiddushin 41a "shlichut minalan ... benei brit."
2. Ketubot 74a "kol tnai ... lo havei tnai."
Tosafot
s.v. tnai till "limirmi bei tna-ah."
3. Mordechai Kiddushin 505, Ktzot 188:2.
4. Tosafot Gittin 66a s.v. kol, Ramban ibid ha ditnan.